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Abstract
This study sets out to examine one of the most important issues on trade and the 
environment, namely, the trade effects of domestic environmental policy. The central 
question addressed is whether stringent domestic environmental policies reduce the 
international competitiveness of environmentally sensitive industries.
This study is distinguished by two major innovations that go beyond the established 
literature: the examination of time-series evidence to explore the relationship between 
environmental regulations and trade patterns, and the introduction of technology 
factors, together with endowment factors, to explain the empirical evidence.
There are five steps in the development of the argument. I first provide time-series 
evidence on the trade effects of environmental policy using the trade-in-goods 
approach. This is to investigate whether export patterns of environmentally sensitive 
goods (ESGs) have undergone systematic changes in the last three decades. The time- 
series evidence suggests that the export patterns for ESGs did not undergo systematic 
change, despite the introduction of stringent environmental standards in most 
developed countries in the 1970s and 1980s.
Secondly, I provide time-series evidence on the trade effects of environmental policy 
using a different approach, namely the factor-content-of-trade approach. The 
environment in this approach is regarded as a factor of production. This approach 
indicates that the net export content of environmental factor services for the majority
vi
of the countries in the study did not experience systematic structural changes in the 
last three decades.
Thirdly, the time-series data are subjected to a multi-country econometric test using 
an extended gravity-equation framework. I test the following two hypotheses. The 
first is that more stringent environmental regulations lower total exports, and/or 
exports of ESGs, and/or exports of non-resource-based ESGs. The second is that new 
trade barriers emerge to offset the effects of more stringent environmental 
regulations. My findings reject both hypotheses. Overall, more stringent 
environmental regulations do not reduce total exports, exports of ESGs and exports of 
non-resource-based ESGs. There is no evidence to support the hypothesis that new 
trade barriers emerge to offset the effects of more stringent environmental 
regulations. Furthermore, higher import tariffs in trading partners are found to reduce 
significantly a reporter country’s export performance in total exports, ESGs and non­
resource-based ESGs. These results support the empirical time-series observations 
using both the trade-in-goods-approach and the factor-content-of-trade approach, and 
appear to reflect the extent to which increases in the stringency of environmental 
regulations are accompanied by technological innovation, which prevents the export 
performance of ESGs from deteriorating.
To explore the dynamic linkage between environmental regulation, technological 
innovation and economic growth theoretically, I set up an intertemporal dynamic 
general equilibrium model in which the more fundamental, dynamic determinant of 
economic growth is its capacity for technological innovation. The basic findings are 
that, (1) changes in the stringency of environmental regulations do not have long-run
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growth effects; and (2) technological innovation is an important determinant of a 
country’s long-run growth.
Fifthly and finally, I investigate the significance of the technology factor, as proposed 
both in the above empirical study and the theoretical model, in determining the 
international competitiveness of environmentally sensitive industries. A generalised 
GDP function, which incorporates both technology change and increasing returns to 
scale, is set up and a flexible translog function form is used to approximate this 
generalised GDP function. Seemingly unrelated regression estimation (SURE) 
techniques are used to estimate a system of sectoral share equations derived from the 
generalised GDP function. Environmental stringency is treated as a factor of 
production together with capital, labour, land, mineral, oil and coal endowments. The 
technology level is regarded as an important determinant of the sectoral share in 
production. The basic hypothesis is that the environmental factor is not a significant 
determinant of the international competitiveness of environmentally sensitive 
industries, while technology is.
The econometric results suggest that the own-technology effects are all positive, as 
suggested by theory, and are statistically significant at a 5 per cent level in most 
cases. However, the environmental stringency variable has only a negligible effect 
and is shown to be statistically insignificant in all sectors. This suggests that countries 
with less stringent environmental policy do not necessarily have a higher sectoral 
share of ESGs.
The emphasis of this study is that the trade effects of domestic environmental policy 
can be better understood if one allows for a dynamic Ricardian technology factor in
viii
the conventional Heckscher-Ohlin framework. Innovation and subsequent increases 
in relative labour productivity, together with factor endowments, are important factors 
in determining the relationship between environmental regulation and international 
competitiveness. This result should help refocus the debate on the relationship 
between environmental regulation and competitiveness in international trade.
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1 Trade Effects of Domestic Environmental Policy: the 
Issue
The origin of the issue
The second half of the twentieth century witnessed heightened concern and a 
vigorous debate on the interaction between trade and the environment at national, 
international and global levels. This is not surprising given that countries are 
becoming increasingly interdependent economically through international trade, that 
trade has been and continues to be an important channel for stimulating growth, and 
that people have more concern for their environment as income levels increase.
The intellectual history of trade and the environment has evolved in two waves 
(Levinson 1996). The first wave of research peaked in the late 1970s and seems to 
have been inspired by the introduction of stringent environmental regulations in 
developed countries from the early 1970s. The second wave occurred in the 1990s, 
mainly motivated by the debate over international trade agreements such as the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Uruguay Round of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The current debate involves significant 
issues of environmental protection, export competitiveness, industry migration and 
the use of environmental regulations such as non-tariff trade barriers including eco- 
labeling (Bhagwati and Hudec 1996; Dean 1992). Although the policy debates 
relating to NAFTA and GATT may have subsided, fundamental long-term issues of 
trade and the environment remain.
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There are three broad issues in the debate on trade and the environment: (a) How do 
domestic environmental policies affect trade? (b) How do trade policies affect the 
environment? (c) What is the relationship between international trade, environmental 
regulation and sustainable development? This thesis focuses on the first question.
Concerns about the effects of domestic environmental policies on trade have been 
expressed in the following ways. The first is the so-called ‘race to the bottom’ effect. 
Will trade with foreign countries with lower environmental standards force a 
domestic country to lower its own standards as a result of political pressures brought 
to bear on governments to ensure the survival of domestic industries? Will there be a 
tendency towards a ‘race to the bottom’ when trade among countries with different 
environmental standards is liberalised? This concern mainly emanates from countries 
with higher environmental standards.
The second concern is the so-called ‘pollution haven’ hypothesis (Walter and Ugelow 
1979; Walter 1982). If free trade occurs between countries with different 
environmental standards, will countries with lower environmental standards tend, 
over time, to develop a comparative advantage1 in environmentally sensitive 
industries with the result that ‘havens’ for the world’s dirty industries emerge?2 
(Cropper and Oates 1992). The flip side of this concern is the fear that capital, and 
associated jobs, will move out of countries with high standards, a tendency termed 
‘industry flight’.
'See Warr (1994) for an excellent discussion of the concepts of ‘comparative advantage’ and 
‘competitiveness’.
2Dirty industries here refer to environmentally sensitive industries. See Chapter 3 for a definition.
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The third concern centres on export competitiveness. This is the debate over whether 
increasingly stringent domestic environmental regulations will reduce the 
international competitiveness of environmentally sensitive industries. The ‘export 
competitiveness’ line receives considerable attention whenever countries are in the 
process of passing new pollution control measures. This is not just an anxiety 
expressed by developed countries where environmental regulations are assumed to be 
more stringent, but it is also an issue of importance in developing countries, and one 
that affects significantly the development strategies of developing countries.
Fourth, there are concerns about unfair trade, ‘eco-dumping’- and calls for ‘level 
playing fields’ and harmonisation of environmental standards across countries.3 4 Trade 
with countries with lower environmental standards is regarded as ‘unfair trade’ 
because of the absence of a ‘level playing field’. Such fears prompt calls for 
harmonisation of environmental standards across countries.
Fifth and finally, there are concerns expressed by developing countries, about a ‘new 
protectionism’ that uses trade measures such as import bans to achieve environmental 
goals,5 and uses environmental measures such as eco-labeling to achieve economic 
goals.6 Under this scenario, developing countries seeking to gain access to developed 
countries’ markets view higher product or process standards, countervailing duties, or
3See Chapter 7 for details.
4US Senator Boren, for example, introduced legislation in the US Congress to countervail the ‘social 
dumping’ allegedly resulting from lower standards abroad. He put such proposals forward on the 
grounds that: ‘We can no longer stand idly by while some US manufacturers ... spend as much as 250 
per cent more on environmental controls as a percentage of gross domestic product than do other 
countries. I see the unfair advantage enjoyed by other nations exploiting the environment and public 
health for economic gain when I look at many industries.’ (Debate on the International Pollution 
Deterrence Act of 1991, statement of Senator David L. Boren, Senator Finance Committee, 25 October 
1991, cited from Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1996).
5The US ban on imports of Mexican tuna caught using purse seine nets, which also kill dolphins, 
stands out as a case in point. Two GATT dispute resolution determinations concluded that the US 
measure violated trade rules. For details, see Esty (1994).
6Verbruggen, Kuik and Bennis (1995) note that ‘Eco-labeling is, in fact, a form of product 
differentiation’.
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import restrictions on goods and services produced in countries with lower 
environmental standards as a new form of protectionism.
At the heart of all these concerns is the impact of environmental standards on 
industrial competitiveness. If the impact of environmental standards on industrial 
competitiveness is negligible, there is no need to fear a ‘race to the bottom’. If the 
impact of environmental standards on industrial competitiveness is trivial, ‘dirty 
industries’ will not migrate to locations with lower environmental standards and the 
‘pollution haven’ hypothesis would be proved to be groundless. If the impact of 
environmental standards on industrial competitiveness is negligible, there would be 
no basis for arguments about ‘level playing fields’ and calls for harmonisation of 
international environmental standards.
Here lies the central issue of this study. Do stringent domestic environmental policies 
reduce the international competitiveness of environmentally sensitive industries?
Analytical framework
To identify an appropriate framework for this study, I take the recent debate between 
Porter and van der Linde (1995) and Palmer, Oates and Portney (1995) over the 
environment-competitiveness relationship as the starting point.
Porter and van der Linde (1995: 97) point out that the relationship between 
environmental regulations and international competitiveness has ‘normally been 
thought of as involving a trade-off between social benefits and private costs’. ‘One 
side pushes for tougher standards; the other side tries to beat the standards back.’
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They argue that this view of the environment-competitiveness relationship ‘has been 
framed incorrectly’. They propose that the environment-competitiveness relationship 
can be seen as ‘complementary’ rather than ‘mutually exclusive’ since ‘properly 
designed environmental standards can trigger innovation that may partially or more 
than fully offset the costs of complying with them’.
However, Palmer, Oates and Porterny (1995) criticise this view and argue that there is 
always a trade-off between environmental regulations and international 
competitiveness. According to their simple, static model, if a firm has been operating 
at a certain abatement level without engaging in R&D, this implies that the cost of the 
R&D effort to reduce the marginal abatement cost to the required level exceeds the 
gains to the firm. In their model of innovation in abatement technology, an increase in 
the stringency of environmental regulations unambiguously disadvantages the 
polluting firm.
I now employ a simple unified model in which to evaluate the debate and as a basis 
for the subsequent work.
Suppose that the objective function of government is to maximise total net benefit, 
that is, the environmentally beneficial effects of regulation to society (social benefit), 
minus the cost to industry plus the discounted gain of innovation effects in the 
following periods arising from regulation. Notice in this formulation, there is not only 
a current gain but also an additional innovation effect that benefits the future. This is 
captured in the following intertemporal optimisation problem.
5
MaxI {Bt (et) -  [C, (et) -  Rt (et)]}? p,dt with respect to et
t
where Bt (et ) and C, (et ) are the social benefits and private costs arising from the 
introduction of et which denotes the stringency of environmental policy. R,(et )can 
be regarded as the benefits from innovation as a result of R&D in abatement 
technology and -  Rt(et)) is the net cost incurred to the firm.
The traditional approach compares the beneficial effects of regulation, Bt{et) and the 
costs that must be borne to secure these benefits, Ct(et) . Rt{et) is zero in this case
since ‘in this static world, where firms have already made their cost-minimizing 
choices, environmental regulation inevitably raises costs and will tend to reduce the 
market share of domestic companies on global markets’ (Porter and van der Linde 
1995: 97). According to Porter and van der Linde’s (1995: 98) new paradigm, 
‘properly designed environmental standards can trigger innovation that may partially 
or more than fully offset the costs of complying with them’. That is, R,(e,) is not
zero. Porter and van der Linde’s idea amounts to assuming dRt(et)/det > 0. There is
an additional gain to the regulation in the form of innovation effects. In Porter and 
van der Linde’s paper, environmental regulation cost and firm’s profit is not a one-to- 
one trade-off (this is what ‘partially or more than fully offset’ means). This feature is 
essential to an understanding of the divide between Porter and van der Linde’s 
argument and that of Palmer, Oates and Porterny (1995). The linkage between 
regulation and innovation as identified by Porter and van der Linde, however, is 
varied.
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As demonstrated in Palmer, Oates and Porterny’s (1995: 125) paper, even in a 
dynamic model, where firms minimise
Min\(Cl(e,)-R,(e,))e-p'dt
t
with respect to et
‘if that technology wasn’t worth investing in before, its benefits won’t be enough to 
raise the company’s profits after the environmental standards are raised, either’. Their 
model suggests that increasing the stringency of incentive-based environmental 
regulations must result in reduced profits for the firm. This is not, however, 
equivalent to the following condition, dRt{et)ldet = 0. We can see clearly that even
Palmer, Oates and Porterny (1995) admit that there exists a possibility that 
environmental regulation cost maybe partly offset by the benefits from adopting the 
new technology. What they emphasis is that this environmental regulation cost cannot 
be fully offset by the benefits from adopting the new technology so that 
environmental regulations must result in reduced profits for the firm. They also 
identify two possibilities that may give rise to an increase in profits following the 
imposition of tighter standards. One is strategic behaviour between firms and the 
other is the existence of opportunities for profitable innovation in the production of 
the firm’s output that for some reason have been overlooked. Again, these two 
possibilities are proved to be groundless in their paper.
The divide between Porter and van der Linde (1995) and Palmer, Oates and Portney 
(1995) over the environment-competitiveness relationship is now clear. They both 
share the idea that there exists a possibility that environmental regulation cost maybe 
partly offset by the benefits from adopting the new technology (but it seems not to be
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acknowledged by Palmer, Oates and Portney). They differ on the question of whether 
this environmental regulation cost can be fully or more than fully offset by the 
benefits from adopting the new technology. However, The extent of this increase in 
benefits is a matter for empirical research. Lanjouw and Mody (1993) and Jaffe and 
Palmer (1997) provide broad empirical support for the argument that increases in 
environmental regulations will stimulate innovation.7 8A recent study by Berman and 
Bui (1998) using plant level data also suggests that environmental regulations are 
productivity-enhancing.
The above discussion is valid in the context of a closed economy. What are the 
implications for the environment-competitiveness relationship if the economy opens 
up to trade? Changes in domestic environmental policies can be thought of as changes 
in environmental factor endowments. Almost all the existing studies, for example 
Siebert (1977; 1987), Pethig (1976), McGuire (1982) and Baumöl and Oates (1988), 
apply the conventional Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek (H-O-V) theorem to analyse the 
theoretical impact of domestic environmental policies on trade flows. The standard 
result, as summarised in Siebert (1987), is that free trade will lead to a situation where 
the country with less stringent environmental regulations (higher environment factor 
endowment) will specialise in the production of pollution-intensive goods.
The limitations of this application of the H-O-V theorem lies in the fact that it 
explains little about the trade effects of domestic environmental policy. Existing 
empirical work consistently rejects the hypothesis that domestic environmental policy
o
has a significant impact on trade. This is not surprising given the fact that,
7 See Chapter 2 for further discussion.
8 As surveyed by Dean (1992), ‘there is little evidence of any significant impact of ECC (Environment 
Control Cost) on the pattern of trade’.
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‘[empirically, the H-O-V theorem has been repeatedly rejected over the years and 
rightfully so: it performs horribly. Factor endowments correctly predict the direction 
of factor service trade about 50 per cent of the time, a success rate that is matched by 
a coin toss’ (Trefler 1995: 1029). And this framework does not incorporate the 
theoretical challenge of ‘new trade theory’ on the H-O-V theorem which claims that 
it is unable to explain the prevalence of intra-industry trade.
Recent theoretical work by Davis (1995) introduces elements of Ricardian trade 
theory within the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) framework and successfully provides a 
unified account of intra-industry and inter-industry trade. Relative labour 
productivity, in the spirit of the Ricardian model, when combined with factor 
endowments, improves the explanations of changing trade patterns significantly, as 
Harrigan (1997) shows.9
Previous work provides some insights,10 but is limited because it fails to take into 
account the long-term gains from R&D and innovation arising from stringent 
environmental regulation. In contrast, the framework I adopt in this study allows for 
consideration of both static endowment effects (changes in environmental standards) 
and technological innovation effects in determining growth and trade patterns. This 
extension is important, both in theoretical modelling and in empirical investigation, 
because it provides interesting insights into the underlying relationship between 
environmental regulation and industrial competitiveness. It is also consistent with 
recent theoretical developments, for example as demonstrated by Davis (1995).
9See Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of this literature and Chapter 6 for empirical measurement.
l0For a detailed discussion of the literature, see Chapter 2.
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Based on the above perspective, this study focuses on two main themes: time-series 
evidence and technological factors. A cross-sectional study is unsatisfactory because 
it may not be able to capture the dynamic effects of domestic environmental policy, 
especially the innovation and productivity effect R,(et). Time-series evidence,
therefore, is one of the major features of the study. Since there are long-term gains 
from R&D and innovation, the subsequent increase in productivity has to be taken 
into account. Innovation and subsequent increases in relative labour productivity, 
together with factor endowments, are important factors in determining the 
environment-competitiveness relationship.
Structure of the study and major findings
The study is structured in the following way.
Chapter 2 examines the existing literature in detail, emphasising the nature of the 
debate, major findings and shortcomings. The directions and scope of the study are 
identified on the basis of this review.
In Chapter 3, I examine whether stringent environmental standards reduce the 
international competitiveness of environmentally sensitive industries using a 
comprehensive dataset of trade flows of environmentally sensitive goods (ESGs) 
disaggregated at the four-digit level of the Standard International Trade 
Classification. The data relate to the period from 1965 to 1995 and cover 34 
countries, which accounted for nearly 80 per cent of world exports of ESGs in 1995. 
The important empirical finding is that the export performance of ESGs for most 
countries examined remained unchanged between the 1960s and 1990s despite the
10
introduction of stringent environmental standards in most developed countries in the 
1970s and 1980s. The claim that higher environmental standards reduce the 
international competitiveness of ESGs cannot be justified in the light of the available 
data.
In a complementary discussion of the trade-in-goods approach adopted in Chapter 3, 
Chapter 4 takes a different perspective by investigating the changing patterns of trade 
in embodied environmental factor services, a factor-content-of-trade approach. In this 
chapter, the environment is treated as a factor of production. I look at trade in 
embodied environmental factor services across more than 70 ISIC sectors for 29 
countries in the period 1970-96. The result indicates that the net export content of 
environmental factor services for the majority of the countries in the study does not 
experience systematic structural change over the last 26 years, despite the 
introduction of stringent environmental regulations in most of the developed countries 
in the 1970s and 1980s. This observation is generally consistent with the observations 
in Chapter 3, using a trade-in-goods approach.
The above empirical time-series evidence is then subjected to a multi-country 
econometric test using an extended gravity-equation framework in Chapter 5. I test 
the following two hypotheses. The first is that more stringent environmental 
regulations lower total exports, and/or exports of ESGs, and/or exports of non­
resource-based ESGs. The second is that new trade barriers emerge to offset the 
effects of more stringent environmental regulations. My findings reject the above two 
hypotheses. Overall, more stringent environmental regulations do not reduce total 
exports, exports of ESGs and exports of non-resource-based ESGs. There is no 
evidence to support the hypothesis that new trade barriers emerge to offset the effects
1 1
of more stringent environmental regulations. Furthermore, higher import tariffs in 
trading partners are found to reduce significantly a reporter country’s export 
performance in total exports, ESGs and non-resource-based ESGs exports. These 
results support the empirical time-series observations using both the trade-in-goods- 
approach and the factor-content-of-trade approach, and may reflect the extent to 
which increases in the stringency of environmental regulations are accompanied by 
technological innovation so that export performance of ESGs does not deteriorate.
Chapter 6 provides a formal endogenous growth model to capture the effects of 
technological innovation on a country’s growth. A simple intertemporal optimisation 
problem is set up to address the issue of the effects of environmental policy on the 
output of environmentally sensitive goods (ESGs) and the growth rate of the 
economy. The basic findings are that (1) changes in the stringency of environmental 
regulations do not have long-run growth effects; and (2) technological innovation is 
an important determinant of a country’s long-run growth.
Chapter 7 examines econometrically the significance of environmental policy for 
trade. A generalised GNP function, which incorporates both technology changes and 
increasing returns to scale, is set up and a flexible translog function form is used to 
approximate this generalised GNP function. Seemingly unrelated regression 
estimation (SURE) techniques are employed to estimate a system of sectoral share 
equations derived from the generalised GNP function. Environmental stringency is 
treated as a factor of production together with capital, labour, land, mineral, oil and 
coal endowments. The level of technology is regarded as an important determinant of 
the sectoral share in production. The basic hypothesis is that while the environmental 
factor is not a significant determinant of the international competitiveness of
12
environmentally sensitive industries, technology is. The result supports this 
hypothesis and suggests that so-called eco-dumping is not an effective strategy in this 
context.
The final chapter summarises the major findings and policy implications of the study. 
Directions for future research are also identified.
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2 International Trade, Environmental Regulation and 
the Competitiveness Debate: the Literature
Empirical evidence
Theory is subject to empirical test. It is therefore worthwhile to consider the empirical 
evidence before turning to theoretical models. This section considers the empirical 
evidence in the relationship between environmental policies and international trade1.
Changes in the stringency of environmental policies may have implications not only 
for the domestic economy, but also for international trade. The impact of domestic 
environmental policy on international trade is generally traced in one of the following 
two ways:2 (1) examining directly the effects of changing abatement costs on trade 
flows of ESGs across countries over time; and (2) investigating the changing trade 
patterns of ESGs.
Studies examining directly the effects of changing abatement costs on trade flows of 
ESGs include Walter (1973), Robison (1988), Kalt (1988), Leonard (1988), Tobey 
(1990), Grossman and Krueger (1993), Van Beers and van den Bergh (1997), among 
others. Low and Yeats (1992) and Sorsa (1994), on the other hand, examine the 
changing trade pattern of ESGs directly.
Walter3 (1973) looks into the pollution content of US trade using input-output
'For a discussion on changing environmental control expenditures, see Jaffe et al (1995).
2Dean (1992) and Levinson (1996) also survey the empirical evidence.
3See Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of Walter (1973) and Robison’s (1988) papers.
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analysis. In that study, direct and overall environmental control charges (including 
those from intermediate goods) for 83 goods and services categories contained in the 
1966 US input-output table are calculated. The pollution content of US exports is 
found to be 1.75 per cent of total exports while the pollution content of US imports is 
found to be 1.52 per cent of total imports. Walter considers this difference to be 
insignificant, and concludes that ESGs are trade-neutral at best and marginally biased 
against US export industries at worst.
Robison (1988) also investigates trade in embodied environmental factor services. He 
also looks into the pollution content of US trade in 1973, 1977 and 1982 using 1973 
and 1977 input-output tables. This discrete time-series result indicates that the ratio 
of the abatement content of US imports to US exports has risen from 1.151 in 1973, 
to 1.167 in 1977 and 1.389 in 1982. On the basis of this result, Robison concludes 
that there is some evidence that US pollution control programs have changed US 
comparative advantage such that more high-abatement-cost goods will be imported 
and more low-abatement-cost goods exported.
Using a conventional Heckscher-Ohlin framework at a disaggregated industry level 
in the United States, Kalt (1988) regresses net exports of the ith industry on that 
industry’s use of the national endowment of factors of production. These include: 
each industry’s use of capital services (K,), flows of research and development inputs 
to each industry (R&Dt), flows of human capital services to each industry (HK„), 
each industry’s claim to the flow of low-skilled labour services (UNSKILL/,), and 
expenditures on pollution abatement services by each industry (ABATE,).
NET, = / ( K„ R&Di, HK„ UNSKILL,, ABATE,)
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Kalt (1988) shows that domestic environmental regulation appears to have a negative 
effect on industries’ trade performance.
By contrast, Leonard (1988) found little evidence that pollution control measures 
have exerted a systematic effect on international trade and investment by conducting 
a large case study of trade and foreign investment flows for several key industries and 
countries.
Tobey (1990) sets up a Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek (H-O-V) multi-factor, multi- 
commodity model. Using 1975 data for 23 countries, Tobey regresses the net exports 
of five different industries that are classified as pollution intensive on the stocks of 
productive factors, including the environment. The environment variable Tobey uses 
is the stringency of environmental regulations, varying from 1 to 7, acting as the 
proxy for the stock of the environment. A country with more stringent regulations is 
assumed to have a lower environment stock than other countries. He found no 
evidence that the introduction of environmental control measures has caused trade 
patterns to deviate from the H-O-V predictions.
Grossman and Krueger (1993) investigate empirically the environmental impacts of 
NAFTA. They regress 1987 US imports from Mexico (relative to total US shipments) 
in 135 industries on factor shares which reflect the factor intensity of each industry. 
Environmental intensity is approximated by the ratio of pollution abatement costs to 
total value added in that US industry. Grossman and Krueger find that the traditional 
determinants of trade and investment patterns are significant, but that the alleged
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competitive advantages created by lax pollution controls in Mexico play no 
substantial role in motivating trade and investment flows.
A recent study by Van Beers and van den Bergh (1997) applies a gravity model to 
examine the impact of relatively strict environmental regulations on a country’s 
exports and imports. Their study differs from the conventional H-O-V framework in 
that bilateral trade flows rather than aggregate trade flows are examined. They argue 
that a disadvantage of the H-O-V approach, which is based on multilateral trade 
flows, is that the effects of differences in strict environmental regulations on trade 
flows between countries may cancel out as multilateral trade is an aggregate of 
bilateral trade flows. Their cross-sectional study for 1992 shows that the broadly 
defined environmental stringency variable does not exert significant effects on 
bilateral trade flows while the narrow one (more directly linked to the Polluter Pays 
Principle) reveals a significant negative impact on exports. In the case of trade flows 
of pollution-intensive goods used as an independent variable, no effect of a relatively 
stringent environmental policy on exports of pollution intensive goods is found. They 
distinguish between resource-based and non-resource-based (or footloose) bilateral 
trade flows and find that stringent environmental policy does have a significant 
negative impact on non-resource-based exports. Although their work provides some 
interesting insights, there are two major limitations. Since their sample consists of 
(21) OECD countries only, there is an obvious sample selection bias problem, the 
reason simply being that trade effects of domestic environmental policy are more a 
North-South problem than a North-North problem4. A technical deficiency relating 
to their data is that macro fluctuation is not properly taken into account. As will be 
discussed in more detailed in Chapter 4, this might bias the results substantially.
4 See Page 2 to 3 for detailed discussions.
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In general, one shortcoming of the existing literature is that the changing pattern of 
export performance of ESGs over time is seldom explored. This leads to an 
incomplete picture of the impact of environmental standards on industrial 
competitiveness. Low and Yeats (1992) first explored this issue by analysing sectoral 
changes that occurred in developed and developing countries’ actual trade and 
revealed comparative advantage in heavily polluting industries. Their result indicates 
that developing countries gained a comparative advantage in pollution-intensive 
products at a greater rate than developed countries. The limitation of this study is that 
it focuses on one particular industry (iron and steel pipes and tubes, SITC 678) and, 
when considering the ESG groups, it only looks at the overall performance of two 
groups of countries, namely developed countries and developing countries. The study 
also only looks at the beginning (late 1960s) and end years (late 1980s). All this 
might result in an incomplete picture of the changing pattern of export performance 
of ESGs over time. Sorsa (1994) also examines this issue but at a more aggregated 
level.
As Levinson (1996: 450) concludes, ‘[t]he literature surveyed is almost unanimous in 
its conclusion that environmental regulations have not affected inter-jurisdictional 
trade or the location decisions of manufacturers. Where studies have found 
statistically significant effects of these regulations, the effects are always quite small.’
Turning now to the empirical evidence on the dynamic effects of environmental 
regulations, there are two studies that look explicitly at the relationship between 
stringency of environmental regulation and development of new technology. Lanjouw 
and Mody (1993) analyse the impact of stringent environmental regulations on the 
patenting of environmental technologies, using international data on expenditure on
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compliance with environmental regulation and environmental patents. Their results
indicate that increases in environmental compliance costs lead to increases in the 
patenting of new environmental technologies, after a one- to two-year lag.
Jaffe and Palmer (1997) analyse the same issue in an econometric study using 
pollution control expenditure (PACE) data and value-added data by industry over 
time (1977-91) in the United States available from the Census Bureau’s Pollution 
Abatement Costs and Expenditure Survey, and R&D data from the National Science 
Foundation. They estimate a highly reduced-form equation,
Log (R&D) =f(\og(value added), log (government R&D), log (PACE))
Although they find no statistically significant relationships between regulatory 
compliance expenditures and patenting activity, they do find that there exists a 
significant positive relationship between regulatory compliance expenditures and 
R&D expenditures by the regulated industry, which is broadly consistent with the 
findings of Lanjouw and Mody (1993).
A study by Berman and Bui (1998), using plant level data between 1979 and 1992, 
examines the effect of air quality regulation on the productivity of some of the most 
heavily regulated manufacturing plants in the United States, the oil refineries of the 
Los Angeles Air Basin. Their major finding includes the observation that despite the 
high costs associated with the local regulations, productivity in the Los Angeles Air 
Basin refineries rose sharply during the 1987-92 period, a period of decreased 
refinery productivity in other regions. They conclude that abatement may be 
productive.These findings suggest that the relationship between environmental
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regulation and competitiveness is not a zero-sum game. This relationship should be 
examined in a dynamic context where R&D and innovation play important roles. The 
theory and empirics of this issue will be examined further in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.
The main conclusion of more than 20 years of these types of empirical study seems to 
be that the trade effect of environmental regulations is insignificant. A number of 
theoretical models have been developed in an attempt to explain the link between 
environmental regulations and trade. However, to date, the theory has provided a 
rather inadequate explanation of the empirical evidence. This section is devoted to a 
survey of this literature with particular emphasis on the methodological differences of 
three different approaches.
Partial equilibrium approach: static, without innovation
The salient feature of the partial equilibrium model is that it analyses only one single, 
isolated market without taking into account the response from other markets. Most 
partial equilibrium models also introduce externality theory into the discussion of 
interactions between trade and the environment. This differs from most general 
equilibrium models which do not discuss externalities, instead taking environmental 
policy as an exogenous variable. One advantage of this modelling strategy is that the 
welfare effect of environmental and trade policies can easily be analysed. Although 
most partial equilibrium models on trade and environment focus on the effects on 
environment of trade and/or environmental policy changes, the trade effects of 
environmental policy can only be drawn indirectly.
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Anderson (1992) provides a comprehensive comparative-static analysis of the welfare 
and environment effects of trade liberalisation. Consider a small economy producing 
a pollution-intensive good which results in a production externality. The result of the 
externality is to drive a wedge between the private and the social costs of production, 
as reflected in Figure 2.1 by S and S', respectively. The marginal private benefit from 
consuming is represented by the D curve. In the absence of either a pollution tax or 
international trade, OQ would be the equilibrium level of production, yielding net 
social welfare equal to the difference between the areas abe and ade.
Figure 2.1 Effects of opening up a small economy to trade in a product whose 
production is pollutive: the case of exportables
Price / /  S'
Quantity
Source: Anderson (1992: 28).
If OPj were the international price, the country would become a net exporter of CXQX 
units of the good under free trade. Net social welfare would be abik - akm, so the 
welfare effect of trade liberalisation relative to autarky is eik - dekm, which may be
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positive or negative depending on the relative magnitude of the gains from trade (eik) 
in the absence of externalities associated with the extra production versus the loss 
from increased the (uncharged) cost of pollution by producing an additional QQX 
units of this product (<dekm). This leads to the proposition that liberalising trade in this 
good whose production is pollutive may or may not improve the welfare in this small 
economy in the absence of a pollution tax if, following the policy change, the country 
exports this good (Anderson 1992: 27).3
I now make use of this simple partial equilibrium device to investigate the trade 
effects of domestic environmental policy changes. Again, suppose in the absence of a 
pollution tax, the marginal private cost of producing a good that is pollutive and the 
marginal private benefits can be represented by the S and D curves in Figure 2.2, 
respectively, OQ is the autarky equilibrium level of production in the absence of a 
pollution tax. If OPi is the prevailing international price, this country will export 
CxQx units of this good under free trade. Now, the country is concerned with the 
externalities arising from the production of the good that is pollutive and imposes an 
ad valorum pollution tax on the good. This can be represented by a shift of the supply 
curve from S to S', resulting in a decrease in the country’s exports of this pollution­
intensive good to CxQx' • Therefore, the most simple partial equilibrium model 
predicts that an increase in the stringency of domestic environmental policy reduces 
the international competitiveness of ESGs. This is exactly the underlying mechanism 
that people are concerned about in the environment-competitiveness relationship. 
However, two points should be kept in mind when drawing real-world implications 
from the above analysis. One is that this is a partial equilibrium model in that it only
^Anderson (1992) also analyses the case of imports and other comparative-static effects. See Anderson 
(1992) for details.
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takes account of one single, isolated market. The other is that it is static in nature and
it is therefore subject to Porter and van der Linde’s (1995) criticism.
Figure 2.2 Trade effects of domestic environmental policy changes: the case of 
exportables
Q Q
Quantity
Source: Author’s drawing on the basis of Anderson (1992: 28).
Innovation in a partial equilibrium model
The above comparative static partial equilibrium analysis sheds considerable light on 
the welfare effects of trade and/or environmental policy and provides some insights 
into the trade effects of domestic environmental policy. Notwithstanding, it is less 
helpful in understanding the environment-competitiveness debate, notably the ‘new 
paradigm’ suggested by Porter and van der Linde (1995) in which innovation plays a 
crucial role. According to Porter and van der Linde (1995: 97-98), ‘[t]he new 
paradim of international competitiveness is a dynamic one, based on innovation’.
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In order to capture the effect of innovation, Palmer, Oates and Portney (1995), 
drawing on some of the earlier literature on innovation in abatement technology, 
present a model in which incentive-based environmental regulation results in reduced 
profits for the regulated firm. The assumptions include: (1) polluting firms are profit 
maximisers; (2) markets are perfectly competitive; (3) each firm takes competitors’ 
outputs and R&D expenditures as given and also takes any regulations as 
exogenously determined (which implies there is no strategic interaction between 
firms, or between the polluting firm and the regulator).
Figure 2.3 Incentive to innovate under an emission fee
Dollars
MAC
MAC
Abatement Level
Source: Palmer, Oates and Portney (1995: 123).
Consider Figure 2.3 where the horizontal axis denotes the firm’s abatement level and 
the vertical axis measures dollar values so that the marginal abatement cost (MAC)
24
without innovation and the marginal abatement cost under innovation (MAC*) can be 
compared on the same dollar basis. The upward slope of the curve implies an 
increasing marginal cost, both for MAC and MAC*. Suppose that the initial effluent 
charge is at P and under this regime the polluting firm chooses its profit-maximising 
level of abatement activity A, corresponding to the point B, where marginal 
abatement cost equals the effluent charge. If this is observed, this implies that the cost 
of the R&D effort to reduce MAC to MAC* must exceed the gains to the firm under 
the above assumptions. Therefore the outcome B (without R&D) must produce more 
profits for the firm than does the attainable point C under which R&D is undertaken. 
The gain to the firm from R&D effort is given by the area OCB, which can be further 
decomposed into two areas: (1) the triangle OBF indicating cost reduction for the 
earlier level of abatement activity due to the new technology and (2) the triangle BCF 
which comes from a higher abatement level at lower abatement cost due to new 
technology. Since the firm has not chosen this option under this regulation scheme, it 
must be that the cost of the R&D efforts that would move the firm from MAC to 
MAC* exceeds the profits that would be gained, OCB.
Now, suppose a new, more stringent incentive-based environmental regulation is 
introduced, taking the form of an increase in the effluent fee to P'. The question of 
interest is whether the firm will respond to the higher effluent charge by sticking with 
the old technology, ending up at H, or by investing in the new one, ending up at D. If 
technology is constant so that MAC* remains the same, it is easy to show that profits 
at choice D (given the higher effluent charge) are less than profits at point C (given 
the lower previous effluent charge) along the MAC* frontier. Since profits are lower 
at C than at B, as observed under the old regulation regime, profits at D must be less
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than at B. This leads to the conclusion that the higher effluent charge reduces profits 
for the firm, even if it adopts new technology.
Although this model provides an interesting starting point for the environment- 
competitiveness debate, it has several limitations. First, it is static in nature. There is 
no underlying behavioural function describing the dynamic R&D innovation process. 
Second, the marginal abatement cost function under the new technology, MAC*, is a 
function of abatement level only. This is a very restrictive assumption since changes 
of regulation regime may imply changes in relative input prices and MAC* should be 
a function of this changing prices if the polluting firm is a profit maximiser. Third, it 
is partial in nature and therefore may not be able to capture the general equilibrium 
effects of changes of domestic environmental policies6. This leads us to a discussion 
of general equilibrium models.
General equilibrium models (I): the Heckscher-Ohlin approach
The literature on the trade effects of domestic environmental policy applying a 
general equilibrium approach generally develops along the lines of the 
Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model.
Since the 1970s most of the studies have analysed the theoretical impact of domestic 
environmental policy on trade patterns and predict that a country will export 
environmentally sensitive goods if it has less stringent environmental regulations and 
hence a relatively abundant environmental factor service. See, for example, Siebert, 
Eichberger, Gronych and Pethig (1980), Siebert (1977, 1987), Pethig (1976), Mcguire
6Note that the last effect includes the change in prices.
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(1982), and Baumol and Oates (1988). With recent papers by Scott and Taylor (1994) 
using a demand and supply general equilibrium device and Chichilnisky (1994) 
looking at North-South trade from the perspective of property rights, their results are 
also mainly in the spirit of the H -0  theorem.
Falvey (1994) summarises the following five standard assumptions of the H -0  model 
that trade theorists have traditionally chosen to work with.
1) Dimensionality. There are two countries, n products and m factors of 
production. Each country is endowed with a fixed stock of each of the 
factors.
2) Mobility. Factors can move without cost among industries within a 
country, but are completely immobile internationally.
3) Competition. All agents are price takers in product and factor markets. 
Producers maximise profits and factor returns adjust to ensure full 
employment of all factors.
4) Technology. Production functions for all products exhibit constant returns 
to scale and diminishing marginal products of factors. Each country has 
the same productive technology for each good. There are no factor 
intensity reversals.
5) Tastes. Consumers everywhere have identical homothetic utility functions.
For simplicity, assume that there are two groups of commodities, pollution-intensive 
goods (XD) and non-pollution-intensive goods (Xc); there are two inputs, 
environment (E) and labour (L), no trans-border pollution and consumption pollution; 
and that the costs of environmental damage are optimally internalised via emission 
charges (t). Under these assumptions, the standard results of the H-O theorem in the
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context of trade and environment can be derived. They can be stated as follows. 
Under free trade, a country will export pollution-intensive goods (X d) if it has a 
relatively abundant environmental factor service (E) and will import non-pollution­
intensive goods (Xc), as shown in Figure 2.4.
Figure 2.4 Trade triangle 
Xc
Source: Author’s drawing.
Here relative factor abundance is defined in terms of the relative quantities of the 
factors in the two countries’ endowments. The logic underlying this result is 
straightforward. Identical technologies and factor prices imply that identical factor 
proportions are used in each industry across countries. To achieve full employment, 
the relatively environmentally-abundant country will have to employ relatively more 
of its resources in the pollution-intensive sector. If products are consumed in the same 
proportions in each country, this implies that pollution-intensive goods will be 
exported.
Pethig (1976) derived several versions of the theorem of comparative advantage with 
respect to environmental scarcity. For example, in his theorem 4 (p. 168), Pethig
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concludes that ‘a country exports and specializes in the production of the 
environment-intensive good, if its environmental control ... is less restrictive than the 
other country’.
Siebert (1987: 156), too, extends the H-O theorem to trade with pollution-intensive 
commodities and concludes that ‘the environmentally rich country will export the 
pollution-intensive commodity’.
Baumöl and Oates (1988: 265) summarise the trade effects of environmental policy in 
a somewhat different way. In their proposition five, ‘[a] country that fails to 
undertake an environmental protection program when other countries do so increases 
its comparative advantage (decreases its comparative disadvantage) in the production 
of items that damage its environment; in the absence of offsetting subsidies, this will 
encourage greater specialization in the production of these polluting outputs’.
Not surprisingly, the result that under free trade a country will export pollution­
intensive goods if it has a relatively abundant environmental factor service is to some 
extent similar to the result gained from the partial equilibrium theorem. The common 
theme behind both partial and general H-O theorems is that an increase in the 
stringency of environmental regulation will lead to a loss of competitiveness in ESGs. 
This result lends support to the concerns of those in the affected industries and has 
been a persistent concern to both poor and wealthy countries.
Copeland and Taylor (1995) provide a simple demand and supply general equilibrium 
model (a highly simplified version of Copeland and Taylor’s 1994 paper) that is 
useful when examining the literature. Although this is a synthesised analytical model,
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it is still in the spirit of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem.
Suppose that all pollution is generated by production, that pollution harms consumers 
but does not affect production possibilities, and that pollution has only localised 
effects. The supply of pollution is the amount of pollution a country is willing to 
allow and depends not only on individual preferences, but also on the political 
process that transforms preferences into policies, and on the institutional framework 
that determines the types of policy adopted. The agent’s indirect utility is given 
specifically by V(p, I, Z) = ln [I/h(p)] - ßZ, where Z is pollution, ß  is a positive 
constant, p is a goods price vector, I is income and h(p) is a price index. Income is 
determined by G(p, v, Z), where v is the endowment vector of primary factors and Z 
is the economy’s supply of the ‘input’ pollution. Utility maximisation implies that 
V ,* Iz + Vz = 0 (2.1)
where subscripts denote a partial derivative. Iz is simply the shadow price of pollution 
(the optimal pollution tax), denoted by r. Thus
r  = - Vz/V, (2.2)
From the specification of the indirect utility function, we can obtain
Vz = -/? and V, = I. (2.3)
Note that if labour is the only primary factor of production, income is simply 
I = wL + rZ. (2.4)
Substituting (2.3) into equation (2.2) and then combining (2.2) with (2.4) yields 
p = r/w=yßL/(l-yßZ) (2.5)
This is the inverse supply curve for pollution. It is upward sloping because consumers 
are willing to tolerate increased pollution if they are compensated with the income 
derived from higher pollution charges.
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The demand for pollution (as an intermediate input into goods production) can be 
written as a decreasing function of p under suitable assumptions on technology. This 
simple framework can then be extended to two countries (North and South) that differ 
only in their endowment of human capital (as mark-up, or effective, labour). If North 
has a greater level of human capital, then the demand for pollution in North, ND, is 
higher than in South (equation (2.5)) and the supply of pollution in North would be 
less than in South since North has a higher income. Under autarky, we can conclude 
that 
PN>PS
That is, under autarky, the relative optimal pollution tax would be higher in North 
than in South. This creates incentives to trade. Under free trade, this model predicts 
that South should export relatively dirty goods and import relatively clean goods.
Figure 2.5 Trade patterns in ESGs: a supply and demand analysis
Quantity of pollution
Source: Copeland and Taylor (1995).
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Chichilnisky (1994) looks at North-South trade from the perspective of property 
rights but the result is also essentially in the spirit of the H-O theorem. The model 
assumes that North and South are identical in regard to standard H-O assumptions 
except that North has the institutions to control externalities optimally, while South 
has no such institutions. Chichilnisky defines comparative advantage in such a 
manner that region S is said to have a comparative advantage in the production of 
environmentally intensive goods, when for each price of environmental resource Pe 
the supply of environmental resource relative to other factors in region S is larger 
than the corresponding supplies in region N. The ‘actual comparative advantage’ is 
defined as the point where comparative advantage is the result of two well-defined 
property right regimes (North and South) so that all the externalities have been 
internalised. The ‘apparent comparative advantage’ is the result of an ill-defined 
property right regime so that some externalities are not internalised. The model 
predicts that South, with ill-defined property rights, will export more 
environmentally-intensive goods than North, with its well-defined property rights, 
despite the fact that ‘actual comparative advantage’ and ‘apparent comparative 
advantage’ are distinguished in the model.
Although Chichilnisky argues that her definition of comparative advantage is 
different from classical ones since the endowments of factors are price-dependent, so 
at different prices the countries can exhibit different H-O advantages (Chichilnisky: 
858), the results are essentially in line with the predictions of the H-O theorem. 
Relaxing the assumption of fixed supply in the H-O framework has been an 
important focus of extensions of H-O theorem. As surveyed by Falvey (1994),
however, under the assumption of variable factor supplies, the trade pattern can be 
explained in terms of differences in factor ‘use’. The implications of variable factor
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supplies for the H -0  theorem depend crucially on the sign of the relevant factor 
supply elasticities. If these elasticities are positive, as in the case of Chichilnisky’s 
model, then the H-O theorem can simply be restated in terms of ‘relative abundant 
utilisation’. It is not surprising that the results from Chichilnisky’s model are 
essentially what the H-O theorem predicts. Once the institutional constraints are in 
place, the price of environmental resources is determined so the relative abundance of 
factor endowments is determined. Countries with ill-defined property rights for 
environmental resources tend to have relative abundant utilisation of environmental 
resources and will export more environmentally-intensive goods.
Chichilnisky’s model can be analysed using Copeland and Taylor’s (1995) supply 
and demand framework. Institutional failure in South leads to a perfectly elastic 
supply curve at ps = 0 (Figure 2.5). North has a supply curve SN with an autarky price 
pN > 0. South will generate comparative advantages in the production of and exports 
of environmentally-intensive goods under free trade, and trade creates a pollution 
haven in South.
Markusen (1997) sets up a simple two-country computable equilibrium model in 
which countries are identical and each country has two industries, one competitive 
and the other experiencing increasing returns under conditions of imperfect 
competition and free entry by multinational firms. His model predicts that plants will 
migrate to regions with weaker environmental regulations when trade is liberalised.
Although general equilibrium models along the lines of the H-O theorem provide 
some interesting insights into the relationship between domestic environmental
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policies and trade patterns, they do not explain the existing empirical evidence 
satisfactorily. Why do these models fail to explain the empirical evidence?
At least two points need to be highlighted. First, the above extension of the H-O 
theorem to trade in ESGs is valid only to the extent that the five assumptions of the 
model are satisfied. Some of these assumptions are very restrictive when one takes 
into account the real-world situation. For example, the assumption of identical 
technology across countries may not be appropriate if looking at North-South 
problems. Perfect competition and identical preferences are also very restrictive 
assumptions. Second, most of the above theoretical models along the lines of the 
H-O theorem can only capture the static factor endowment effect and are therefore 
subject to Porter and van der Linde’s (1995) criticism that technological innovation 
effects are not considered.
We now turn to another approach, the Heckscher-Ohlin model with Ricardian 
technology (H-O-R).
General equilibrium models (II): the Heckscher-Ohlin model with Ricardian 
technology
General equilibrium models of the kind discussed in the last section, are static in that 
they assume identical technology and production functions across countries. 
However, there are three ways to incorporate technology differences into the static 
H-O framework.
First, the assumption of identical technology can be relaxed in the basic H-O world.
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Under Ricardo’s framework, international differences in technology are not only 
allowed, but serve as the basis for explaining positions of comparative advantage. 
Empirically, since MacDougall’s (1951) classic study, researchers have consistently 
found relative labour costs to be a powerful explanatory variable for trade flows. The 
many follow-up studies include Balassa (1963) and Golubad Hsieh (1995).7 Since the 
1960s trade theorists have been interested in modifying the H-O model to allow 
countries to differ in their prevailing states of technology. Jones (1970) provides a 
comprehensive theoretical account of technology differences under the H-O 
framework.
As surveyed by Falvey (1994), the effects of technology differences can be divided 
into two major categories, product-augmenting and factor-augmenting. Product- 
augmenting technology differences imply that one country can produce a larger 
output from the same factor inputs in a particular sector (or sectors) and the 
technology therefore acts very much like product price changes. Factor-augmenting 
technology differences imply that a factor (or factors) in one country is uniformly 
more productive than the same factor in the other, independent of the sector in which 
the factor is employed and this type of technology acts very much like factor 
endowment changes. If technology differences are purely factor-augmenting, the 
trade pattern might be explained in terms of ‘effective’ factor endowments. But to the 
extent that technology differences are product-augmenting, there are now two 
potential determinants of the pattern of trade. It is straightforward to apply this to 
analyse the relationship between environmental regulation and trade. If there is a 
factor-augmenting technology difference between the North and the South in which
7See Obstfeld & Rogoff (1996).
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the North possesses advanced technology, this may lead to production and export of 
more of pollution-intensive goods in the North.
The second approach is attributed to Davis (1995). It is now accepted as a matter of 
fact that empirically the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek (H-O-V) theorem performs
o
‘horribly’ with a success rate matched by a coin toss and that the H-O-V framework 
does not incorporate the theoretical challenge of ‘new trade theory’. Davis develops a 
model that allows for both Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin influences (termed the 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Ricardian model or H-O-R), providing a unified account of intra­
industry and inter-industry trade. Intra-industry trade can arise even if returns to scale 
are constant and markets perfectly competitive. The model assumes there are two 
countries, One and Two, two factors, K (capital) and L (labour), three goods, Xi, X2 
and Y. The first two goods are perfectly competitive intra-industry goods and are 
capital-intensive relative to Y. Preferences are identical and homothetic. 
Technologies are assumed to be identical across countries in X2 and Y, with a small 
Hicks-neutral productivity difference in Xi. Since there is an absolute technical 
advantage in the production of good Xi, only the technology of country One (which is 
assumed to have the superior technology in the production of Xi) will be used in 
production of this good.
The results are in sharp constrast with the H-O model. First, the H-O model simply 
predicts that a country exports the good that uses intensively its relatively abundant 
factor of production. The H-O-R model predicts that there are two possibilities. If 
country One is the labour-abundant country, but has an absolute advantage in the 
production of good Xi, it produces the world supply of that capital-intensive good, so
8Trefler (1995: 1029).
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must export it. Even if One is the capital-abundant country, since its factor 
endowment net of this may make it the ‘labour-abundant’ country in the residual, 
factor endowments are employed to produce the goods with common technologies. 
Labour-abundant country Two would then export capital-intensive good X2. Second, 
in strong contrast to the H-O model, H-O-R predicts that even countries with 
identical endowment ratios may engage in substantial trade, namely, intra-industry 
trade.
Since a Ricardian element is brought into the H -0 framework, absolute advantage 
becomes an important factor along with relative factor endowment in determining the 
pattern of trade. The H-O-R model has received strong empirical support recently. 
For example, Harrigan (1997), in an econometric study, finds that relative 
productivity which is in the spirit of Ricardian model, when combined with factor 
endowments, significantly improves the explanations for changing trade patterns. 
Trefler’s (1995: 1029) empirical test also reveals that ‘H-O-V is rejected empirically 
in favor of a modification that allows for home bias in consumption and international 
technology differences’.
Despite the advance in the theoretical modelling that incorporates Ricardian elements 
into the H-O framework, the literature on environmental regulation and the 
competitiveness debate has not so far been able to take advantage of this 
development.
Further, one has to recognise that both the first and second approaches treat 
technology differences as exogenously given and there is a lack of intertemporal 
dynamic determinants. The third approach is to model R&D and innovation as
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endogenous variables that interact with changes in environmental policy. The 
literature on the effects of environmental policy on growth is scant. Chapter 6 
provides a model for R&D and innovation as endogenous variables interacting with 
changes in environmental policy.
This chapter has provided a brief review of the established empirical and theoretical 
literature on the trade effects of environmental policy and highlighted shortcomings 
in the existing literature. The next chapter presents an empirical analysis of the trade- 
environment nexus using time-series data and a trade-in-goods approach.
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3 Trade in Environmentally Sensitive Goods: A 
Global Perspective1
Introduction
Widespread concern has been expressed recently about the relationship between the 
international competitiveness of ESGs and environmental regulations.2 Does free 
trade with countries with lower environmental standards lead to a shift of production 
activity away from home countries with higher environmental standards to foreign 
countries? Will countries with higher standards be forced to lower their standards if 
capital and jobs also migrate to exploit lower environmental standards abroad (the so- 
called ‘race to the bottom’)?3 Is it really the case that countries with lower 
environmental regulations increase their competitiveness in the production of ESGs? 
This last question receives considerable attention whenever countries are in the 
process of passing new pollution control measures.
As discussed in Chapter 2, one of the limitations of the existing empirical literature is 
that time-series patterns of trade in ESGs are seldom explored. This results in an 
incomplete picture of the changing pattern of export performance of ESGs over time. 
It is my belief that a complete picture of the changing pattern of export performance 
of ESGs over time is an essential starting point for any study on the debate on 
international trade, environmental regulation and the competitiveness of ESGs.
'A version of this chapter has been accepted for publication in World Development (forthcoming).
2See Anderson and Blackhurst (1992), Dean (1992) and Low and Yeats (1992).
3See Bhagwati and Hudec (1996).
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This chapter undertakes a preliminary analysis of the effects of environmental 
regulations on ESG trade by examining whether the pattern of export performance of 
environmentally sensitive goods has undergone systematic changes due to the 
introduction of stringent environmental standards in most developed countries in the 
1970s and the 1980s. More precisely, I seek to examine whether countries with high 
export performance in ESGs in the 1960s became countries with low export 
performance in ESGs in the 1990s. A comprehensive dataset of trade flows of ESGs 
disaggregated to the four-digit level of the Standard International Trade Classification 
(SITC) is employed. The data relate to the period from 1965 through 1995 for 34 
reporter countries. These 34 reporter countries include 25 OECD countries and some 
developing economies in East Asia and accounted for nearly 80 per cent of world 
exports of ESGs in 1995. These disaggregated trade data and the coverage of the 
reporter countries make it possible to obtain a good overview of the changing trade 
pattern of ESGs. The important empirical finding is that export performance of ESGs 
for most countries remained intact between the 1960s and the 1990s, despite the 
introduction of stringent environmental standards in most of the developed countries 
in the 1970s and 1980s.
I first look at the export performance of each ESG for each of the reporter countries in 
the initial year 1965, the first year in which data are available, and compare it with 
that in the end year 1995. Those countries which exported more than the world 
average of ESGs (i.e. those which had a revealed comparative advantage (RCA) 
index4 greater than one) in 1965 achieved the same level of performance in 1995. 
Looking more closely at the year-to-year path of the RCA index of ESGs, I found that 
those commodities with either one or two years’ high export performance (RCA
4See the next section for the definition of the RCA index.
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index greater than one) and those commodities with either 30 or 31 years’ high export 
performance accounted for a large proportion of the exports of ESGs for most 
countries. Time-series patterns for the changing export performance of ESGs for 
some countries that claim to have higher environmental standards did not reveal a 
significant reduction in exports in the 1970s and 1980s. The results are quite robust in 
terms of both the weighted and the unweighted version of this trade pattern. This 
suggests that the pattern of export performance of ESGs has not undergone systematic 
change despite the introduction of stringent environmental standards in most 
developed countries in the 1970s and 1980s.
The following section provides a brief definition of ESGs and its relevant trade 
categories in terms of Standard International Trade Classification (SITC); section 3 
discusses the dataset and methodology used in this study. Section 4 reports the 
results. Section 5 examines the robustness of the results and the final section presents 
a conclusion.
Definition of environmentally sensitive goods
There is no uniformly agreed definition of environmentally sensitive goods. Two 
approaches have been used to identify environmentally sensitive goods in the 
received literature.5 The conventional approach has been to identify ESG sectors as 
those that have incurred high levels of abatement expenditure per unit of output in the 
United States and other OECD economies (see, for example, Robison 1988; Tobey 
1990; and Low and Yeats 1992). The second approach is to select sectors which rank 
high on actual emissions intensity (emissions per unit of output) in the United States
sSee Mani and Wheeler (1997).
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(see for example, Mani and Wheeler 1997). I adopt the conventional approach in this 
study. However, both approaches come up with similar environmentally sensitive 
sectors. Five sectors have typically emerged as leading candidates for 
environmentally sensitive sectors: iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, industrial 
chemicals, pulp and paper, and non-metallic products.
As defined in Low and Yeats (1992), environmentally sensitive goods include all 
four-digit products in SITC 67 (iron and steel), SITC 68 (non-ferrous metals) and 
SITC 69 (metal manufactures n.e.s.). Also included are all four-digit products in pulp 
and waste paper (251); organic chemicals (512); inorganic chemicals (513, 514); 
radioactive material (515); coal, petroleum chemicals (521); manufactured fertilisers 
(561); paper and paperboard (641); paper articles (642); veneers, plywood (631); 
wood manufactures n.e.s. (632); petroleum products (332); agricultural chemicals 
(599); and cement (66 i).6 These industries incurred pollution abatement and control 
expenditures of approximately 1 per cent or more of the value of their total sales 
(1988). The highest expenditure:output ratio in 1988 was just over 3 per cent 
(cement) and the weighted average for all US industry was 0.54 per cent.
Data and methodology
This study uses a comprehensive dataset of annual trade flows (exports and imports) 
of ESGs disaggregated at the four-digit level of the Standard International Trade 
Classification (SITC) from 1965 to 1995 for 34 reporter countries.7 These 34 reporter
6Low and Yeats (1992). Tobey (1990) used a similar definition of environmentally sensitive goods.
7I focus on the SITC four-digit level rather than five-digit level because data for some commodities 
stop at the four-digit level without any further disaggregation. The data used in this study are taken 
from the United Nations COMTRADE database from International Economic Databank at the 
Australian National University.
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countries accounted for nearly 80 per cent of world exports (and trade) of ESGs in 
1995. They include 25 of the 29 OECD countries8 as of May 1997, and major East 
Asian developing economies. There are 134 ESG commodities at the four-digit level. 
ESGs at the four-digit level include: chemical phosphatic fertiliser (SITC code 5612), 
newsprint paper (SITC code 6411), cement (SITC code 6612) and iron, steel wire 
products (SITC code 6731). There are 286,905 observations in total.
As is well known and discussed by Gagnon and Rose (1995),9 the value of 
international trade flows has increased substantially in the last 40 years. This is partly 
a result of inflation, partly a result of real economic growth and partly a result of the 
increasing importance of trade relative to total output. In particular, a macroeconomic 
imbalance may result in substantial changes in net exports.
To abstract these effects from our data, the export-revealed comparative advantage 
(.XRCA) index is used in this analysis. This XRCA index, introduced by Balassa 
(1989) in 1965, is defined as a country’s share in the exports of a particular 
commodity divided by the share of that particular commodity in the world exports of 
manufactured goods, as follows
XRCA*=
v*
^  iw
(
V
\
/
(3. 1)
where XRCAi k gives country Vs export revealed comparative advantage in industry k, 
X  stands for exports, subscript w stands for world, superscript k represents industry k, 
and superscript l stands for total exports. This index has some limitations. It might not
8 Except Hungary, Czech Republic, Turkey and Iceland.
9Gagnon and Rose (1995) used similar methodology to test product cycle theory.
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‘reveal’ the comparative advantage of a particular commodity especially when 
domestic or international distortions are present. However, as discussed in another 
paper by Balassa in 1987, other indices have their own disadvantages. For example, 
the net export index used by Balassa (1989) has the practical disadvantage of being 
affected by the idiosyncrasies of national import protection; in the case of 
intermediate products, net exports are influenced by demand for the purpose of 
further transformation in export production. Ballace, Forstner and Murray (1987) 
discuss the RCA index and find that, while cardinal measures of different RCA 
indices are highly inconsistent, both ordinal and dichotomous measures, and 
especially dichotomous measure, generate consistent results.10 For the purposes of 
this study, I am interested only in the changing pattern of comparative advantage 
which can be adequately captured using dichotomous measures. Drysdale and 
Garnaut (1982) and Drysdale (1988) also provide extensive discussion of this and 
other related indices.
This XRCA index works reasonably well in terms of the above-mentioned data issue. 
Since it is an index, the inflation effect can be removed if it is an across-the-board 
increase in the prices of all commodities. By dividing exports of a particular 
commodity category by total manufactured exports, this index also takes into account
10Ballace, Forstner and Murray (1987) discuss three trade-only RCA indices: (1) T/XMik = Tik/(Xik 
+Mik)-, (2) BALik=Xik/E(Xik)-, (3) D-Rik = ((T/XMik/T/XMim)-1 )*(sign Tik), where T is net trade (X - M), 
XM is total trade, i is the country, k is the commodity and m indicates the summation across all 
manufactured products. In the BAL index, E(Xik) = Xwk* (Xim/Xwm), where w indicates the summation 
across all countries. It represents the expected level of exports of the product from the country 
assuming the country’s exports of the product are in proportion to the country’s share of world exports 
of all manufactured products combined. BAL refers to the Balassa index (Balassa 1965). D-R index 
refers to Dongers and Riedel (1977). For 77 XM, see UNIDO (1982). There are three interpretations of 
these RCA indices. The traditional interpretation of RCA indices is that the index quantifies the 
commodity-specific degree of comparative advantage enjoyed by one country vis avis any other 
country. The second interpretation is that these indices provides a commodity-specific ranking of 
countries by degree of comparative advantage. The third provides a demarcation between countries 
that enjoy a comparative advantage in a particular commodity and those countries that do not. These 
three alternatives are referred to as cardinal, ordinal and dichotomous measures, respectively.
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macroeconomic trade balance effects. For instance, a 1 per cent growth in exports 
spread uniformly across all goods (for example, when domestic savings are greater 
than domestic investment) will not affect the level of this index. Furthermore, by 
dividing a country’s export sectoral share of a particular commodity category by the 
same sectoral share in the world exports of manufactured goods, a general increase or 
decrease in world exports of a particular commodity (growth effect) will not change 
the level of this index either. This is particularly useful since the share of ESG exports 
to total exports has declined from 21.7 per cent in 1965 to 16.9 per cent in 1995 
(Table 3.1).
Table 3.1 Exports of ESGs and their importance in world trade: cross-section and 
time series
Europe 
OECD (18) 
countries
North
America
Oceania Northeast
Asia
Southeast
Asia
Other World
Market shares of total exports by region (%)
1965 45.1 20.8 2.3 6.7 2.5 22.7 100
1975 43.8 17.0 1.7 9.3 2.5 25.6 100
1985 42.4 17.5 1.6 15.6 3.8 19.1 100
1995 43.7 17.3 1.3 19.4 6.6 11.6 100
Shares of ESGs to total exports (%)
1965 24.4 20.3 9.2 23.1 18.1 18.8 21.7
1975 24.5 17.2 15.1 23.6 17.8 16.1 20.7
1985 23.5 16.3 17.6 13.4 19.1 22.9 20.3
1995 18.7 16.5 20.2 11.3 11.9 22.6 16.9
Market shares of ESG exports by region (%)
1965 50.6 19.5 1.0 7.1 2.1 19.7 100
1975 52.0 14.1 1.3 10.6 2.1 19.9 100
1985 49.1 14.1 1.4 10.3 3.6 21.6 100
1995 48.4 16.9 1.6 13.0 4.7 15.5 100
Note: Europe OECD includes 18 of the 22 European OECD countries (Finland, Greece, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom, Austria, France, Italy, Belgium, Luxemburg, Portugal, 
Switzerland, Denmark, Germany, Norway and Spain) but not Hungary, Turkey, Czech Republic and 
Iceland, as of May 1997. North America refers to the US, Canada and Mexico. Northeast Asia includes 
Japan, Korea, Taiwan, China and Hong Kong. Southeast Asia includes Thailand, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Indonesia and Singapore. Oceania includes Australia, New Zealand and Papua New 
Guinea. ESGs refers to environmentally sensitive goods.
Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of United Nations COMTRADE database, International 
Economic Databank, Australian National University.
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For reasons that will shortly become clear, a normalisation is used for the commodity 
trade share. This measures the relative importance of a particular commodity trade 
share in the trade of total ESGs at a particular point in time, as follows:
\
•  100
S
(3.2)
where i refers to a particular commodity category within ESGs, t refers to a point in 
time and e indicates total ESGs. The sum of any time period over all ESGs is 100, 
and Sit is a percentage measure.
This dataset will be analysed from the following four perspectives. Changes in the 
dichotomous measures of the XRCA index between the beginning and the ending 
period of the sample will be examined first. We would like to see by what percentage 
the export flows of ESGs change in 1995 compared with those in 1965 for each of the 
reporter countries. One would expect that those commodities with a high export 
performance at the beginning of the sample period will become less competitive at 
the end of the sample period if the claim that stringent environmental standards 
reduce ‘international competitiveness’ holds.
A second and more rigorous statistical test of the association between the 1965 series 
and the 1995 series is performed to determine whether there is any association 
between export performance of ESGs in the beginning and end years. Although a few
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tests for association are available, Kendall’s tau-b11 was chosen. This test ranks the 
XRCA index for each year and calculates the test statistic based on the number of 
concordant and discordant pairs of observations. Kendall’s tau-b is similar to a 
gamma test but has the advantage that it also takes into account the tied pairs (that is, 
pairs of observations that have equal values of X or equal values of Y).12
As a third step in this analysis, histograms for each reporter country based on the 
number of years each reporter country has ‘revealed comparative advantage’ (or 
‘specialisation’ with an XRCA greater than 1 are used to look at the ESG export 
performance in the intervening years. Of course, there are two different ways to look 
at this. The first counts the number of commodities that fall into each of the zero and 
31 year frequencies and reports this as a percentage of the total number of 
commodities. The other takes the normalised trade share of each commodity in a 
particular year (1990 in this exercise) as the weight, and reports this percentage. The 
latter is generally supposed to convey more information. However, as an alternative 
way to look at this issue, the former will be discussed in the section on robustness. If 
environmental standards have significant effects on trade flows of ESGs, then one 
might expect there to be many fluctuations of these histograms, indicating that many 
ESGs have changed their export performance position.
Fourthly, an alternative perspective is provided by looking at the export performance 
of ESGs in the intervening years. For this purpose, a time-series pattern of export 
performance of ESGs is calculated. The indicator used here is the percentage trade
"The formula for Kendall’s tau-b is as follows: tau-b = (P-Q)/((wrwc)1/2), where P = XjXjnyAy (twice 
the number of concordances), Q = XiXjnyDy (twice the number of disconcordances), Ay = Xk>iXi>jnki + 
Ek<iXi<jnki , Dy = Xk>iXi<jnki + Xk<iXi>jnki> wr =n~_ 2 and wc=n~ - Xi nj2 . See Kendall and Stuart
( 1979).
12The Spearman correlation test statistic does not take tied pairs into account.
share of those ESGs that indicated a ‘specialisation’ in total ESGs trade for each year 
and each country. Since a dichotomous measure can be assigned to each commodity 
at a particular point in time, the normalised trade share of those commodities (within 
the ESG group) is summed to provide a percentage share of the normalised trade of 
all ESGs. If the above histogram does not convey sufficient information about the 
locus of the changing share of one country’s competitive ESGs, this time-series 
pattern then offers a unique picture to look at the export performance of ESGs for a 
selected country over time. This indicator therefore can be expressed as
C.HX4 x r c a : > l (3)
where C„ is the competitive indicator for country i at time t. k denotes commodity 
(ESGs). Sit denotes shares of commodity k in country f  s total trade at time t.
Results
Table 3.2 shows the breakdown of dichotomous measures of the XRCA index 
between the beginning (1965) and the end of the period (1995). This is the weighted 
version of the breakdown of the XRCA index between 1965 and 1995.
These tables are reported using the following matrix:
1995 N 1995 S T o ta l
1965 N A n A 12 A ,
1965 S A-21 A 22 A 2
T o ta l A 3 A 4 1 0 0
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where
Ai = Percentage of normalised trade flows of ESGs that were not specialised in 1965. 
A2 = Percentage of normalised trade flows of ESGs that were specialised in 1965.
A3 = Percentage of normalised trade flows of ESGs that were not specialised in 1995. 
A4 = Percentage of normalised trade flows of ESGs that were specialised in 1995.
An = Percentage of normalised trade flows of ESGs that were not specialised in 1965 
or in 1995.
A12 = Percentage of normalised trade flows of ESGs that were not specialised in 1965 
but became specialised in 1995.
A21 = Percentage of normalised trade flows of ESGs that were specialised in 1965 but 
became non-specialised in 1995.
A22 = Percentage of normalised trade flows of ESGs that were specialised both in 
1965 and in 1995.
‘N’ stands for ‘non-specialisation’ where the XRCA index is less than one while ‘S’ 
refers to ‘specialisation’ where the XRCA index greater than one. It is a dichotomous 
measure in the sense that each commodity at a particular point in time is either in the 
position of ‘S’ or ‘N’. ‘1965 N’ therefore represents those commodities that did not 
have ‘revealed comparative advantage’ in 1965 while ‘1965 S’ represents those 
commodities that had ‘revealed comparative advantage’ in 1965.
The same logic applies to both ‘1995 N’ and ‘1995 S’. Since this is the weighted 
version (using commodity shares in the ESG group in 1990 as the weight) of the 
XRCA dichotomy, the number in the tables represents the percentage of trade flows 
rather than the percentage of the number of commodities. These trade flow
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percentages of ESGs should sum to 100 at any given point in time. The fourth column
of each of the two-way tables is the breakdown of the 1965 ESG trade flows while the
fourth row of each two-way table is the 1995 breakdown.
Table 3.2 Breakdown of two-way tables: selected countries
Australia Austria
1995 N 1995 S Total 1995 N 1995 S Total
1965 N 38.1 11.1 49.2 1965 N 20.0 17.1 37.1
1965 S 10.1 40.7 50.8 1965 S 12.2 50.7 63.0
Total 48.2 51.9 100 Total 32.2 67.8 100
Kendall’s tau-b: 0.27 Kendall’s tau-b: 0.34
P-value: 0.0001 No. of P -value: 0.0001 No. of
ESGs:133 ESGs: 133
Belgium-Luxembourg Brazil
1995 N 1995 S Total 1995 N 1995 S Total
1965 N 18.8 32.0 50.8 1965 N 25.8 46.8 72.5
1965 S 6.8 42.4 49.2 1965 S 1.6 25.9 27.5
Total 25.6 74.4 100 Total 27.3 72.7 100
Kendall’s tau-b: 0.39 Kendall’s tau-b: 0.25
P -value: 0.0001 No. of P -value: 0.0001 No. of
ESGs: 134 ESGs: 130
Canada Chile
1995 N 1995 S Total 1995 N 1995 S Total
1965 N 31.2 23.3 54.5 1965 N 42.9 12.4 55.4
1965 S 5.8 39.8 45.6 1965 S 0.0 44.6 44.6
Total 37.0 63.1 100 Total 43.0 57.0 100
Kendall’s tau-b: 0.29 
P -value: 0.0001 No. of 
ESGs: 125
Kendall’s tau-b: 0.27 
P -value: 0.0001 No. of 
ESGs: 129
China
1995 N 1995 S Total
1965 N 57.0 8.4 65.4
1965 S 17.4 17.1 34.6
Total 74.4 25.6 100
Kendall’s tau-b: 0.15
P -value: 0.01 No. of ESGs:
134
Denmark
1995 N 1995 S Total
1965 N 38.6 19.4 58.0
1965 s 7.5 34.5 42.0
Total 46.1 53.9 100
Kendall's tau-b: 0.40
P -value: 0.0001 No. of
ESGs: 134
Finland
1995 N 1995 S Total
1965 N 31.2 20.6 51.8
1965 S 2.7 45.6 48.2
Total 33.8 66.2 100
Kendall’s tau-b: 0.30
P-value: 0.0001 No. of
ESGs: 132
France
1995 N 1995 S Total
1965 N 26.7 22.5 49.2
1965 S 19.3 31.5 50.8
Total 46.0 54.0 100
Kendall’s tau-b: 0.15
P-value: 0.0128 No. of
ESGs:133
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Greece Hong Kong
1995 N 1995 S Total
1965 N 45.1 26.9 72.0
1965 S 7.7 20.4 28.0
Total 52.7 47.3 100
Kendall’s tau-b: 0.24
P-value: 0.0002 No. of
ESGs:128
Indonesia
1995 N 1995 S Total
1965 N 45.5 49.8 95.3
1965 S 1.9 2.8 4.7
Total 47.4 52.6 100
Kendall’s tau-b: 0.20 
P-value: 0.005 No. of 
ESGs:128
Italy
1995 N 1995 S Total
1965 N 41.7 14.6 56.3
1965 S 10.8 32.9 43.7
Total 52.5 47.5 100
Kendall’s tau-b: 0.38 
P-value: 0.0001 No. of 
ESGs:134
Korea
1995 N 1995 S Total
1965 N 40.6 42.1 82.7
1965 S 8.2 9.1 17.3
Total 48.8 51.2 100
Kendall’s tau-b: 0.26 
P-value: 0.0001 No. of 
ESGs:133
Mexico
1995 N 1995 S Total
1965 N 46.3 15.8 62.0
1965 S 15.8 22.2 38.0
Total 62.0 38.0 100
Kendall’s tau-b: 0.28 
P-value: 0.0001 No. of 
ESGs:134
New Zealand
1995 N 1995 S Total
1965 N 31.2 45.2 76.4
1965 S 0.3 23.3 23.6
Total 31.5 68.5 100
Kendall’s tau-b: 0.44
P-value: 0.0001 No. of
ESGs:131
1995 N 1995 S Total
1965 N 59.1 17.9 77.0
1965 S 4.0 17.5 21.5
Total 63.1 35.4 98
Kendall’s tau-b: 0.50
P-value: 0.0001 No. of
ESGs:106
Ireland
1995 N 1995 S Total
1965 N 37.7 46.8 84.5
1965 S 9.1 6.4 15.5
Total 46.8 53.2 100
Kendall’s tau-b: 0.21
P-value: 0.002 No. of
ESGs:132
Japan
1995 N 1995 S Total
1965 N 52.4 8.1 60.5
1965 S 17.7 21.8 39.5
Total 70.1 29.9 100
Kendall’s tau-b: 0.31
P-value: 0.0001 No. of
ESGs:134
Malaysia
1995 N 1995 S Total
1965 N 56.4 20.6 77.0
1965 S 3.5 19.5 23.0
Total 59.9 40.1 100
Kendall's tau-b: 0.38
P-value: 0.0001 No. of
ESGs:133
Netherlands
1995 N 1995 S Total
1965 N 22.1 16.4 38.4
1965 S 0.9 60.7 61.6
Total 23.0 77.0 100
Kendall’s tau-b: 0.40
P-value: 0.0001 No. of
ESGs:133
Norway
1995 N 1995 S Total
1965 N 26.5 15.3 41.8
1965 S 21.2 37.0 58.2
Total 47.7 52.3 100
Kendall’s tau-b: 0.23 
P-value: 0.0001 No. of
ESGs:131
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Philippines______________________________  Poland
1995 N 1995 S Total 1995 N 1995 S Total
1965 N 62.5 23.3 85.8 1965 N 18.6 31.1 49.7
1965 S 10.0 4.3 14.2 1965 S 13.1 37.2 50.3
Total 72.5 27.5 100 Total 31.7 68.3 100
Kendall’s tau-b: 0.22 Kendall’s tau-b: 0.20
P-value: 0.0027 No. of P-value: 0.0005 No. of
ESGs:124 ESGs:134
Portugal Singapore
1995 N 1995 S Total 1995 N 1995 S Total
1965 N 52.5 25.8 78.3 1965 N 60.4 16.8 77.2
1965 S 3.2 18.5 21.7 1965 S 17.8 5.0 22.8
Total 55.7 44.3 100 Total 78.2 21.8 100
Kendall’s tau-b: 0.37 Kendall’s tau-b: 0.15
P-value: 0.0001 No. of P-value: 0.0123 No. of
ESGs:133 ESGs:131
Spain Sweden
1995 N 1995 S Total 1995 N 1995 S Total
1965 N 42.8 40.0 82.8 1965 N 28.4 17.1 45.5
1965 S 7.6 9.6 17.2 1965 S 6.0 48.5 54.5
Total 50.4 49.6 100 Total 34.4 65.6 100
Kendall’s tau-b: 0.21 Kendall’s tau-b: 0.50
P-value: 0.0005 No. of P-value: 0.0001 No. of
ESGs:134 ESGs:132
Switzerland Taiwan
1995 N 1995 S Total 1995 N 1995 S Total
1965 N 37.9 21.5 59.3 1965 N 45.9 37.7 83.6
1965 S 0.5 40.2 40.7 1965 S 14.3 2.1 16.4
Total 38.4 61.6 100 Total 60.1 39.9 100
Kendall’s tau-b: 0.49 Kendall’s tau-b: 0.13
P-value: 0.0001 No. of P-value: 0.0337 No. of
ESGs:133 ESGs:134
Thailand United Kingdom
1995 N 1995 S Total 1995 N 1995 S Total
1965 N 67.9 19.9 87.9 1965 N 42.5 31.6 74.2
1965 S 1.7 10.4 12.1 1965 S 5.3 20.6 25.9
Total 69.6 30.4 100 Total 47.8 52.2
Kendall’s tau-b: 0.38 Kendall’s tau-b: 0.39
P-value: 0.0001 No. of P-value: 0.0001 No. of
ESGs:131 ESGs: 134
United States Venezuela
1995 N 1995 S Total 1995 N 1995 S Total
1965 N 41.4 14.2 55.6 1965 N 27.9 67.7 95.7
1965 S 14.3 30.1 44.4 1965 S 1.8 2.2 4.0
Total 55.8 44.2 100 Total 29.8 69.9 100
Kendall’s tau-b: 0.39 Kendall’s tau-b: 0.04
P-value: 0.0001 No. of P-value: 0.58 No. of
ESGs:134 ESGs: 130
Source: Author's calculations on the basis of United Nations COMTRADE database, International 
Economic Databank, Australian National University.
52
For example, in the case of Australia, 49.2 per cent of the normalised trade flows of 
ESGs were in a position of ‘non-specialisation’ while 50.8 per cent of the normalised 
trade flows of ESGs were in a position of ‘specialisation’ in 1965. Among the 49.2 
per cent of the normalised trade flows of ESGs which were in a position of ‘non­
specialisation’ in 1965, 38.1 per cent remains in a position of ‘non-specialisation’ in 
1995 while 11.1 per cent switch to a position of ‘specialisation’. The same logic 
applies to the column-wise explanation.
If stringent environmental standards do hurt those countries with higher 
environmental standards (mostly developed countries) and benefit those countries 
with lower environmental standards (mostly developing countries), then one would 
expect a significant changes in the export performance of ESGs across countries. In 
other words, the export performance of the ESGs of developing countries would 
increase while that of developed countries would decrease. However, a striking 
feature of this table is that trade volumes that move from a ‘specialisation’ position to 
a ‘non-specialisation’ position account for no more than 15 per cent of the ESG trade 
volumes for the majority countries except for China, France, Japan, Norway and 
Singapore, whose percentage is about 20.
Further, taking into account those trade volumes that move from a position of ‘non­
specialisation’ to a position of ‘specialisation’, one can see that these trade volumes 
always exceed trade volumes that move from a ‘specialisation’ position to a ‘non­
specialisation’ position with the exceptions of Japan, Norway and China.14 Even in 
the case of Japan, Norway and China, this difference is very small, 9.57 per cent, 5.95 
per cent and 9.01 per cent, respectively. It becomes clear that the pattern of export
13 Mexico is on the margin, i.e. 15.75 per cent.
14The United States is on the margin with 14.34 per cent to 14.16 per cent.
53
performance of ESGs is quite persistent in the sample period. Those commodities 
which did not display much ‘revealed comparative advantage’ at the beginning of the 
sample period tend to remain in a position of ‘non-specialisation’, while those 
commodities which had a ‘revealed comparative advantage’ at the beginning of the 
sample period remain in a position of ‘specialisation’.
There are two exceptions, Brazil and Venezuela. The pattern of ESG export 
performance in these two countries changed dramatically between 1965 and 1995. In 
Brazil, 72.5 per cent of the normalised trade flows of ESGs were in a position of 
‘non-specialisation’ while 27.5 per cent of the normalised trade flows of ESGs were 
in a position of ‘specialisation’ in 1965. In 1995, 72.7 per cent of the normalised trade 
flows of ESGs were in a position of ‘specialisation’ while 27.3 per cent of the 
normalised trade flows of ESGs were in a position of ‘non-specialisation’. In the case 
of Venezuela, 95.7 per cent of the normalised trade flows of ESGs were in a position 
of ‘non-specialisation’ while 4.0 per cent of the normalised trade flows of ESGs were 
in a position of ‘specialisation’ in 1965. In 1995, 69.9 per cent of the normalised trade 
flows of ESGs were in a position of ‘specialisation’ while only 29.8 per cent of the 
normalised trade flows of ESGs were in a position of ‘non-specialisation’.
Measures of association using Kendall’s tau-b test statistic also convey the economic 
message that there is a strong association between the export performance of ESGs 
between 1965 and 1995. The p-value shows that the null hypothesis that the two 
series are distributed independently can be rejected at a significance level of 1 per 
cent for most countries except China (1.02%), France (1.28%), Singapore (1.23%), 
Taiwan (3.37%) and Venezuela (58.1%). This result is presented beneath the two-way 
tables for each country in Table 3.2. Note that Kendall’s tau-b ranges from -1 to +1
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and the nominator is the difference between twice the number of concordances and
twice the number of disconcordances. If this difference is not very large, Kendall’s 
tau-b coefficient can be very low. This does not necessarily mean that the correlation 
between the two series is weak.
These two-way tables and their statistical tests suggest that those commodities with a 
high export performance at the beginning of the sample period remain competitive at 
the end of the sample period for most countries.
Figure 3.1 provides a histogram of years in ‘specialisation’ for selected countries that 
claim to have higher environmental standards (see Appendix 3 for results of other 
countries). The data are first classified by reporter and commodity. The number of 
years in ‘specialisation’ is then counted for each commodity. Since there are 31 years 
of observations in total, a sub-group that was in ‘specialisation’ for each of the 31 
years then is put to the extreme right of the histogram while a sub-group that was not 
in ‘specialisation ’ for each of the 31 years is put to the extreme left of the histogram. 
These are the weighted versions of the histogram in the sense that it is the normalised 
trade volume rather than the number of commodities that is put into each cell.
If stringent environmental standards do have a significant impact on the international 
competitiveness of ESGs, one would expect that many goods are not in consistent 
‘specialisation’ or ‘non-specialisation’. For most countries, one can see a bimodal 
breakdown of the composition of trade in ESGs, especially for OECD countries, 
indicating that most trade in ESGs is accounted for by goods in consistent 
‘specialisation’ or ‘non-specialisation’.
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Figure 3.1 Histograms of years in ‘specialisation’ of ESGs for selected countries: 
1965-95
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Notes: The horizontal axis denotes number of years in specialisation. The vertical axis denotes 
percentage trade share in total ESGs.
Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of the United Nations COMTRADE database from 
International Economic Data Bank, Australian National University.
For developing countries, one can see the same results with the exceptions of Brazil, 
Mexico, Philippines and Venezuela. Overall, these histograms also reveal that export 
performance of ESGs for most countries is quite persistent. As these histograms do 
not consider the sequencing of export performance of ESGs, an alternative way to 
look at the ESG export performance in the intervening years is necessary.
Figures 3.2 shows the time-series pattern of the share of the normalised trade volume 
of those ESGs with an XRCA index greater than one relative to total ESG trade for
some selected countries that claim to have higher environmental standards. This 
simple figure reveals a more striking result. The share of the normalised trade volume
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of those ESGs with the XRCA index greater than one relative to total ESG trade did 
not decrease over time for most countries, except Japan.
Figure 3.2 Time-series pattern of the overall competitiveness of ESGs for selected 
countries
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Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of the United Nations COMTRADE database from 
International Economic Data Bank, Australian National University.
If the sample period is then divided into two sub-periods, before and after the end of 
the 1980s, for Japan and the United States, one can see that after a slow decrease in 
competitiveness of ESGs in the first period, there was a stark increase in 
competitiveness of ESGs in the second period. This is an interesting story that 
requires more theoretical explanation along with an examination of the overall export 
performance of ESGs over time.
The above analysis suggests that the export performance of ESGs is persistent 
throughout the sample period despite the introduction of stringent environmental 
standards by the industrialised countries two decades ago. The claim that higher 
environmental standards reduce the ‘international competitiveness’ of ESGs cannot 
be justified in the light of the available data.
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Robustness
The dataset used in this study is comprehensive in the sense that it covers nearly 80 
per cent of the world exports of ESGs. It is important to test the robustness of the 
results to determine the extent to which the results are affected by the way we look at 
these data.
As a check on the robustness of my findings, the data are smoothed using a three-year 
average in order to reduce the influence of any irregular variations in a particular 
year. Two period averages, 1965-67 and 1993-95, have been chosen as 
representative of the 1960s and the 1990s. A similar breakdown of the two-way tables 
is then calculated both for the weighted and the unweighted trade volume of each 
country. The finding that trade volumes that move from a position of ‘specialisation’ 
to a position of ‘non-specialisation’ account for no more than 15 per cent of the ESG 
trade volumes for the majority of countries is even more starkly apparent. France, 
with 19.3 per cent previously, had a 13.09 per cent downturn in this three-year 
average version. The maximum percentage downturn is 18.97 per cent (Singapore) in 
this version compared with 21.20 per cent (for Norway, which recorded 17.09 per 
cent in the three-year average) in the previous version.
The unweighted two-way tables are also calculated for each of the countries and the 
findings remain unchanged. Those commodities that move from a position of 
‘specialisation’ to a position of ‘non-specialisation’ account for a small proportion of 
the ESG trade (less than 20 per cent) for the majority of countries.
To check the robustness of these results using the dichotomous measure, I take an 
approach suggested by Gagnon and Rose (1995). To eliminate small deviations from
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one in the XRCA index, ESGs are classified into categories: (a) those with a value of 
XRCA greater than one standard deviation above one, ‘specialisation’; (b) those with 
a value of XRCA index within a standard deviation of one, ‘balance’; (c) those with a 
value of XRCA index at least one standard deviation below one, ‘non-specialisation’; 
where the standard deviation is computed for each commodity’s XRCA time series. 
This categorisation is then applied to the first and last years of the data. Using the 
normalised trade volume computed earlier as the weight, we obtain the weighted 
‘standardised’ version of the two-way tables.
The result shows that the majority of the ESGs commodities that have the status of 
‘specialisation’, ‘balance’, or ‘non-specialisation’ in the first year remain in the same 
position in the last year for all the countries of interest. Those ESGs that switch their 
position from ‘specialisation’ in the first year to ‘balance’ or ‘non-specialisation’ in 
the last year again account for no more than 15 per cent of the total ESG trade volume 
for most countries except Japan, Mexico, France and Poland. If one takes account of 
those ESGs that switch their positions from ‘balance’ in the beginning year to ‘non­
specialisation’ in the final year, the ESGs that show a decline in their competitiveness 
still account for less than 15 per cent for the majority of the countries except Japan, 
Mexico, France, Poland, Norway and China, which have a reduction of around 20 per 
cent. This result is quite consistent with the result obtained from the simple 
dichotomous measures of the two-way tables.
Another check on the robustness of this finding is to calculate the unweighted version 
of the histogram of years in ‘specialisation’ for each country. Instead of using the 
normalised trade volume that corresponds to the cells they belong to in the histogram, 
the number of commodities is used in the calculation of cell entry. The results also 
show a bimodality for most countries.
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One caveat is in order. While the XRCA index can be distorted by domestic or 
international protection, international protection may be more significant than 
domestic protection for exports of ESGs. In either case, this distortion would 
underestimate the XRCA index especially for developed countries whose average 
tariff levels are relatively lower than those of developing countries. This will lead to 
an underestimation of the percentage share of those commodities with a downturn 
from a position of ‘specialisation’ to ‘non-specialisation’.
But if one looks at the changing pattern of those trade volumes that move from ‘non­
specialisation’ to ‘specialisation’, these trade volumes always exceed trade volumes 
that move from ‘specialisation’ to ‘non-specialisation’ for the majority of the 
countries except for Japan, Norway and China, as discussed in the fourth section. This 
finding can thus be considered to be even more robust.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined whether the pattern of export performance of 
environmentally sensitive goods underwent systematic changes in the period between 
the 1960s to the 1990s. A comprehensive dataset of trade flows of ESGs 
disaggregated to the four-digit level of the Standard International Trade Classification 
(SITC), from 1965 to 1995 for 34 reporter countries is employed. These 34 reporter 
countries accounted for nearly 80 per cent of world exports of ESGs in 1995. It is 
therefore to be expected that this analysis will provide a full picture of the changing 
performance of ESGs over time. Two different means to break down the two-way 
tables of export performance of ESGs, using a histogram and time-series pattern, have
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been employed to examine the pattern of export performance of ESGs between the 
beginning (1965) and end year (1995), as well as in the intervening years.
The important empirical finding is that the export performance of ESGs for most 
countries remained unchanged between the 1960s and the 1990s despite the 
introduction of stringent environmental standards in most of the developed countries 
in the 1970s and the 1980s. This result suggests that the claim that higher 
environmental standards reduce the ‘international competitiveness’ of ESGs cannot 
be justified easily, at least on the basis of this examination of the data. Of course, 
there may be other potential explanations for these empirical results. For example, it 
could be that the environmental standards actually adopted were not implemented 
effectively and did not, therefore, affect producer's behaviors and trade patterns. If 
this were so, it is difficult to understand why there has been so much attention 
focused on the issue of environmental standards worldwide. The more plausible 
explanation is, then, that there were some off-setting changes, such as through the 
adoption of new technologies to alleviate the impact of environmental controls, as 
suggested by Berman and Bui (1998). We shall come to this argument later in 
Chapter 6 and 7.
Since the relationship between environmental standards and international 
competitiveness has been treated as mutually exclusive theoretically (Pething 1976; 
McGuire 1982; Palmer, Oates and Portney 1995), the persistence of ESG export 
performance deserves closer scrutiny. The next chapter will provide a different 
perspective using an alternative approach, the factor-content-of-trade approach, to 
explore whether the net export content of environmental factor services for most 
countries underwent systematic changes in the last three decades.
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A ppend ix  3 H istogram s o f years in ‘ specia lisa tion ’ o f ESGs fo r selected countries: 
1965-95 (continued)
Australia Belgium-Luxemburg
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30
Ginada
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30
China
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 300 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30
62
Denmark
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30
France
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30
Greece
uuuul tu duü tili Mil l in t dU H
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 -  
0
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30
Hong Kong
a H i -  n S
Indonesia
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30
Ireland
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30
30 30
20 -1 
10 -  
0
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30
Korea
n.L l l o l .  0 D In D lot DO
MexicoMalaysia
9 12 15 18 21 24 27 300 3 6
Netherlands
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30
New Zealand
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30
64
Poland
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30
Philippines
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30
PortuaJ
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30
Singapore
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30
Sweden
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 300 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30
65
40
30
20
10
0
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30
Taiwan
United Kingdom
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30
Venezuela
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30
Notes: The horizontal axis denotes number of years in specialisation. The vertical axis denotes 
percentage trade share in total ESGs.
Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of the United Nations COMTRADE database from 
International Economic Data Bank, Australian National University.
4 Trade in Embodied Environmental Factor Services:
A-Factor-Content-of-Trade Approach
The environment as a factor of production
In the literature of trade and environment, the environment1 is generally conceived of 
as a byproduct of the production and/or consumption of ESGs, or it is treated as a 
factor of production. The conventional textbook approach to environmental 
economics adopts the former approach (Baumöl and Oates 1988). In this context, 
pollution is due to externalities that arise as a result of the production and/or 
consumption of ESGs. The result of these externalities is to drive a ‘wedge’ between 
the private and social marginal cost of production. This ‘wedge’ can then be corrected 
through a Pigovian tax-sum-subsidy scheme.
This approach can be extended to analyse the effects of trade liberalisation on 
production and trade in the environment. A simple partial equilibrium model is often 
used to illustrate such effects (Anderson and Blackhurst 1992).
However, the idea that the environment should be treated as a factor of production 
can be traced to Coase’s well-known paper (Coase 1960). In his paper, Coase showed 
that, even if the Pigovian tax is exactly adjusted to equal the damage that would be 
done to society as a result of the negative production externality, the tax would not 
necessarily bring about Pareto optimal solutions. This interesting finding leads Coase 
to insist on a change of approach so that the environment is treated as a factor of
'For example, pollution.
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production. ‘If factors of production are thought of as rights, it becomes easier to 
understand that the right to do something which has a harmful effect (such as the 
creation of smoke, noise, smells, etc.) is also a factor of production’ (Coase 1960: 
44).
The idea that the environment can be treated as a factor of production has recently 
been formally incorporated into theoretical modelling (Siebert 1987; Lopez 1992; 
among others). For example, Siebert (1987) interprets nature and the environment as 
a scarce resource. Ramon Lopez (1992) extends the conventional neoclassical 
production function to include the environment. In that model, total industry output is 
also a function of the environmental factor of production, y, = G' [f (K„ L, 4), jc,-; r], 
where y, is the output of industry i, x,• is the environmental factor used by industry i 
and r is an index of technology. Lopez argues that it is necessary to distinguish two 
types of environmental factor. The first type is that which does not have stock 
feedback effects in production, such as air pollution. Air quality tends to improve 
very fast when the rate of air emissions is reduced. In the case of air as an 
environmental factor, x, is air emissions produced by industry i. The other type is an 
environmental resource that has both flow and stock feedback effects on production. 
Examples of these are forest resources, fish stocks and agricultural soil depth. In these 
cases, production can expand in the short run by more intensive exploitation of the 
resource, but at the cost of a gradual reduction in the stock, which eventually may 
decrease productivity in the respective industries.
It is well known that international trade in goods can be interpreted as indirect flows 
of factor services. Thus, international trade in ESGs can also be interpreted as indirect 
flows of environmental factor services if the environment is treated as a factor of
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production. It would be interesting to investigate the trade patterns of embodied 
environmental factor services across a range of countries over time. The results could 
be compared with those obtained in the previous chapter in which attention is focused 
on the changing pattern of tradable goods that move across borders over time. These 
are two basic approaches to testing trade theory, particularly the Heckscher-Ohlin 
(H-O) Theorem.
The concept of trade in embodied environmental factor services, where pollution is 
the environmental factor, captures the idea that traded goods embody an 
environmental factor service. It reflects the amount of pollution emitted domestically 
for goods produced for export. The relevance of this concept in investigating the trade 
effects of environmental policy lies in the fact that the factor-content-of-trade 
approach is an alternative to the trade-in-goods approach. A simple example 
(applying the H-O Theorem) is that if countries have different domestic 
environmental policies, their ability to pollute or their abundance of environmental 
services2 might differ. In the resulting trade pattern, one would expect countries with 
stringent environmental regulations to have more embodied environmental factor 
services in their imports than that in their exports, while countries with less stringent 
environmental regulations might reveal the opposite pattern. However, as discussed 
below, it becomes very hard to predict the indirect movement of a particular factor 
when there are more than two factors.
Trade in embodied environmental factor services
Surprisingly, there are few studies in the literature that look at trade in embodied
2We assume the same assimilative capacity, social preference and focus on institutional arrangements.
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environmental factor services. In one of the earliest studies, Walter (1973) looks into 
the pollution content of US trade. The question Walter asks is whether 
‘environmental-control charges actually incurred by industry form an essentially 
trade-neutral pattern, or whether they are fundamentally export-biased or import- 
biased’. Walter calculates direct and overall environmental-control (including those 
from intermediate goods) charges for 83 goods and services categories contained in 
the 1966 US input-output table. The environmental-control cost (ECC) is 
approximated using the estimated direct and indirect costs attributable to 
environmental management which include current R&D expenditure for compliance, 
depreciation on current pollution abatement equipment, the capital cost of that 
equipment, and current operating costs associated with environmental management.
The estimated ECC per dollar of sales, together with the input-output coefficients, is 
then used to calculate the direct and overall ECC for each of the 83 sectors. The 
resulting estimates are multiplied by the average annual export (import) value for 
each sector and the summation across 83 sectors gives the pollution content of US 
exports (imports). One should note that the same ECC coefficients are used for both 
exports and imports when ideally foreign trade partners’ ECC coefficients should be 
used for the pollution content of US imports. The pollution content of US exports is 
found to be 1.75 per cent of total exports while the pollution content of US imports is 
found to be 1.52 per cent of total imports. Walter interprets this difference to be 
insignificant, and concludes that ECCs are trade-neutral at best and marginally biased 
against US export industries at worst.
Another study that investigates trade in embodied environmental factor services is 
Robison’s work (1988). He also looks into the pollution content of US trade for 1973,
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1977 and 1982 using input-output tables for 1973 and 1977. This discrete time-series 
result indicates that the ratio of the abatement content of US imports to US exports 
has risen from 1.151 in 1973, to 1.167 in 1977 and 1.389 in 1982. On the basis of this 
result, Robison concludes that ‘there is some evidence that US pollution control 
programs have changed the US comparative advantage such that more high- 
abatement-cost goods will be imported and more low-abatement-cost goods 
exported’. This result differs from that of Walter (1973). Walter’s study shows that 
the ratio of abatement content of US imports to US exports in 1968-70 is 0.812,3 *
which indicates that the United States exports more environmental factor services 
than it imports.
Embodied environmental factor services: data and methodology
In this section, the idea of the factor content of trade is introduced and a modified 
version is derived for the estimation in the next section. The factor content of trade 
approach was first employed by Leontief (1953) in his well-known test of the 
Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) Theorem and later formalised theoretically by Travis (1964), 
Vanek (1968), Melvin (1968), Deardorff (1982) and many others.
We consider a world in which / primary factors combine to produce m goods in n 
countries. Factors cannot be traded but goods can. A country’s consumption, exports 
and imports are described by the following vectors: C ' = (C /,..., C Jm),
X j = (X /,...,X ]m) and M 7 =(Af/,...,M Jm) are m-dimensional vectors of final 
consumption demands for goods in country j, exports and imports of country j, 
respectively; and T'  = (7/ ,...,7^') is an m-dimensional vector of country / s net
3This number is calculated using the average annual overall environmental control loadings of US
imports during the 1968-70 period, that is, US$751 million, divided by that of US exports during the
same period, that is, US$609 million.
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exports. Elements of V will be negative for goods which are net imports. A country’s 
net export vector can then be written in the following form:
T = X - M (4.1)
We then define Vx, V^, VT and V2 as the actual quantities of factors embodied in X, 
M, T and C, respectively. Constant returns to scale and no joint production are 
assumed so that techniques of production can be represented by the amount of inputs 
used per unit of output of each good. Various production techniques can therefore be 
represented by the input-output coefficient matrices A(w), where ahi denotes the 
direct-plus-indirect requirement of factor h per unit of output of good i.
The factors embodied in X are equal to
where a foreign country’s input-output coefficient matrices are distinguished by 
asterisks. Note that if the countries have homogenous, identical technology and factor 
prices are equalised, we obtain
A(w) =A*(w*).
According to Deardorff (1982), the three versions of the factor content of trade can be
Vx = A(w)X (4.2)
and the factors embodied in M are
Vm = A*(w*)M (4.3)
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defined as follows.
1. Factor content based on domestic coefficients, VTD. This factor content of trade 
definition imputes factors to goods on the basis of domestic techniques of 
production, i.e. A(w). This gives
VTD = A(w)X-A(w)M = A(w)T (4.4)
2. Actual factor content of trade, VT: This imputes to traded goods those factors 
actually used in their production wherever that took place. This gives
VT = VX-VM = A(w)X-A*(w*) M (4.5)
3. Factor content based on actual content of consumption, VTC. This refers to the 
difference between country /  s endowment of factors and the factors that are 
embodied in its consumption. In other words,
VTC = V-V1 (4.6)
where V is the total factor endowment vector of country j.
If the countries have homogeneous, identical technologies and factor prices are 
equalised, we obtain A(w) = A*(w*). So definition 1 is equivalent to definition 2. If 
full employment is further assumed, the three definitions of the factor content of trade 
are identical.
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If pollution is treated as one type of environmental factor service, the pollution 
intensity can be measured using the input-output coefficients, A(w), for each sector.
Then, the factor content of trade for each country can be calculated using equation 
(4.5)
Since detailed sectoral pollution intensity data for trading partners (except the United 
States) are generally not available, I follow Walter (1973) and Robison (1988) by 
assuming that US pollution intensity can be applied to other countries. This is not a 
harmless assumption, however, because it could lead to an underestimation of the 
pollution content of exports for countries with lower environmental regulations than 
the United States, and an overestimation of pollution content of exports for countries 
with higher environmental regulations than the United States. In the case of imports, 
this can also lead to an underestimation of the pollution content of imports for 
countries with higher environmental regulations relative to their trading partners. This 
point must be borne in mind when providing interpretations of the pollution content 
of trade for a particular country.
Equation (4.5) becomes
VT = V X-VM = A(w)X-A*(w*)M (4.5)
yT _ yX yM _ A(W)VSX.A(W)™ M (4.7)
where A(V)US denotes the pollution intensity matrix in the United States.
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Two problems arise when one tries to apply real world data to equation (4.7).4 First, 
changing values of exports and imports for a country may simply be due to export or 
import price changes without any real changes. The use of value rather than volume 
of exports and imports may, therefore, bias the result5 as was the case in Walter 
(1973). Second, a macroeconomic imbalance, such as a persistent national saving and 
investment imbalance, may lead to substantial changes in net exports without any 
structural implications.6 For example, the United States experienced persistent current 
account deficits, with current account deficits as a percentage of GDP at 3.70 in 1987 
and an annual average of 2.0 in the 1980s.7 It is obvious that these effects need to be 
removed if meaningful results are to be derived.
We therefore propose to modify equation (4.7) as follows.
( \ ( \
v;=L
i 2X
1 M 5X
V *' ) \  1 7
(4.8)
where i is sector i. 
j  is country j. 
t is year t.
a l. s is pollution intensity index measured by the LAHTI8 index for the United
States.
X ijt is sector i ’s exports for country j  in year t.
M ijt is sector i ’s imports for country j  in year t.
4Both Walter (1973) and Robison (1988) make use of this equation in their studies.
?See further discussion in the section on structural changes.
6For example, factor endowment changes.
7This is calculated on the basis of data from World Development Indicator 1997, World Bank and 
International Economic Databank, the Australian National University.
8The definition follows below.
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Vjt is factor content of trade for country j  in year t.
This modification takes into consideration the above two problems. Instead of using 
the export value for country j  in year t, the export share of sector i for country j  in 
year t is used. This abstracts away the inflation effect if it is an across-the-board 
increase in the prices of all commodities. The assumption of a uniform across-the- 
board price increase is equivalent to deflating the export value by the export unit 
value index, an approach commonly adopted in applied trade analysis. As will be 
argued later in this chapter, this modification also removes the effects of 
macroeconomic imbalances such as current account deficits. A 1 per cent increase in 
exports spread uniformly across all goods (for example, when domestic savings are 
greater than domestic investment) will not affect the level of this share. This method 
distinguishes this study from those of Walter (1973) and Robison (1988). The 
significance of this modification will be discussed further later.
In order to capture the changing patterns of the pollution content of trade for each 
country in the last 26 years, a normalisation is carried out so that the pollution content 
of net exports for each country in 1970 is normalised to unity. Depending on the 
initial condition, this normalisation can yield a positive or negative unity. If positive, 
this indicates that this country’s exports are more pollution-intensive than its imports. 
The reverse holds for a negative unity. From a time-series perspective, starting from a 
positive result in year 1970, a number greater than one, say 1.3, in the later years, t = 
1970 + n with n = 1, ..., 26, indicates that the pollution content of exports for country 
j  in year t is 1.3 times as great as that in 1970. A change of sign indicates a structural 
change in the pollution content of trade.
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To explore further whether there are structural changes on the patterns of embodied 
environmental factor services trade, the import content of embodied environmental 
factor services trade, as measured by
yMyp
f  \
v *■ )
(4.9)
is then divided by the export content of embodied environmental factor services trade, 
as measured by
Vxv jt
f  \
V ' /
(4.10)
That is,
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An index of greater than unity, I jt >-1, indicates that country f s  imports are more
pollution-intensive than its exports in year t while an index of less than unity indicates 
that country f s  exports are inherently more pollution-intensive than its imports in 
year t.
In terms of data, this study differs from those of Walter (1973) and Robison (1988) in 
that I use a newly available index, the Linear Acute Human Toxic Intensity (LAHTI)
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index,9 developed by the Industrial Pollution Projection System (IPPS) of the World 
Bank in 1994,10 to measure the embodied environmental factor services. The LAHTI 
index belongs to the family of pollution intensity indexes and it measures the amount 
of pounds of toxic chemical releases and transfers per US$1,000.
The highest LAHTI index is for fertilisers and pesticides (ISIC 3512) with 105.3 risk- 
weighted pounds of toxic chemical releases and transfers per US$1,000 of product 
shipped while the lowest LAHTI index is for soft drinks and carbonated water (ISIC 
3134), with only 0.22 pounds per US$1,000. The LAHTI index generally confirms 
the intuitive belief that the most intensive sectors in terms of toxic waste per dollar of 
output are industrial chemicals, plastics, paper and metals. The middle-ranked sectors 
are associated with consumer products such as electrical appliances, textiles, and 
cleaning preparations, followed by the high shipment value (and consequently 
relatively low intensity) machine-tool industry, with the food and drink sectors filling 
the least intensive rankings. This pattern of pollution intensity also largely conforms 
to the ESGs that are used in the previous chapter.
Data for exports and imports by ISIC sector for each country from 1970-96 are 
calculated. This is done by making a concordance between ISIC and SITC codes.11 I 
have data for 29 countries’ exports and imports for each ISIC four-digit sector in the 
last 26 years. These ISIC four-digit sectors match the sectors of the pollution intensity 
developed by World Bank IPPS project (1994).
9Lee and Roland-Holst (1997) also use this index for a different sort of examination of the pollution 
content of Japan and India’s trade.
10For a detailed discussion of the construction of this index, see Hettige, Marin, Sinh and Wheeler 
(1994).
"This work was carried out at International Economic Databank of the Australian National University.
78
Some caveats are in order. Deardorff (1982), Ethier (1984) and Helpman (1984) 
provide the factor-content version of the general law of comparative advantage as 
summarised in Wong (1995). With identical technologies across countries, a country 
on average indirectly exports the factor that is cheaper under autarky. However, it 
becomes very hard to predict the indirect movement of a particular factor when there 
are more than two factors.
Since the focus of this study is whether there are systematic structural changes in the 
pattern of the embodied environmental factor service trade, the problem of predicting 
indirect movements of environmental factor services is not of great interest here. If 
stringent environmental factors do have significant impacts on the export 
performance of ESGs, one would expect a significant fall in net exports of embodied 
environmental factor services exports and a significant increase of embodied 
environmental factor services imports. It is this hypothesis that I investigated using a 
trade-in-goods approach in the previous chapter. The next section examines this using 
a factor-content-of-trade approach.
Are there structural changes?
Table 4.1 presents trends in net exports of environmental factor services, with a 
normalisation performed in 1970. Two distinct features emerge from this table. First, 
I turn to changes in sign that indicate significant structural changes of the pollution 
content of trade. I observe that the sign remains unchanged in this period for the 
majority of countries. Countries that are net importers of environmental factor 
services remained so throughout the period examined, as did countries who were net 
exporters of environmental factor services. Take the United States as an example. If
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net exports of environmental factor services are normalised to unity for 1970, this 
index remains around unity in the 1970s. If the introduction of stringent 
environmental regulation has significant effects on trade patterns, we would expect a 
significant decline of net exports of environmental factor services. However, this is 
not what I observe. There are even slight increases in net exports of environmental 
factor services in the 1980s, and this index declines to 1.3 in 1996. This indicates that 
no systematic structural changes occurred in patterns of the pollution content of trade 
despite the introduction of higher environmental regulations in the 1970s and 1980s 
in most developed countries. This result is generally consistent with what I found 
using the trade-in-goods approach in the previous chapter. Of course, there are a few 
exceptions, for example, Australia, Ireland and Malaysia. A simple correlation test 
indicates there is a positive correlation between the performance in the initial year 
and that of the end year (see Figure 4.1).
Second, I examine the variations for each country across time. Table 4.1 also 
calculates the mean and variance of each country in the period 1970-96. The variance 
is low except for Japan, the United Kingdom, Malaysia, Australia, Taiwan and 
Mexico.
When I plot net export performance of environmental factor services in 1971-75 
against that in 1991-95 for each country selected, I obtain the picture shown in Figure 
4.1. The underlying data are given in column 3 and 7, Table 4.1. As this figure 
reveals, most of the data points are bunched in the first (northeast) and the third 
(southwest) quadrants, suggesting very strongly that there is a positive correlation 
between the net export performance of environmental factor services in 1971-75 and 
that in 1991-95. This indicates that countries that are net importers of environmental
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factor services remained so throughout the period examined, as did countries who
were net exporters of environmental factor services.
Table 4.1 Indices of net exports of environmental factor services: 1970 = 1
1970 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996 Mean Variance
US 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.7 2.6 1.6 1.3 1.5 2.0
Japan -1.0 -0.3 -2.7 -5.5 -4.8 -3.2 -1.6 -2.7 22.7
Germany, Fed. 1.0 1.4 0.6 0.0 -0.1 n.a. n.a. 0.6
France -1.0 -1.2 -1.2 -1.0 -0.7 -0.7 -0.9 -0.9 0.3
United Kingdom -1.0 0.1 0.9 2.0 2.1 0.7 -0.4 0.6 7.9
Italy -1.0 -0.6 -1.0 -0.6 -0.8 -0.9 -0.6 -0.8 0.2
Finland 1.0 1.1 0.3 0.6 1.8 1.2 1.5 1.1 1.5
Norway 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.4 1.4 0.8 0.5 1.0 0.6
Sweden -1.0 -1.1 -1.3 -1.5 -0.4 -0.7 -0.8 -1.0 0.8
Denmark -1.0 -1.1 -0.9 -1.0 -0.8 -0.7 -0.5 -0.9 0.3
Netherlands 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 0.5 0.6 1.1 1.1
Ireland -1.0 -0.9 -0.5 -0.2 -0.3 0.2 0.5 -0.3 1.7
Spain -1.0 -0.9 -0.9 -0.6 -0.3 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 0.3
Belgium-Luxemburg 1.0 1.2 1.0 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.6 1.2
Canada 1.0 1.0 1.2 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.8 0.9
Australia -1.0 -1.6 5.0 8.1 2.5 3.3 4.8 3.0 70.9
New Zealand -1.0 -0.9 -0.9 -0.8 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.7 0.4
Greece 1.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 -0.3 0.0 -0.1 1.7
Singapore -1.0 -2.1 -1.9 -1.4 -1.4 -1.7 -1.7 -1.6 0.8
Korea -1.0 -1.4 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 -0.6 -0.4 -1.0 0.6
Hong Kong -1.0 -1.0 -1.1 -1.0 -1.2 -1.1 -1.0 -1.0 0.0
Taiwan -1.0 -1.7 -1.7 -1.6 -1.5 -1.0 -0.9 -1.3 0.8
Mexico 1.0 -0.3 -0.3 -0.5 -1.2 -1.4 -2.4 -0.7 6.9
Chile 1.0 0.7 1.6 0.8 0.3 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9
India -1.0 -1.9 -1.2 -1.4 -1.1 -1.4 -0.4 -1.2 1.3
Indonesia -1.0 -1.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.7 0.7
Malaysia 1.0 0.2 -1.4 -1.5 -1.9 -1.6 -1.2 -0.9 7.1
Philippines -1.0 -1.3 -0.9 -0.9 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.8 0.7
China -1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.6 0.3
Note: ‘n.a.’ denotes ‘not available’.
Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of UNIDO and UN COMTRADE database at International 
Economic Databank, the Australian National University.
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Figure 4.1 Net exports of environmental factor services: 1970-75 vs 1991-95
Finland
JAPAN
Note: The horizontal axis denotes values in 1971-75; the vrtical axis denotes 1991-95 values.
Source: Author’s calculations.
Similar patterns can be found in Table 4.2 where the pollution content of imports to 
exports ratios is calculated. For example, the United States has a pollution content of 
imports to exports ratio of 0.90 in 1970-72, indicating that the United States exported 
more environmental factor services than it imported. This ratio remains relatively 
unchanged and is 0.82 in 1994-96. Western European countries, such as Finland, 
Norway, Netherlands and Belgium-Luxembourg, also export more environmental 
factor services than they import, again without experiencing any structural changes, 
despite the fact that stringent environmental regulations were introduced in the 1970s 
and 1980s.
Strikingly, most of the developing countries import more environmental factor
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services than they export. Newly industralising economies (NIEs) such as Korea, 
Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong and Mexico, import more pollution-intensive goods 
than they export, with a persistent pattern since the 1970s when the data are first 
available. Developing East Asian countries such as China, India, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and India also import more environmental factor services than they 
export, with countries like China, the Philippines and Indonesia exhibiting a slightly 
declining trend.
The time-series patterns of the environmental factor content of trade observed differ 
significantly from the predictions of conventional wisdom. Developed countries 
overall export more environmental factor services than they import while developing 
countries import more environmental factor services than they export, despite the fact 
that stringent environmental standards have been in place since the 1970s in 
developed countries. This finding therefore merits further explanation. Relatively 
stringent environmental regulation in developed countries implies relatively scarcity 
in environmental factor endowment. However, if we allow for technological 
differences across countries, relative factor abundance has to be reinterpreted in terms 
of ‘effective’ factor endowments, as discussed in Chapter 2. With developed 
countries developing advanced technology in the production of ESGs, the ‘effective’ 
factor endowments in developed countries may be more abundant than in developing 
countries so that developed countries export more environmental factor services. The 
linkage between environmental regulation and technology innovation will be 
explored further in a dynamic intertemporal general equilibrium model in Chapter 5. 
In the meantime, we can accept the fact of technology difference across countries in a 
static world.
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Also, with more than two factors embodied in trade flows, it is very difficult to 
predict indirect flows of factor services. If environmental regulations do have a 
significant impact on the international competitiveness of ESG industries, structural 
changes in the patterns of indirect flows of factor services should be expected. The 
above results indicate that there are no significant structural changes in the patterns of 
the environmental factor content of trade.
Table 4.2 Patterns of environmental factor content of trade: import-export ratio
(three-year average)
1970- 1973- 1976- 1979- 1982- 1985- 1988- 1991- 1994-
72 75 78 81 84 87 90 93 96
u.s. 0.90 0.89 0.94 0.86 0.83 0.73 0.75 0.83 0.82
Japan 1.07 1.01 1.25 1.45 1.75 1.83 1.61 1.52 1.30
Germany, Fed. 0.96 0.95 0.98 0.98 1.00 1.01 1.00 n.a. n.a.
France 1.22 1.19 1.20 1.23 1.16 1.13 1.10 1.12 1.17
United Kingdom 1.05 0.97 0.95 0.92 0.87 0.85 0.87 0.92 1.00
Italy 1.23 1.12 1.22 1.23 1.14 1.16 1.23 1.23 1.22
Finland 0.91 0.93 0.98 0.97 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.90 0.91
Norway 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.69 0.64 0.60 0.65 0.68 0.86
Sweden 1.11 1.09 1.10 1.13 1.15 1.08 1.02 1.06 1.09
Denmark 1.73 1.78 1.58 1.65 1.59 1.45 1.52 1.46 1.33
Netherland 0.84 0.80 0.82 0.80 0.82 0.79 0.85 0.92 0.92
Ireland 2.06 1.70 1.47 1.17 1.09 1.19 1.12 0.96 0.83
Spain 1.44 1.32 1.34 1.30 1.22 1.20 1.08 1.20 1.31
Belgium-Luxemburg 0.83 0.81 0.83 0.85 0.93 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.95
Canada 0.77 0.77 0.76 0.72 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.90 0.94
Australia 1.13 1.06 0.77 0.78 0.69 0.69 1.03 0.92 0.78
New Zealand 3.70 2.99 2.51 2.37 2.33 1.81 1.62 1.63 1.33
Greece 0.79 1.04 1.03 1.08 1.32 1.34 1.21 1.13 1.14
Singapore 1.02 1.17 1.06 1.12 1.06 1.07 1.09 1.09 1.13
Korea 1.52 1.83 1.62 1.38 1.48 1.57 1.56 1.30 1.24
Hong Kong 1.43 1.44 1.48 1.43 1.40 1.58 1.58 1.50 1.50
Taiwan 1.71 2.08 2.00 1.82 1.90 1.87 1.73 1.53 1.48
Mexico 0.97 1.06 1.09 0.93 1.05 1.33 1.05 1.15 1.44
Chile 0.74 0.95 0.67 0.70 0.83 1.06 0.84 0.84 0.78
India 1.66 2.69 1.73 2.00 1.93 1.92 1.78 1.98 1.57
Indonesia 2.10 1.80 1.15 1.25 1.14 1.27 1.28 1.20 1.24
Malaysia 0.86 1.04 1.21 1.31 1.35 1.43 1.44 1.43 1.36
Philippines 2.87 3.73 2.27 1.95 2.06 1.48 1.30 1.39 1.49
China 2.39 2.05 2.02 1.68 1.84 1.35 1.74 1.71 1.49
Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of UNIDO and UN COMTRADE database at International 
Economic Databank, the Australian National University.
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A comparision of approaches
In this section, I discuss the significance of my modification of the methodology 
comparing it with Walter (1973), using data for the United States as an example. 
Recall that I make use of equation (4.8) in the calculation of the environmental factor 
content of trade. One interpretation of this approach is that the United States’ 
environmental factor content of trade is simply the trade-share-weighted average of 
pollution content across ISIC four-digit sectors. Equation (4.8) is written again for 
convenience as follows:
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If the United States was shifting away from pollution-intensive goods exports to non- 
pollution-intensive goods exports, the export-share-weighted average of the pollution 
content would decrease. This formula can therefore be used to look at the changing 
trade pattern of embodied environmental factor services.
Walter (1973) makes use of the following approach
(4.12)
This is nothing but an explicit expression of equation (4.5). Instead of using trade 
share as the weight, Walter (1973) uses trade (exports or imports) value as the weight
in equation (4.12).
If the assumptions that trade is balanced at all points of time, and that there is no 
inflation hold, (as in the H-O-V Theorem), there is no problem with using this 
approach. However, changes in export unit value and/or import unit value and, in 
particular, changes in macroeconomic balance, would have different implications for 
trade in environmental factor services. Suppose national saving is less than 
investment and this transmits directly to a simultaneous increase in the current 
account deficit. For simplicity, this current account deficit leads to a e across-the- 
board increase in imports while exports remained unchanged. This produces a net 
export content of environmental factor services at time t + 1 as follows
X  = I X % , +1 -  (1 + (4.13)
This will lead to an exaggeration of the environmental factor content of net exports 
although there is no significant change in environmental regulation policy. If one 
makes use of equation (4.8), a e per cent across-the-board increase in imports with 
exports remaining unchanged resulting from a macroeconomic imbalance will not 
lead to any change in the environmental factor content of net exports. To express this 
more clearly, we have
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So Vjt remains unchanged.
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Using the United States as an example, I first deflate US export and import values by 
the export unit value and import unit value indexes to remove any inflationary effects. 
Then I make use of equation (4.12) to calculate the environmental content of trade 
from 1970 to 1996. The resulting volume of environmental factor services is then 
normalised to unity in 1970. In order to see how macroeconomic imbalance affects 
the result, I also normalise the United States’ current account deficit as a percentage 
of GDP so that it is also one in 1970.
Figure 4.2 presents the changing pattern of these two indicators. The most striking 
feature is that the changing pattern of trade in embodied environmental factor services 
closely follows the current account imbalance. This is not surprising given the fact 
that, as reflected in equation (4.13), a change in the macroeconomic balance will lead 
to an exaggeration of the environmental factor content of net exports. Unless the 
effects of macroeconomic imbalance in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s are 
taken into account, the resulting trend in the pattern of environmental factor services 
can be very misleading.
This can be demonstrated using equation (4.8). A macroeconomic imbalance will not 
lead to any changes in the environmental factor content of net exports if one applies 
equation (4.8). (See equation (4.14) for details.) Figure 4.3 plots the changing pattern 
of environmental factor services from 1970 to 1996 after removing the inflationary 
effect and the macroeconomic imbalance effect. I can now compare it with what I 
observe using export (import) value as the weight. The significant difference is that 
there actually was a persistent trade pattern of embodied environmental factor 
services in the last 26 years in the United States.
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Figure 4.2 United States: current account imbalance and trends of embodied 
environmental factor services trade using trade volume as the weight
embodied environmental factor service using trade volume as the weight
1988
Current account deficit to GDP ratio
Source: Author’s calculations. Data for exports and imports are from UNIDO. Data for export and 
import unit value, current account as a percentage of GDP are from International Financial Statistics, 
International Monetary Fund.
Figure 4.3 United States: trends of embodied environmental factor services trade 
using trade share as the weight
1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996
Source: Author’s calculations. Data for exports and imports are from UNIDO. Data for export and 
import unit value, current account as a percentage of GDP are from International Financial Statistics, 
International Monetary Fund.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, the environment has been treated as a factor of production. On the 
basis of this perspective, this chapter investigates the changing patterns of trade in 
embodied environmental factor services across more than 70 ISIC sectors for 29 
countries in the period 1970-96.
There are few studies of the environmental factor content of trade in the literature. 
This study differs from those of Walter (1973) and Robison (1988) in terms of both 
data and methodology. A newly available dataset for a pollution intensity index 
constructed by the IPPS project of the World Bank in 1994 is used in this study. 
Instead of using trade value to calculate net exports of environmental factor services, 
I use the trade-share-weighted average to impute the net export content of 
environmental factor services. The significance of this modification is that it removes 
biases from both the effects of inflation and macroeconomic imbalance. The result 
indicates that the net export content of environmental factor services for the majority 
of the countries in the study does not experience systematic structural change in the 
last 26 years, despite the introduction of stringent environmental regulations in most 
of the developed countries in the 1970s and 1980s. This observation is generally 
consistent with the observations in the last chapter using a trade-in-goods approach.
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5 Trade Effects of Domestic Environmental Policy: A 
Multi-Country Econometric Analysis
We have made use of both the trade-in-goods approach (in Chapter 3) and the trade- 
in-factor-services approach (in Chapter 4) to explore time-series evidence on the trade 
effects of environmental policy across countries. The striking and robust feature 
revealed in these two chapters is that the export performance of ESGs for most of the 
countries does not reveal systematic changes in the last three decades, despite the 
introduction of stringent environmental regulations since the 1970s. In this chapter, 
this phenomenon is subjected to a multi-country econometric test using an extended 
gravity-equation framework. In this framework, bilateral exports depend on the 
countries’ size and wealth, degree of inward orientation, geographic distance that 
measures the natural obstacles to trade between trading partners and ‘artificial’ 
obstacles such as tariffs and environmental stringency. The extent of environmental 
stringency is measured by unique indices recently developed by the World Bank.
I test the following two hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that more stringent 
environmental regulations lower total exports, and/or exports of ESGs, and/or exports 
of non-resource-based ESGs. The second hypothesis is that new trade barriers emerge 
to offset the effects of more stringent environmental regulations.
My findings reject the above two hypotheses. Overall, more stringent environmental 
regulations do not reduce total exports, exports of ESGs or exports of non-resource- 
based ESGs. Neither was there any evidence to support the hypothesis that new trade 
barriers emerge to offset the effects of more stringent environmental regulations.
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Furthermore, higher import tariffs in trading partners are found to reduce significantly 
a reporter country’s export performance in total exports, ESGs and non-resource- 
based ESGs exports. These results conform to the empirical time-series observations 
in Chapters 3 and 4 and may reflect the extent to which increases in the stringency of 
environmental regulations are accompanied by technological innovation so that the 
export performance of ESGs does not deteriorate.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. It first develops the two main 
hypotheses that are testable in the gravity-equation framework. It then describes the 
extended gravity equation with environmental stringency and import tariffs variables 
and presents the data and the measurement used in the study, followed by a 
discussion of the empirical results. The last section provides some conclusions.
The hypothesis
The effect of domestic environmental policy on trade flows has been a major concern 
both to governments and private sectors in many countries. Introducing a higher 
environmental standard into the economy imposes additional costs to the production 
of ESGs and may, therefore, exert a negative impact on the export performance of 
ESGs. As a result, concerns have been expressed that countries with higher 
environmental regulations may lose their comparative advantage in the production 
and exports of ESGs.
The empirical literature on testing the trade effects of domestic environmental policy 
has mainly followed the conventional Heckscher-Ohlin approach, with net exports of 
disaggregated industries as the explanatory variable in a multilateral trade flow
91
context (for example, Kalt 1988; Tobey 1990). Van Beers and van den Bergh (1997), 
however, argue that a disadvantage of this approach is that the effects of differences 
in strict environmental regulations on trade flows between countries may cancel out 
as multilateral trade flows are an aggregate of bilateral trade. Furthermore, changes in 
the stringency of environmental regulations may have different impacts on resource- 
based and non-resource-based (footloose) environmentally sensitive industries. Non­
resource-based ESGs can respond to changes of environmental costs by migrating to 
countries with less stringent environmental regulations (Markusen et al. 1993). On 
the other hand, resource-based ESGs may not be sensitive to alterations in the 
stringency of environmental regulations. Jaffe et al. (1995), for example, argue that 
natural resource endowments may partly or largely explain the pattern of pollution­
intensive exports. Therefore, testing the effects on exports of non-resource-based 
environmentally sensitive goods may be a more sensible approach than testing total 
exports or total ESGs.
It is well known that importing countries’ trade tariffs exert negative effects on their 
trading partners’ export performance. It has also been argued that trade barriers may 
emerge to offset the trade effects of more stringent environmental regulations. For 
example, Leidy and Hoekman (1994) discuss the possibility that new trade barriers 
may have emerged to offset the effects of more stringent environmental regulations. It 
is, therefore, necessary to disentangle the trade effects that arise from reporter 
countries’ relatively stringent environmental regulations from their own and their 
trading partners’ high import tariffs. I shall include indicators that measure the degree 
of trade protection and test these effects explicitly.
I therefore set out the hypothesis of this study as follows.
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Hypothesis /  Higher stringency of environmental regulations lowers total bilateral 
exports, bilateral exports of ESGs and bilateral exports of non­
resource-based ESGs.
Hypothesis II New trade barriers emerge to offset the trade effects of more stringent 
environmental regulations.
Although Van Beers and van den Bergh (1997) employ a similar framework to test 
the trade effects of environmental policy, this study differs from theirs in three major 
ways. First, I use a recently available, unique environmental performance index 
developed by a World Bank research team after two years’ work based on 31 
countries’ environmental reports presented to the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992 by 145 countries. The UNCED 
reports are similar in form as well as coverage, and permit cross-country 
comparisons. This is expected to minimise significantly any possible measurement 
errors arising from inter-country environmental regulations.
Secondly, my sample avoids possible sample selection bias, which is a crucial issue 
in drawing inferences from the sample regression results. ‘The 31 UNCED report 
countries were selected randomly from the total of 145 by the Work Bank research 
team. These 31 countries range from highly industrialized to extremely poor, they are 
drawn from every world region, and they range in size and diversity from China to 
Jamaica’ (Dasgupta et al. 1995: 3). Van Beers and van den Bergh’s (1997) sample 
consists of 21 OECD countries only. Since the trade effects of domestic
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environmental policy are mainly a North-South rather than a North-North problem, 
there is an obvious sample selection bias problem in their study.
Thirdly, a technical deficiency relating to their measurement of export flows is that 
macro fluctuation is not properly taken into account. They pick up exports in a 
particular year (1992) without removing the effects of cyclical and macro 
disturbances. This might bias the results significantly, as discussed in Chapter 4.
Empirical model of trade with environmental regulations
In the 1960s the gravity model was developed independently, by Dutch economists 
Tinbergen (1962) and his collaborator Linnemann (1966) and Finnish economists 
Pöyhönen (1963) and Pulliainen (1963). It has been used extensively in empirical 
studies of international trade since then. As Anderson put it, the gravity equation is 
‘[p]robably the most successful empirical trade device of the last twenty-five years’ 
and ‘usually produces a good fit’ (1979: 106). The theoretical foundations of the 
gravity model can be found in Anderson (1979), Helpman and Krugman (1985), 
Helpman (1987) and Bergstrand (1985; 1989; 1990). According to this static general 
equilibrium model, bilateral trade is determined by three factors, as discussed 
extensively by Linnemann (1966): (1) factors indicating total potential supply of 
exporting countries, such as exporting countries’ income and population;1 (2) factors 
indicating total potential demand of importing countries, such as importing countries’ 
income and population; (3) factors representing the ‘resistance’ to a trade flow from a
'Population as an explanatory variable of potential export supply may not be such a straightforward 
matter. Linnemann uses the ratio between production for the domestic market and production for the 
foreign market as an indicator and argues that a larger population tends to be associated with high 
domestic market/foreign market ratio due to economies of scale and diversification demands (1966: 
12-14).
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potential supplier to a potential buyer, such as geographic distance and other 
‘artificial’ trade impediments.
The use of geographic distance to measure the natural obstacles to trade is 
controversial. Some suggest measuring the economic distance between countries on 
the basis of the difference between f.o.b. prices for particular commodities, as they 
can be calculated from the foreign trade statistics. However, Linnemann (1966) 
rejects this suggestion on the ground that this method would tend to underestimate 
differences in economic distance. This is simply because it can only be applied to 
(some) commodities actually traded between the countries concerned, but not to 
commodities which are not traded between them because of the very fact that 
transportation costs are too high. Also, three elements of natural trade obstacles, 
namely transport costs, transport time and economic horizon (or ‘psychic distance’), 
are all clearly related to the distance between the two trading partners. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to use geographic distance as a ‘proxy variable’ for total natural trade 
impediments but one has to keep in mind that it not only stands for transportation 
costs but also for a variety of factors that together constitute obstacles to trade due to 
the existence of space.2
The basic gravity equation is given by
X,J = A ,( Y f '  {N .)h( y />  { N / '  ( D y (ESVV, (5.1)
where X (J is exports from country i to country j ;  ( Yi ) and ( Yj ) are GDP for exporting 
country i and importing country ;; ( N t ) and ( AL) are populations of countries i and
2 For a detailed discussion, see Linnemann (1966).
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j\ Dt] is the geographical distance between countries i to j; ( ENVi) and ( ENVj ) are 
environmental stringency indices developed by the World Bank; etj is a log normally 
distributed error term.
Since import tariffs are frequently argued to be either an ‘artificial’ obstacle to trade 
or new trade barriers that have emerged to offset the effects of more stringent 
environmental regulations, I extend the above model further to include variables of 
import tariffs both for reporting and partner countries. Equation (5.1) therefore is 
modified as
= /30 O' )ft (N, )ft (Y/> (Nt )h  (D„ )a (ENV, (DT, /*
(5.2)
where ( DTj) and ( DT j ) are import tariffs of countries i and j, respectively.
Different versions of this gravity equation have been used in empirical studies. 
However, equation (5.1) is the most general version in the sense that it encompasses 
other more restricted gravity models. For example, Kalirajan and Shand (1998) do not 
include population in their equation but instead use GDP per capita. This is equivalent 
to placing the restriction that the coefficient on GDP and population are of equal 
value but the opposite sign. Tamirisa (1998) uses GDP per capita rather than GDP in 
his gravity equation analysis. Mathematically, this is essentially equation (5.1) after 
simple re-parameterisation.
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To implement the empirical analysis, the above equations are modified by taking 
natural logs for both sides of the equations and the resulting estimated equations are 
log-linear as follows:
ln(X„) = a 0 + ß ,ln(y,)+ ß 2\n(Ni) + ß } ln(Fy)+ ln(Wy) +
ß 5 ln(Djy) + ß 6ln (ENV,) + 7 ln(SVV,.) + e,y
and
ln(X.. ) = a 0 + ß ] ln(T,.) + ß 2 \n(Ni) + ß 3 \n(Y.) + ß 4 \n(N .) + ß 5 ln(/)..) + 
ß 6 ln (ENV,) + ß 7 ln (ENVi) + ß 8 ln(D7)) + ß9 In (D7\) + e,y
(5.4)
where a 0 = \n(ß0) is the constant term that accounts for the effects of unmeasured 
trade distortions on exports and I leave the error term e(/ to take care of all the 
possible measurement errors and £ij is assumed to be independently and identically 
distributed. The model can be estimated by the ordinary-least-squares method.
Data and measurement
Empirical implementation of the model described in the previous section requires 
data on bilateral total exports, bilateral exports of ESGs and bilateral exports of non­
resource-based ESGs, gross domestic product (GDP), population, bilateral geographic 
distance, environmental stringency and import tariffs.
The major data constraint concerns the environmental stringency variable. Data for 
environmental stringency are generally not available, especially comparable cross-
sectional data. Fortunately, I am able to make use of a set of unique environmental 
stringency indices recently developed by the World Bank. The World Bank’s set of 
environmental stringency indices covers 31 countries. These indices measure the 
status of environmental policy and performance using a multidimensional survey of 
31 national UNCED reports from Rio. These reports were compiled by each country 
on the basis of identical survey questions and clearly defined UNCED guidelines. The 
participation of non-government organisations (NGOs) in these surveys helps to 
assure us that the UNCED reports are not mere government handouts. These make a 
cross-country comparison possible (see Dasgupta et al. 1995). This set of indices 
encompasses many aspects of environmental policy and therefore can be used as the 
‘proxy variable’ for environmental stringency. Since the survey considers the state of 
policy and performance in four environmental dimensions, namely, Air, Water, Land 
and Living Resources, the resulting environmental stringency index is a composite 
index of these four environmental dimension indices.
Unfortunately, some countries do not engage in bilateral trade with other sample 
countries. I therefore eliminate them from the sample. The resulting number of 
sample countries is 20. They are Bangladesh, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Egypt, Finland, 
Germany, India, Ireland, Kenya, Korea, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, South Africa, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad/Tobago and Tunisia. The 
model is estimated using cross-sectional data for these 20 countries in 1990 and there 
is a total of 361 observations.
The definition for ESGs has been discussed in detail in Chapter 3. Non-resource- 
based ESGs include ‘iron and steel’ (SITC 67), ‘metal manufactures, n.e.s.’ (SITC 
69), ‘cement’ (SITC 661) and ‘agricultural chemicals’ (SITC 599). This definition is
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based on Low (1992) and UNIDO (1982) and is discussed by Van Beers and van den 
Bergh (1997).
Data on bilateral exports are obtained from the United Nation’s COMTRADE 
database, available at the International Economic Data Bank of the Australian 
National University. Since current bilateral export data are subject to various 
distortions such as macroeconomic imbalance and inflation, I deflate export data in 
the period 1988 to 1992 using an export price index for each country obtained from 
the World Bank’s World Development Indicator (1997). These data are then averaged 
over 1988-92. Bilateral trade data are in US$ ’000.
Data on real GDP and population are obtained from Penn World Tables, Mark 5.6, by 
Summers and Heston (1991), available from the National Bureau of Economic 
Research online web site. Real GDP is in US$ billion while population is expressed 
in millions. Geographic distance is the direct-line distance between the capital cities 
of countries. It is measured in kilometres.
Since measurement of the intensity of non-tariff barriers is challenging, and the 
available measures are inadequate, I use explicit import tariffs to capture the border 
distortions. Therefore, in this study, the effects of non-tariff barriers (other than 
environmental stringency) are not measured separately but accounted for in the 
intercept (Tamirisa 1998 makes the same assumption). Import tariffs are measured as 
tariff revenue as a share of total imports and are obtained from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicator 1997.
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Data for environmental stringency are obtained from Dasgupta, Mody, Roy and 
Wheeler (1995). The data belong to the family of index numbers, with the larger 
number indicating high stringency of environmental policy.
A list of summary statistics of the above variables, including mean, standard 
deviation, minimum, maximum and number of observations, is given in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.2 provides the correlation coefficient between variables. Most of the variables 
were not highly correlated, with the exception of GDP and population. High 
correlation between GDP and population may not be a serious problem since I can 
test the restriction that the coefficients of GDP and population are the same but of 
opposite sign. If this restriction is valid, I can use GDP per capita rather than GDP 
and population separately. Furthermore, what I am interested in is the sign and 
coefficient of the environmental regulation variable and those of the import tariff 
variable, rather than those of GDP or population. Since the variables are not highly 
correlated, the possibility of multicollinearity can be excluded.
Estimation results
The estimation of equation (5.3) in general will violate the statistical hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity since my sample countries differ greatly in terms of income and 
country size. The error terms associated with large countries might have variances 
much larger than the error terms associated with smaller countries. This may also be 
the case with income. I conduct various heteroscedasticity tests' and am able to
3 The results are not reported here but are available on request.
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reject the statistical assumption of homoscedasticity. In the light of this, I first make 
use of the White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix and calculate 
the t-value based on the corrected standard errors. The result is reported in Table 5.3. 
Furthermore, I implement the maximum likelihood estimation of equation (5.3) and 
(5.4) to correct possible ‘dependent variable heteroscedasticity’ (Prais and 
Houthakker 1955 and Theil 1971), with results reported in Appendix 5A and 5B.
Table 5.3 provides three versions of regressions for equation (5.3) with dependent 
variables using total bilateral exports (ln(X..)), bilateral exports of ESGs (In(Xdy))
and bilateral exports of non-resource-based ESGs (ln(Xrc;y)), respectively. The
results suggest that all coefficients have the expected signs in all three regressions. 
GDP in country i indicating the potential export supply and GDP in country j  
indicating the potential import demand are both found to be positive, and highly 
significant factors (at the \ per cent level) in determining bilateral exports for the full 
sample. Parameters on population variables for the exporting countries are negative 
and significant, indicating that the greater the population the higher the domestic 
market-foreign market ratio. Coefficients of population variables for importing 
countries are negative but not significant for all three regressions. Coefficients of 
distance variables are negative and statistically significant at the 1 per cent level for 
all three equations, suggesting that the higher the transportation costs the lower the 
bilateral exports.
The coefficients of In(ENVi) are all positive and statistically significant at least at the
1 per cent level. This suggests that the hypothesis that more stringent environmental 
regulation will lower total bilateral exports, exports of ESGs and non-resource-based
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ESGs exports can be rejected. I do not even find evidence to support the hypothesis 
that higher environmental regulations will lower exports of non-resource-based ESGs, 
an argument that has been frequently put forward on the basis that non-resource- 
based ESGs are footloose industries and respond significantly to changes in the 
stringency of environmental regulations.
To investigate whether new trade barriers emerge to offset the trade effects of more 
stringent environmental regulations and to disentangle the effects of environmental 
regulations and those of border distortions, I include import tariff variables and carry 
out a regression on equation (5.4). The results, with White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity 
correction, are reported in Table 5.4. The overall coefficient significant tests using F- 
statistics are significant, ranging from 71.84 to 90.51 with (9, 351) degree freedom. 
Adjusted R-square values range from 0.64 to 0.69. Both GDP variables for exporting 
and importing countries and distance variables have the expected sign and are at least 
statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. Even then, high environmental 
stringency in exporting countries is not associated with lower total bilateral exports, 
lower ESGs exports or lower non-resource-based ESGs exports.
We find that partner countries’ high import tariffs do reduce reporter countries’ 
export performance in total bilateral exports, ESG exports and non-resource-based 
ESG exports, significant at least at the 1 per cent level. However, the hypothesis that 
new trade barriers emerge to offset the trade effects of higher stringency of 
environmental regulations cannot be accepted in the light of this test. Coefficients of 
import tariffs (ln(DT’)) for exporting countries appear to be positive but statistically 
insignificant.
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Results from the dependent variable heteroscedasticity model using the maximum 
likelihood estimation technique, as shown in Appendix 5.1 and 5.2, reveal similar 
patterns. This suggests that my findings are rather robust.
I not only make use of the composite environmental stringency index in my 
regressions, but also carry out separate tests on equation (5.3) and (5.4) using each of 
the four dimensional environmental stringency variables, namely, Air, Water, Land 
and Living Resource indices. Results from these tests generally conform to the above 
findings (See Appendices 5.3-5.6). This is not surprising since there is a high 
correlation between these four dimensional environmental stringency variables.
Conclusion
In this chapter, two hypotheses are subjected to a multi-country empirical test using 
an extended gravity equation framework. The first is whether countries with more 
stringent environmental regulations lower their exports of ESGs and/or non-resource- 
based ESGs. The second hypothesis is whether new trade barriers emerge to offset the 
trade effects of more stringent environmental policies. To test this hypothesis, I am 
able to make use of a unique set of comparative environmental stringency indices 
recently developed by the World Bank.
Our results reject the above two hypotheses, suggesting that countries with higher 
stringency of environmental regulations do not reduce their exports of ESGs and/or 
non-resource-based ESGs, and that new trade barriers do not emerge to offset the 
trade effects of more stringent environmental policy in any statistically significant 
way. My findings are robust compared with alternative versions of heteroscedasticity
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correction estimations and alternative environmental dimension indices such as the
Air, Water, Land and Living Resource indices also developed by the World Bank.
An implication of this study is that the trade effects of domestic environmental policy 
may not well be understood if one confines oneself to the static factor endowment 
theory. Technological innovation, together with other factors, may be more important 
in determining the export performance of ESGs. A recent study by Berman and Bui 
(1998), using firm-level data, shows that more stringent air quality regulation results 
in an increase in productivity levels in petroleum refining in the United States. They 
conclude that abatement investments are productive. My results are consistent with 
their findings and should help refocus the environmental competitiveness debate.
However, a theoretical model that discusses the linkage between environmental factor 
endowment, technological innovation and growth in a dynamic context is necessary. 
This is a theme that I shall now turn to in Chapter 6.
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Table 5.3 Regression results of extended gravity model (Equation (5.3))
Trade flows In (X y) In (X dy) In (Xny)
ln (Y,) 1.61
(6.32)**
2.38
(8.54)**
3.09
(10.58)**
In (N,-) -0.43
(-1.89)*
-1.13
(-4.47)**
-1.31
(-5.10)**
In (Yj) 1.00
(4.82)**
1.11
(3.78)**
1.16
(3.94)**
In (Nj) -0.09
(-0.45)
-0.07
(-0.26)
-0.38
(-1.47)
ln (Dij) -0.90
(-7.86)**
-0.92
(-6.39)**
-0.81
(-4.66)**
ln (ENV/) 2.32
(3.42)**
2.86
(3.51)**
2.60
(3.05)**
In (ENV/) 1.67
(2.63)**
0.87
(1.04)
0.61
(0.70)
Constant -18.72
(-2.93)**
-21.0
(-2.77)**
-22.22
(-2.62)**
Log-likelihood -695.09 -789.23 -795.43
R2 adjusted 0.665 0.629 0.67
F-statistic 103.24 88.13 105.41
Number of observations 361 361 361
Notes: ** denotes significant at the 1% level; * denotes significant at the 5% level. Figures in 
parentheses are t-ratios.
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Table 5.4 Regression results of extended gravity model (Equation (5.4))
Trade flows In (Xij) In (Xdij) In (Xn,y)
In (Y i) 1.55
(5.88)**
2.32
(8.01)**
3.04
(10.33)**
ln (N;) -0.38
(-1.63)
-1.08
(-4.19)**
-1.27
(-4.96)**
In (Yj) 0.85
(4.07)**
0.90
(3.05)**
0.85
(2.98)**
ln (N ;■) 0.03
(0.18)
0.10
(0.37)
-0.13
(-0.53)
ln (Dij) -0.91
(-8.29)**
-0.94
(-6.76)**
-0.83
(-5.07)**
In (ENV,-) 1.98
(2.84)**
2.48
(2.92)**
2.28
(2.52)**
In (ENV,-) 0.77
(1.14)
-0.30
(-0.35)
-1.15
(-1.27)
ln (DT/) -0.17
(-1.39)
-0.18
(-1.21)
-0.15
(-0.88)
ln (DTj) -0.46
(-3.57)**
-0.60
(-3.38)**
-0.91
(-5.22)**
Constant -8.81
(-1.30)
-8.74
(-1.05)
-5.68
(-0.60)
Log-likelihood -688.83 -783.14 -782.44
R2 adjusted 0.67 0.64 0.69
F-statistic 84.04 71.84 90.51
Number of observations 361 361 361
Notes: ** denotes significant at the 1% level; * denotes significant at the 5% level. Figures in 
parentheses are t-ratios.
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Appendix 5.1 Heteroskedasticity model of extended gravity equation (Equation (5.3))
Trade flows In (Xij) In (Xdy) In (Xnij)
ln (Y,) 1.10 2.52 3.50
(5.15)** (11.99)** (40.03)**
ln (N,) -0.07 -1.63 -1.44
(-0.37) (-7.67)** (-22.32)**
ln (Yß 0.70 1.10 1.20
(3.13)** (4.20)** (18.84)**
In (Nj) 0.22 -0.08 -0.38
(1.10) (-0.40) (-8.12)**
ln (Dij) -0.90 -0.79 -0.83
(-5.55)** (-3.63)** (-11.39)**
ln (ENV,) 2.90 0.99 2.78
(4.63)** (1.25) (6.76)**
In (ENV)) 2.35 -0.18 0.63
(3.65)** (-0.27) (4.32)**
Constant -25.24 -2.69 -24.39
(-3.87)** (-0.34) (-8.37)**
Log-likelihood -766.38 -907.50 -5956.39
R2 adjusted 0.663 0.61 0.675
Number of observations 361 361 361
Notes: ** denotes significant at the 1% level; * denotes significant at the 5% level. Numbers are 
estimated asymptotic coefficients except otherwise indicated. Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t- 
ratios. Results are obtained using quasi-Newton method.
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Appendix 5.2 Heteroskedasticity model of extended gravity equation (Equation (5.4))
Trade flows In (Xy) In (Xdy) In (Xny)
ln (Y,)
In (Nf) 
ln OO) 
ln (Nj )
In (Dy)
ln (ENV,) 
In (ENV}) 
ln (DTd  
ln (DT/) 
Constant
1.09
(5.04)**
-0.07
(-0.36)
0.58
(2.55)**
0.31
(1.61)
-0.91
(-5.68)**
2.38
(3.37)**
1.51
(2.14)**
- 0.20
( - 1.20)
-0.45
(-2.74)**
-14.68
(-1.97)**
2.75
(13.06)**
-1.93
(-8.99)**
0.85
(3.23)**
0.11
(0.54)
- 0.66
(-3.15)**
-0.31
(-0.34)
- 1.22
(-1.73)
-0.09
(-0.44)
-0.72
(-3.50)**
13.44
(1.52)
-910.49
0.60
361
3.36
(34.79)**
-1.32
(-17.83)**
0.93
(11.48)**
-0.19
(-2.76)**
-0.78
(-9.45)**
3.21
(5.73)**
-1.37
(-6.94)**
0.39
(2 .20)**
-0.89
(-12.20)**
-12.98
(-2.97)**
-2797.87
0.685
361
Log-likelihood -762.66
R2 adjusted 0.676
Number of observations 361
Notes: ** denotes significant at the 1% level; * denotes significant at the 5% level. Numbers are 
estimated asymptotic coefficients except otherwise indicated. Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t- 
ratios. Results are obtained using quasi-Newton method.
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Appendix 5.3 Regression results of extended gravity model (Equation (5.4)): Air 
quality regulation as an environmental stringency variable
Trade flows In (Xj j ) In (Xdij) In (Xnl7)
In (Yj) 1.32
(4.21)**
2.28
(6.47)**
3.09
(8.86)**
In (NO -0.18
(-0.63)
-1.06
(-3.29)**
-1.34
(-4.29)**
In (Yj) 0.64
(2.47)**
0.84
(2.45)**
0.88
(2.65)**
ln (Nj) 0.22
(0.90)
0.15
(0.52)
-0.15
(-0.54)
ln (D ij) -0.86
(-7.74)**
-0.94
(-6.59)**
-0.85
(-5.06)**
ln (ENV,0 2.07
(3.00)**
1.80
(2.16)*
1.34
(1.57)**
In (ENVy) 1.15
(1.78)
-0.01
(-0.02)
-0.87
(-1.08)
In (DT,-) -0.19
(-1.61)
-0.26
(-1.82)
-0.25
(-1.52)
ln (DT,) -0.45
(-3.68)**
-0.58
(-3.30)**
-0.87
(-5.12)**
Constant -6.63
(-1.35)
-3.13
(-0.52)
-0.48
(-0.71)
Log-likelihood -687.05 -785.09 -785.14
R2 adjusted 0.68 0.64 0.69
F-statistic 85.26 70.64 88.59
Number of observations 361 361 361
Notes: ** denotes significant at the 1% level; * denotes significant at the 5% level. Figures in 
parentheses are t-ratios (White’s heteroskedasticity corrected).
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Appendix 5.4 Regression results of extended gravity model (Equation (5.4)): Water 
quality regulation as an environmental stringency variable
Trade flows In (Xij) In (Xdy) In (Xnij)
In (Yf) 1.69
(6.77)**
2.37
(8.82)**
3.05
(11.00)**
ln (N,) -0.49
(-2.18)*
-1.09
(-4.45)**
-1.24
(-5.01)**
ln (Y/) 0.83
(4.27)**
0.88
(3.20)**
0.75
(2.83)**
ln (Nj) 0.06
(0.32)
0.12
(0.48)
-0.05
(-0.21)
In (Dij) -0.92
(-8.28)**
-0.92
(-6.70)**
-0.79
(-4.87)**
ln (ENV/) 1.48
(2.24)*
2.52
(3.09)**
2.54
(2.91)**
ln (ENWj) 0.93
(1.43)
-0.21
(-0.26)
-0.78
(-0.90)
ln (DT,) -0.22
(-1.87)
-0.19
(-1.28)
-0.14
(-0.84)
ln (DT,) -0.45
(-3.53)**
-0.60
(-3.36)**
-0.88
(-5.09)**
Constant -3.60
(-0.69)
-6.74
(-1.04)
-7.62
(-1.03)
Log-likelihood -690.07 -782.45 -781.42
R2 adjusted 0.67 0.64 0.69
F-statistic 83.19 72.25 91.24
Number of observations 361 361 361
Notes: ** denotes significant at the 1% level; * denotes significant at the 5% level. Figures in 
parentheses are t-ratios (White’s heteroskedasticity corrected).
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Appendix 5.5 Regression results of extended gravity model (Equation (5.4)): Land 
quality regulation as an environmental stringency variable
Trade flows In (X,;) In (Xdij) In (Xn,;)
In (Yf) 1.65
(6.62)**
2.46
(8.73)**
3.16
(11.08)**
in m -0.47
(-2.19)*
-1.21
(-4.91)**
-1.39
(-5.65)**
ln (Y )) 0.97
(4.93)**
0.94
(3.26)**
0.87
(3.15)**
In ( N j ) -0.08
(-0.44)
0.05
(0.22)
-0.15
(-0.63)
ln (D ij) -0.95
(-8.60)**
-0.97
(-7.02)**
-0.85
(-5.28)**
ln (ENV,) 1.79
(2.46)**
2.16
(2.30)*
2.03
(2.07)**
In (ENV;) 0.25
(0.34)
-0.60
(-0.63)
-1.46
(-1.50)
ln (DT/) -0.19
(-1.60)
-0.23
(-1.50)
-0.19
(-1.09)
ln (DT;) -0.51
(-3.89)**
-0.62
(-3.49)**
-0.92
(-5.30)**
Constant -1.43
(-0.25)
-2.56
(-0.36)
-1.19
(-0.14)
Log-likelihood -690.58 -784.53 -783.36
R2 adjusted 0.67 0.64 0.69
F-statistic 82.85 70.98 89.85
Number of observations 361 361 361
Notes: ** denotes significant at the 1% level; * denotes significant at the 5% level. Figures in 
parentheses are t-ratios (White’s heteroskedasticity corrected).
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Appendix 5.6 Regression results of extended gravity model (Equation (5.4)): Living 
Resource quality regulation as an environmental stringency variable
Trade flows In (X,y) In (Xdy) In (Xn,y)
ln (Y;) 1.57
(6.52)**
2.33
(9.02)**
3.06
(11.55)**
In (N,-) -0.42
(-2.07)*
-1.12
(-5.10)**
-1.32
(-5.96)**
ln (Yj ) 0.93
(5.06)**
0.91
(3.34)**
0.84
(3.21)**
In (Ny) -0.05
(-0.29)
0.09
(0.40)
-0.11
(-0.52)
In (Dy) -0.94
(-8.68)**
-0.95
(-6.87)**
-0.83
(-5.31)**
In (ENVy) 1.99
(3.36)**
2.57
(3.50)*
2.31
(2.98)**
In (ENVy) 0.42
(0.73)
-0.38
(-0.50)
-1.22
(-1.51)
In (DTy) -0.13
(-1.08)
-0.13
(-0.86)
-0.11
(-0.63)
In (DTy) -0.48
(-3.61)**
-0.62
(-3.42)**
-0.94
(-5.36)**
Constant -3.21
(-0.70)
-5.69
(-0.99)
-3.84
(-0.58)
Log-likelihood -687.69 -781.42 -780.82
R2 adjusted 0.68 0.64 0.69
F-statistic 84.82 72.89 91.68
Number of observations 361 361 361
Notes: ** denotes significant at the 1% level; * denotes significant at the 5 % level. Figures in 
parentheses are t-ratios (White’s heteroskedasticity corrected).
Source: Author’s calculations.
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6  Environmental Regulation, Technological
Innovation and Economic Growth: A Theoretical 
Model
Introduction
Many developing countries have long seen environmental regulations and economic 
development as mutually exclusive. According to this view, to achieve rapid 
economic development and secure international competitiveness in environmentally 
sensitive industries, domestic environmental standards should not be stringent. To the 
extent that the environment has assumed a growing importance, this can be postponed 
until a high income level has been achieved. This perception has received 
considerable support from static cost-benefit analysis.
This chapter provides an alternative view on this issue. It attempts to formalise a 
simple model in which the more fundamental, dynamic determinant of a country’s 
long-run growth is its capacity for technology innovation. The physical setup of this 
model is basically along the lines of recent endogenous growth literature, especially 
Uzawa (1965), Lucas (1988) and Rebelo (1991). Three key features characterise the 
model. First, it is based on the intertemporal optimisation of representative agents in 
the economy. Second, ESGs are modelled as an intermediate good which is used in 
the production of final consumption goods. Third, R&D takes place by means of a 
linear technology and is sector-specific (to the intermediate goods sector). Firms with 
an R&D sector therefore have to make decisions about the allocation of the dynamic
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factor that can be accumulated. With the production function exhibiting constant 
returns to scale in the factor that is accumulated, the equilibrium is characterised by 
endogenous growth.
Two important issues can be addressed using this framework. First, what are the 
effects of environmental regulation on long-run growth? Second, how important is 
technological innovation to a country’s growth? The basic findings are that, (1) 
changes in the stringency of environmental regulations do not have long-run growth 
effects; (2) technological innovation is important in determining a country’s long-run 
growth.
The limitation of the model is obvious. Since it is a closed economy model, the 
extension to trade is not addressed explicitly and neither are the trade effects of 
environmental policy. Nevertheless, it does provide a simple framework to address 
the issue of environmental regulation, technological innovation and a country’s long- 
run growth. This is important for countries, especially developing countries, facing 
the choice of appropriate development strategy.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section is the basic 
setup of the model in the context of a central planned economy. Section 3 examines 
the equilibrium, Section 4 looks into balanced growth path and analyses the effects of 
environmental regulation. Section 5 provides a version of this model for a 
decentralised economy. The last section provides a conclusion.
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The basic model: the central planner’s problem
Preferences
Consider an economy where there is an infinitely-lived representative household 
whose intertemporal problem is to choose the level of consumption Y to maximise the 
sum of all its future flows of discounted utility over an unbounded horizon subject to 
an equation of motion of private wealth, A. The utility function is assumed to be 
increasing in Y and strictly concave: U (Y) > 0 and U (Y) < 0. The concavity 
assumption generates a consumption-smoothing profile. U(Y) is also assumed to 
satisfy the Inada conditions: U (Y) —> ° o  as Y —» 0, and U (Y) —> 0 as Y —> «. To 
obtain a closed form solution, we further assume the utility function has the following 
isoelastistic form:
y l - « p  _1
U(Y,) = -------dt (6.1)
This is known as the constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution (CIES) utility 
function and is widely used in the endogenous growth literature because it permits an 
easy solution. The elasticity of substitution for this utility function is the constant a  = 
1/cp. A higher (p implies a lower willingness to substitute intertemporally. p is the 
subjective discount rate.
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Production
There are two factors of production: the environment1 and human capital. Production 
includes two sectors: final goods production using as its inputs the environment factor 
and the intermediate good; and intermediate goods production using as its inputs the 
environment factor and human capital. The production function for each sector can be 
written explicitly as follows.
1) Final goods sector:
Y = E\~aX a (6.2)
where Y denotes output of final goods, E\ is the input of the environment factor in the 
final goods sector and X is the output of intermediate goods. Subscript t is omitted 
hereafter for simplicity.
2) For the intermediate goods sector:
X = E'-ß(eH)ß (6.3)
Where E2 is the input of the environment factor in the intermediate goods sector, H is 
the amount of skill level per worker and 6 e [0,l] is the fraction of human capital 
devoted to the production process. The intermediate goods sector is assumed to be the
1 It may be rather difficult to think of the environment as a of factor of production. The following two 
explanations might be helpful. First, imagine a country sets up a targeted emission quota (it can be set 
up by internal or external demand as at the 1997 Kyoto conference) which is subsequently distributed 
among the major polluters in the country and there is a tradable permit market for these quotas within 
national borders. The price of the quota, therefore, can be regarded as the cost of environment factor 
input. The other way to think about it is that emission reduction implies more abatement activity and 
less conventional inputs available for the production of goods. Reductions in E, the environment 
factor, therefore, result in reduced output (For the latter interpretation, see also Cropper and Oates 
(1992)).
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environmentally sensitive goods sector since most of the ESG sectors ‘tend to be 
basic industries, often involved in the processing of raw materials (chemicals, pulp 
and paper, refineries)’ (Siebert et al. 1980). Its output is used to produce the final 
consumption good and it has an R&D sector attached.
Following Uzawa (1965) and Lucas (1988), endogenous growth is modelled through 
human capital formation that takes place within the firm. I assume that at each point 
in time, production in the intermediate goods sector is endowed with a certain stock 
of human capital. This is a crucial departure from the existing literature. Since human 
capital is assumed to be firm-specific, it can either be used as an additional factor of 
production of intermediate goods or as input to increase the existing human capital 
stock.
H = A ( \ - d ) H  (6.4)
where A is a positive productivity parameter. The environmental factor supply of this 
economy is fixed and is subject to changes by governmental environmental 
regulations. Therefore, we have
E = E, + E2 (6.5)
This completes the basic setup of the model.
Equilibrium
The intertemporal choice facing the planner is
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(6 .6)
f~ y x~v - 1
MaxU(Yt)= e~p ------ -dt
Jt 1 -<p
Subject to. (6.2), (6.3), (6.4) and (6.5) 
The current-value Hamiltonian is given by
yi-<P _  j
J = ~ -------+ A[/l(l ~d)H]+l;l (El'-aX a - Y )  + l;1-[E2'-ßm ) l i +
I —  (p J  ' Z
(6.7)
where X is the shadow price of human capital and , £2 and are the shadow
prices of final consumption goods Y, intermediate goods X and environmental input 
E. Solving the optimal conditions for control variables, Y, X, Ej, E2 and 0, and for the 
state variable H gives the following six first order conditions.
4 11 vTY
v (6.8)
4, (1 - a ) - E ; a( x r  =z3 (6.9)
42( \ -ß )E~ß(0H)ß = 4j (6.10)
= 4 2 (6.11)
$ 2ß E ' - ße ß - ' H ß = XAH (6.12)
X ^ ß E \ - ße ß H ß-' i n  m 
P= + " ,  +A(1 0)
A A
(6.13)
Equation (6.12) states that in equilibrium, the marginal product of human capital must 
be equally valued in production and in human capital accumulation. Equations (6.9)
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and (6.10) state that the marginal product of the environment factor in each 
production sector should be equal to its shadow price, . Equation (6.13) states that
•
in equilibrium, the subjective discount rate equals capital gains, A/A, plus the 
marginal productivity of human capital in production and in ‘schooling’. The 
transversality condition is
lim[A(0-#(0*exp(-p0] = 0 (6.14)
t —>oo
Substituting (6.12) into (6.13) gives
— = p -  A (6.15)
X
Equation (6.15) implies that the shadow price of human capital changes at a constant 
rate, (p - A). Combining equations (6.14) and (6.15), the transversality condition 
becomes
\im[H(t) • exp"A'] = 0 (6.16)
/ —>oo
We can see that the transversality condition holds exactly. Equation (6.16) also 
implies that the quantity of human capital H (t) does not grow asymptotically at a rate 
higher than A. It would be suboptimal for the central planner to accumulate human 
capital forever at a rate higher than A, because utility would increase if this human 
capital were instead put into production at some finite time.
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Now, we can solve for the equilibrium allocation of the environmental factor between 
two sectors, final goods and intermediate goods sectors. Dividing (6.9) by (6.11) and 
making use of equation (6.10), we obtain the following equations:
(6.17)
, = « •(  \ - ß )  
1 - a ß
(6.18)
The equilibrium allocation of the environmental factor between two sectors EJE is 
constant and independent of E.
Balanced growth paths
We can now derive the balanced growth paths of Y, X and H, respectively. From 
equations (6.9), (6.10), (6.11) and (6.12), the following function can be derived:
Substituting equation (6.2) and (6.3) into (6.19) gives the following relation between 
stringency, E and the input of human capital into intermediate goods sector, {OH).
U  (6H) = aß Y'-(p (6.19)
K  ~\A-aßO-q>)X • E /<'-°W-»» (6.20)( 1 - 0 0 X 1 - * ) /
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is a positive constant. Taking
natural logarithms and totally differentiating equation (6.20) with respect to time t 
yields
Note that on the balanced growth path, 0 = 0 .  Since X grows at a constant rate (p - 
A) while H grows at rate A(l-0) along the balanced growth path, one can readily 
solve for the equilibrium value of 6.
This gives the result that on the balanced growth path, changes in E do not affect the 
sectoral allocation of human capital between the production of intermediate goods 
and the R&D sector. Having solved the equilibrium value of 0, we can now examine 
the effects of changes in the stringency of environmental regulation on output growth 
of ESGs and ENSGs (environmentally non-sensitive goods). Dividing (6.2) by (6.3) 
and making use of equation (6.22) gives the following equation:
( 6 .21)
p -aß(\-<p)A  
A(\ -  aß(\ -  (p))
(6 .22)
(6.23)
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where 77 =
a ( l - ß ) /
/ ( l - a ß )
( I - a ) /
/(I -aß)
( a - m - ß )
is a positive constant. It follows that along the
balanced growth path,
(6.24)
Equation (6.24) states that in equilibrium the effects of changes in the stringency of 
environmental regulations on the relative output growth of ENSGs to the ESG sector 
is positive. To put it another way, an increase in environmental stringency (a 
reduction of E) will lead to a higher output of ESGS relative to ENSGs. (Note that 
this result can also be derived in a static version of this model.)
Although changes of environmental supply have level effects on the output of final 
goods, the long-run growth rate of final goods will not be affected by changes in 
environmental supply in this economy. To see this, one can take natural logarithms 
and totally differentiate equation (6.19). This gives
a ß ( A - p )
\-aß{\-q>)
(6.25)
Some properties are worth noting. First, changes in E do not have a long-run effect on 
growth. Second, the rate of growth is higher the greater the productivity of human 
capital accumulation A. Third, the rate of growth is higher the greater the elasticity of
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intertemporal substitution (1/a). Fourth, the rate of growth is higher the lower the 
pure rate of time preference (p).
The decentralised economy
The above problem can also be analysed in the context of a decentralised economy. 
Since there is no externality at all in the above economy, one would expect the result 
in a decentralised economy would be the same as that for a central planner.
Imagine there is an infinitely-lived representative household whose intertemporal 
problem is essentially that of the central planner in this decentralised economy. The 
household is assumed to be endowed with a certain amount of the environmental 
factor and lends to two production sectors at competitive price £. A{t) is the 
household’s assets at time t. Y and X denotes the output of final consumption goods 
and intermediate goods respectively. Py and Px are the prices of final goods and the 
intermediate goods sector. This representative household maximises its utility as 
given in equation (6.1) subject to the following budget constraint:
A = rA + e E - P v Y (6.26)
where r is the real interest rate. The current value Hamiltonian is given by
y>-<P _  i
J = --------- + p(rA + e E -  PY)  (6.27)
1 ~(p
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where ^  is the present value shadow price of an additional unit of income. The first 
order condition for this problem is given by
r = / j • py (6.28)
•
P P ~ P  = PA (6.29)
Equation (6.28) may be arranged as
— = p -  A (6.30)
P
or alternatively
p(t) = jU(0) • e{p-A)'(6.31)
Faced with an intertemporal choice, the representative intermediate goods producer 
seeks to maximise
j " [PxE'2' ß(ÖHf  - eE,\e~ndt (6.32)
Subject to H = A ■ (1 -  6) • H
The current-value Hamiltonian is given by
J = [PxE'2-ß(eH)ß - eE 2\+ l [A ( \ -6 )H \  (6.33)
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where X is the shadow price of an additional unit of human capital and e the factor 
price of the environment input. Solving the optimal conditions for control variables, E 
and 0, and for the state variable H gives the following three first-order conditions.
ßPxE\-ß0 M H ß =XAH (6.34)
(1 -,ß)PxE;ß(OH)ß (6.35)
X ßPß'2-ße ßH ß-'r = —+ ------ ------------+ A( \ -0 )
X X
(6.36)
Equation (6.34) states that in equilibrium, the marginal product of human capital must 
be equally valued in production and in human capital accumulation. Equation (6.35) 
states that the marginal product of the environment factor should be equal to its 
market price £. Equation (6.36) states that the return on accumulated capital equals
capital gains, XIX , plus the marginal productivity of human capital in production and 
in ‘schooling’.
The representative final goods sector firm seeks to maximise its life-time profit
K =  J o" (p, • • X“ - e  -  x )- e~ndt
The first-order condition to this problem is given by
(6.37)
{ \ - a ) - P x -E;aX a =e (6.38)
cc -P -  • X a-' = P,
y  i x (6.39)
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Sectoral allocation of environmental input E can be solved readily as that in the 
central planner’s problem. This gives
£ , =
e 2 =
• E
1 - a ß
(6.40)
a - Q - ß )  r
1 - a ß  E
(6.41)
The solution for the effects of E on sectoral allocation of human capital is given by 
combining equation (6.34), (6.39) and (6.28). From equation (6.34), we can see that
AA(6H) = aß ■ ( l / )  • Y'~* (6.42)
Therefore
dH
liXA
4 -0 0 (1 -? »  ( l -o 0 (X l-? » /
. £  7 (1 -0 0 (1 -?» (6.43)
where K = aß 1 - a  
1 - a ß
\( l-a)(l-<p) /
« ( 1  - ß O
1 - a ß
a ( l -a ) ( l - ? »
a positive constant.
Note that on the balanced growth path, 0 = 0 .  Since X grows at constant rate (p - A) 
while H grows at rate A(l-0) along the balanced growth path one can readily solve the 
equilibrium value of 0:
g _ p - a ß ( \ - ( p ) A  
A{\-aß{\-(p))
(6.44)
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This gives the same result as that in the centralised economy that on a balanced 
growth path, changes in E do not affect the sectoral allocation of human capital 
between the production of intermediate goods and the R&D sector. Having solved the 
equilibrium value of 0, we can now illustrate the effects of environmental regulations 
on relative output of ESGs and ENSGs, by dividing equation (6.2) by (6.3). This 
gives
— = n • Eß(l~a)x (6H)ß{a~l) (6.45)
where 7] =
a (  1 - / 3 ) ,
( l - a / 3 )
( o - l X l - / »
(1 -a ) .
(1 -aß)
( o - l )
is a positive constant. It follows that along the
balanced growth path,
— > 0 (6.46)
dE
Equation (6.46) states that in equilibrium the effects of changes in the stringency of 
environmental regulations on the relative output growth of ENSGs to the ESG sector 
is positive. To put it another way, an increase in the stringency of environmental 
stringency (a reduction of E) will lead to a higher output of ESGs relative to ENSGs.
Although changes in environmental supply have level effects on the output of final 
goods, the long-run rate of growth of final goods, however, will not be affected by
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changes in environmental supply in this economy. To see this, one can take natural 
logarithm and totally differentiate equation (6.42). This gives
£  =  a ß ( A - p )  
\ - a ß ( \ - ( p )
(6.47)
We thus obtain the same properties as in the centralised economy.
Conclusion
In this chapter, a simple intertemporal optimisation problem is set up to address the 
effects of environmental policy and technological innovation on a country’s long-run 
growth. There are two sectors, a final goods sector which is ENSGs, and an 
intermediate goods sector which is assumed to be ESGs. R&D activity is assumed to 
be sector specific. There are two factors, an environment factor and human capital. 
The basic findings are that, (1) changes in the stringency of environmental regulations 
do not have long-run growth effects; (2) technological innovation is important in 
determining a country’s long-run growth.
The limitation of the model is obvious. Since it is a closed economy model, the 
extension to trade is not addressed explicitly and neither are the trade effects of 
environmental policy. Nevertheless, it does provide a simple framework to address 
the issue of environmental regulation, technological innovation and a country’s long- 
run growth. This is important for those countries, especially developing countries, 
when facing the choice of appropriate development strategy. Many developing 
countries have long seen environmental regulations and economic development as
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mutually exclusive. To the extent that the environment has assumed a growing 
importance, this can be postponed until a high income level has been achieved. This 
perception has received considerable support from static cost-benefit analysis. 
Interestingly, this chapter has provided an alternative view on this issue. That is, 
changes in the stringency of environmental regulations do not have long-run growth 
effects, while technological innovation has. There can be a compromise between 
environment and growth.
In the next chapter, the effects of technology factor on the international 
competitiveness of ESGs will be tested explicitly.
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7 International Trade and Environmental Policy: The 
Role of Technology and Effectiveness of ‘Eco- 
Dumping’
Time-series studies in Chapters 3 and 4 suggest that trade patterns of ESGs did not 
undergo systematic change during the last three decades. One plausible explanation 
for this is that technological innovation may play an important role in determining 
international competitiveness. Environmental regulation may be productivity 
enhancing, as suggested in a recent study by Berman and Bui (1998) using plant level 
data. The theoretical discussion in Chapter 6 also identified the importance of 
technological innovation as a factor in economic growth. In this chapter, I investigate 
the significance of the technology factor in determining the international 
competitiveness of environmentally sensitive industries in the context of policy 
debate over ‘eco-dumping’.
Introduction
A country is regarded as engaging in ‘ecological-dumping’,1 or ‘eco-dumping’, when 
it gains international competitiveness in environmentally sensitive industries by 
imposing relatively lax environmental standards on the production of a good. More 
precisely, ‘eco-dumping’ can be defined as a policy which ‘prices
1 When a firm sells products in another country at prices below average cost or below the price in the 
home country, it is called dumping. Dumping sometimes can be beneficial to importing countries if the 
reason for selling products at lower prices is that foreign demand curve is more elastic and the firm just 
wants to price discriminate (Viner 1923). In practice, however, dumping is illegal in the United States 
and some other countries because it is regarded as a form of predatory pricing (Davis and McGuinness 
1982; Ethier 1982) used by foreign firms to gain market share and market powers. The penalty is a 
high tariff or non-tariff barrier, or so-called anti-dumping duties. See also Article VI of the GATT.
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environmentally harmful activities at less than the marginal cost of environmental 
degradations, i.e. a policy which does not internalise all environmental externalities’. 
(Rauscher 1994: 824).
‘Eco-dumping’ and its counterpart, anti-dumping, have emerged as a new issue 
threatening the trade liberalisation agenda of the Asia Pacific Economic Forum 
(APEC) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). As the trade and environment 
debate intensified, there has been a resurgence of calls for a ‘level playing field’, 
‘harmonisation of environmental standards’ or ‘fair trade’, and fears of loss of 
international competitiveness of environmentally sensitive industries from developed 
countries in the 1990s. Developing countries, on the other hand, see these calls as 
new protectionism, in the form of hidden non-tariff barriers, and are concerned about 
market access problems (Dua and Esty 1997).
An even more important issue facing developing countries concerns appropriate 
development strategies. Is there a conflict between environmental standards and 
international competitiveness? Do developing countries need to sacrifice their hopes 
for economic development, or international competitiveness more narrowly, in the 
interests of higher environmental standards? Any degradation of environment due to 
lax environmental standards will have negative effects on the sustainability of 
economic development. The question then becomes clear. Is there a choice to be 
made between economic development (or narrowly, international competitiveness of 
ESG industries) versus environmental standards or should economic development 
take the environmental standards into account?
2 For an interesting analysis of global warming and developing countries, see Schelling (1992).
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There have been several normative analyses of this issue in the literature. These 
include Bhagwati and Hudec 1996, Chichilnisky 1994, Brander and Taylor 1997, 
Anderson and Blackhurst 1992, Esty 1994, Dua and Esty 1997, Porter and van der 
Linde 1995, Markusen 1997 and Barrett 1994, among others (see also Chapter 2). 
What is lacking is further empirical analysis, as pointed out in a 1995 ministerial 
report to the OECD Council, ‘the next stage of the OECD’s work programme should 
include empirical analysis of selected policy areas and economic sectors’ (OECD 
1995).
In the context of this literature, this chapter examines trade liberalisation and 
environmental policy from an empirical perspective. It aims to investigate the 
effectiveness of ‘eco-dumping’, if any, on the international competitiveness of 
environmentally sensitive industries. I seek to examine whether the introduction of 
stringent environmental policies will lead to a decline in ESG industries in the 
presence of a technology factor. To this end, a generalised GDP function, which 
incorporates both technological change and increasing returns to scale, is set up and a 
flexible translog function form is used to approximate this generalised GDP function. 
Seemingly unrelated regression estimation (SURE) techniques are used to estimate a 
system of sectoral share equations derived from the generalised GDP function. 
Environmental stringency is treated as a factor of production, as discussed extensively 
in Chapter 4, together with capital, labour, land, mineral, oil and coal endowments. 
The technology level is regarded as an important determinant of the sectoral share in 
production. The basic hypothesis is that the environmental factor is not a significant 
determinant of the international competitiveness of environmentally sensitive 
industries, while technology is.
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This chapter is organised as follows. The generalised GDP function is derived in the 
next section. A flexible translog function form is set up to approximate the 
generalised GDP function in section 3. Section 4 discusses data and measurement 
issues. Section 5 reports the econometric results and tests their robustness. The final 
section presents a conclusion.
Technology, increasing returns to scale and the generalised GDP function
Following Samuelson (1953), Dixit and Norman (1980), Woodland (1982), Kohli 
(1993) and Harrigan (1997), I consider a small open economy characterised by fixed 
aggregate factor supplies, constant returns to scale, and competitive market clearing. 
It can be shown that the equilibrium for the production sector can be obtained using
'j
the following maximisation problem
Max p»y subject to y e Y (v) (7.1)
p, y e IR N, v e IR M,
where y is the N-dimensional output vector, p is the price vector for output, v is the 
M-dimensional factor endowment vector, and Y (v) is the set of all output vectors 
which can be produced given the technology and the factor endowment. Its boundary 
is called the production possibility frontier. This is essentially the problem that a 
central planner would attempt to solve given the price vector p and the factor
3 Woodland (1982) shows that the maximum GDP function G (p, v) is essentially the same as the 
minimum factor payment function m (p, v). They are dual. The term GDP function is sometimes called 
the revenue function (Dixit and Norman 1980), or restricted profit function (Diewert 1974). The 
function actually estimated is invariably a measure of the income generated in the country at the prices 
facing producers, i.e., GDP at factor cost. It is not GDP at market prices which includes tariff revenue.
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endowment vector v. The optimum y is clearly a function of p and v: y* = f (p, v). 
Substituting this optimum output vector y* into the objective function p.y gives the 
GDP function which is a function of p and v as well. The GDP function can be 
written as
G = G (p, v) (7.2)
G (p, v) is non-decreasing, linearly homogenous, and concave in v, and non­
decreasing, linearly homogenous, and convex in p.
This optimisation problem may also be illustrated diagrammatically in Figure 7.1 for 
the case of 2 x 2. In Figure 7.1, the area OAB is the production possibility set given 
the economy’s factor endowment. The optimum output vector y° can be solved given 
the price vector, p. This gives the point y° where the highest iso-GDP line is tangent 
to the production possibility curve given the factor endowment vector v. The price 
vector p, drawn starting from any point y1 (not shown on the graph) on the iso-GDP 
line, must be orthogonal to any vector starting at y1 and lying on the iso-GDP line. 
This is so because for any y that itself lies on iso-GDP line, we have
P y1 = p y2 = GDP.
Hence
pAy = 0 for Ay = y2 -y'.
Thus, vector p is orthogonal to vector Ay. Note that when we draw the price vector in 
the diagram, we use the ‘units’ on the axes to represent units of prices rather than 
goods.
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Figure 7.1 Geometric illustration of maximisation of GDP function (1)
The GDP function approach has proved very useful in international trade theory 
analysis and trade empirical studies. As long as the GDP function is twice 
continuously differentiable, applying Hotelling’s lemma gives the gradients 
(derivative) of G (p, v) with respect to p and v which are the vector of output supplies 
and vector of factor price, respectively.
y = Gp(p,v) and w = Gv (p, v) (7.3)
Constant returns to scale and identical technological change are two of the basic 
assumptions underling the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem. It has been argued by ‘new 
trade theory’ that increasing returns to scale is one important factor that explains trade 
patterns, especially the large observed volume of intra-industry trade. We can 
demonstrate that the assumption of constant returns to scale can easily be relaxed in 
the generalised GDP function framework.
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In the case of increasing returns to scale, a firm’s output is not only a function of 
factorial value added f(v), as in the case of constant returns to scale, but also a
function of industry output g(Y).
y = g(Y) f(v) (7.4)
where g' > 0 and g" < 0, indicating that the larger the industry, the more efficient the 
firm will be. And Y = Xy = g(Y) f(v) is the industry output vector. Let the 
equilibrium industry output vector be Y, then the firm will maximise {pg(Y)}-f(v), 
where g(Y) can be treated as a scalar of price vector p. The GDP function then 
becomes
where 0 = diag (0i, 02, ... , 0N) =g (X).
Similarly, applying Hotelling’s lemma gives the gradients (derivative) of G(pg(Y), v) 
with respect to p and v, which are the vector of output supplies and vector of factor 
price, respectively.
G = G(pg(Y), v)
or
G = G(0p, v) (7.5)
d G(0p, v) / 0p = {0 G(0p, v) / 0( 0p )} • {0( 0p) / 0 p } = 0f(v) = y
and
0 G(0p, v) / 0v — w (7.6)
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where d G(0p, v) / d(  0p) = f(v) and d(0p) /  dp  = g(Y). This can be illustrated 
diagrammatically as in Figure 7.2. Comparing Figure 7.2 with Figure 7.1, we can see 
that increasing returns to scale can be modelled as industry-specific price changes, 
and the optimum output vector is again given by the gradient of the GDP function.
Figure 7.2 Geometric illustration of maximisation of GDP function (2)
Dixit and Norman (1980) and Harrigan (1997) arrived at a similar result by relaxing 
the assumption of no technology difference across countries and industries. Suppose 
there exists a production function for each good given by
where cp is a scalar parameter relative to some base country. The assumption of the 
existence of distinct production functions implies that joint production is ruled out. 
The resulting GDP function can be shown to have the form
y = <pf(v) (7.7)
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G = G(cpp, v) (7.8)
where (p = diag {cpi, q b ,  •••  , 9 n }- This formulation implies that industry-specific 
neutral technology change can be modelled in the same way as an industry-specific 
price increase, as in the case of increasing returns to scale.
However, it is now clear that the parameter attached to the price vector stands not 
only for the effect of industry-specific neutral technology change, as discussed by 
Harrigan (1997), but also for increasing returns to scale, which was not included in 
Harrigan’s study.
Approximation of the generalised GDP function using flexible functional form
Having laid out the theoretical background, the next step towards testing the 
hypothesis is to approximate the GDP function using a flexible functional form. Since 
its introduction by Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau in 1973, the translog function has 
received considerable attention in the empirical literature. It has several advantages 
over the Cobb-Douglas and CES functions. Following Woodland (1982), Kohli 
(1978; 1991 and 1993) and Harrigan (1997), a translog function is used to 
approximate the GDP function. The translog GDP function takes the form
In G(0p, v) = In ooo + £  a0j In 0j pj + X ß0/ In v*
j  i
+ 1/2 EX a jkIn 0; pyIn 0*p* (7.9)
j  k
+ 1/2 E E  ß,mln V,-ln vm + E E y 7,ln07p; In v,
i m j  i
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where j  and k stand for products that are in (R N while i and m denote factor supplies 
that are in IRM, 0 is a variable capturing the effects of both technology level and 
increasing returns to scale. We can impose symmetry by requiring that cc;* = a*,- and 
P/m = Pm/ for all j, k, i and m. Since the GDP function is linear in v and p, we require
X Ooj = 1 Xpo, = 1 X aß = 0 X pim = 0 and X yyi = 0
j i j i i
Differentiating In G(0p, v) with respect to each In p; and imposing the homogeneity 
restrictions Xy 09* = 0 and X, y,- = 0 and adjusting the terms gives the sectoral share in 
GDP, S/ = ipj yj / G as a function of technology parameters, prices and factor supplies:
N N M
Sj = Ooj + X a kj In (p* / Pi ) + X akj In (0* / 0i ) + X y7 In (v, / vi) (7.10)
k= 2 k—2 i=2
j= 1,2, ...,(N-1)
In the case of free trade, each country faces the same prices but they differ in their 
factor endowments, technology level and scale economy. This implies Xk 0 ikj In (p* / 
pi ) is a constant and it can be factored into the constant term. Following Harrigan 
(1997), if one takes into account the fact that many goods are non-traded, only 
tradable goods price will be absorbed into the constant term. The problem is that data 
for non-tradable goods prices are generally not available. One approach is to treat 
them as random with some estimable probability distribution that may generate a 
stochastic process with a constant dummy for each country and a classic disturbance 
term. These reformulations are defined by a  in (7.11). Therefore, we have the 
following estimated equation
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N M
Sj = a + X akj ln (0k) + X y,- In (v, / vO + e7 (7.11)
k= 1 i=2
j=  1,2...... (N-l)
The only sign restriction on this equation in theory is that the own-technology/returns 
to scale effect, a i s  positive: holding other factors constant, an increase in the 
technology level should lead to an increase in its sectoral share. Theory also requires 
that the cross-technology effects are symmetric, a kj = otjk for all sectors j  and k, k ^ j.
Since 0 is a variable capturing the effects of both technology level and increasing 
returns to scale, we assume the following relationship between the effect of 
technology level 0{, and increasing returns to scale 0S
6= etTes,''t (7.12)
Substituting equation (4.12) into (4.11) gives
N N M
S j  = a  + X a kj t ln (0kt) + X akj (1- t) ln (0ks)+ X yj In (v, / vj) + e, (7.13)
k= 1 k= 1 i=2
j  -  1,2,.. . ,  (N-l)
With data on technology level, increasing returns to scale and factor endowments, 
equation (7.13) can be estimated by substituting equation (7.12). However, data on 
increasing returns to scale across industries and/or countries are generally not 
available. The best way to approach this problem may be to treat the increasing 
returns to scale effect as random with some estimable probability distribution as £
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=  pi +  ej (7.14)
where ej is white noise. Rewriting equation (7.13) using (7.14) gives the equation to 
be estimated
N M
Sj = ß + I  Pkj ln (Qkt) + 2 Tij In (v,- / vi) + e* (7.15)
k= 1 i=2
7=1,2 , . . . ,  (N-l)
where constant term ß, which equals to (a + Eay (1- t) In (0ks)) with k = l to N , 
combines the effects of all goods prices, non-traded goods technology parameters and 
increasing returns to scale effect and ß^ = oCjt/u.
Data and measurement
To estimate the above model, I need data on sectoral output share, technology level 
and factor endowment. As to sectoral output share, I choose ISIC 33, 34, 35, 36 and 
37, as follows. These five industries are generally regarded to be the environmentally 
sensitive industries. All data are for 1988.
Sectoral output share
Data on sectoral output value added and sectoral employment are available from the 
UNIDO (United Nations Industrial Development Organisation) industrial statistics 
database. GDP in current price data are from the World Bank CD-ROM World 
Development Indicators 1997. Sectoral output value added is divided by GDP to 
obtain the sectoral output share as the dependent variable.
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Table 7.1 Industry classification codes for environmentally sensitive industries
ISIC code descriptions
1 . 33 Manufacture of wood and wood products
2. 34 Manufacture of paper, paper products and printing
3. 35 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
4. 36 Manufacture of non-metal mineral products
5. 37 Manufacture of basic metal products
Source: UNIDO (1992).
Technology
Technology is a variable that has no uniform definition, especially in the empirical 
literature. Total factor productivity is sometimes used to measure Hicks-neutral 
technology differences across industries (and/or countries). Since data for sectoral 
factor supplies are not available, sectoral value added per worker is therefore used 
instead. This can be justified as follows. The first is the fact that embodied technology 
changes (especially labour augmenting changes) can be regarded as a reasonable 
approximation of the process of technology progress. As shown in Barro and Sala-i- 
Martin (1995: 34), the long-term experience of the United States and some developed 
countries ‘suggests that a useful theory would predict that per capita growth rates 
approach constants in the long run; that is, the model would possess a steady state’. 
Therefore technological progress must take the Harrod-neutral (labour augmenting) 
form in order for the model to have a steady state. Second, if the production function 
takes the Cobb-Douglas form, it is possible for technological progress to be both 
Hicks-neutral and Harrod-neutral. Suppose the production function, in the case of two
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factors, Capital Kt and Labour Lt, is
Y,= f (K„ A(f)L,) = ß K ( A W  L,)1'“ (7.16)
After arranging items on the right-hand side, this function becomes
Y,= (A(f))1'“ ß K,“L,l a = y K,“L,l a (7.17)
This function satisfies the criteria of both Hicks-neutrality and Harrod-neutrality. 
Environmental factor
Data on the environmental factors is generally not available. In light of this, an 
aggregate index number is often chosen. For example, quoting data from Walter and 
Ugelow (1979), Tobey (1990) chose an index number to approximate a country’s 
environmental stringency which is measured on a scale from one to seven for a set of 
23 countries.
The latest attempt to ‘measure the status of environmental policy and performance’ is 
a World Bank project by Dasgupta et al. (1995). This dataset has been discussed in 
Chapter 5 and is also shown in Table 7.2. Since sectoral output value added and 
factor endowment data are not available for some of the countries included and 
therefore there is a lack of degrees of freedom in the econometric study, this dataset is 
not explicitly employed. However, I construct the environmental stringency variable 
on the basis of their data.
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Table 7.2 Environmental stringency and GDP per capita for selected countries
Country Environment Index ICPGDP PCGNP Rank by 
Environment 
Index
Germany 951 16920 22320 1
Switzerland 945 21690 32680 2
Netherlands 900 14600 17320 3
Finland 894 15620 26040 4
Ireland 871 9130 9550 5
Bulgaria 737 7900 2250 6
Korea 686 7190 5400 7
Jamaica 633 3030 1500 8
Czech 622 3470 3470 9
S.Africa 619 5500 2530 10
Tunisia 589 3979 1440 11
Trinidad 563 8510 3610 12
China 530 1950 370 13
India 507 1150 350 14
Pakistan 506 1770 380 15
Brazil 492 4780 2680 16
Jordan 474 4530 1240 17
Ghana 465 1720 390 18
Kenya 464 1120 370 19
Thailand 448 4610 1420 20
Philippines 447 2320 730 21
Paraguay 443 3120 1110 22
Egypt 441 3100 600 23
Malawi 441 670 200 24
Zambia 437 810 420 25
Nigeria 396 1420 290 26
Mozambique 368 620 80 27
Bangladesh 363 1050 210 28
Tanzania 341 540 110 29
Papua NG 329 1500 860 30
Bhutan 256 510 190 31
Ethiopia 253 310 120 32
Note: PCGNP stands for per capita GNP and ICPGDP for per capita GDP estimates compiled by the 
UN International Comparisons Program. ‘Environment Index’ denotes the environmental stringency 
index compiled by Dasgupta et al., World Bank.
Source: Dasgupta et al. (1995).
Table 7.2 shows the environmental stringency index developed by the World Bank 
project. One interesting feature of this dataset is that the relationship between per 
capita income and environmental stringency is positive and highly significant. As can 
be seen in Table 7.3, the Spearman correlation coefficients between the
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environmental stringency index, and ICPGDP and PCGNP is -0.86987 and -0.8553, 
respectively. Both are statistically significant at the 0.01 per cent level. This suggests 
that higher income countries tend to have more stringent environmental policies. 
Based on this result I use GDP per capita as an ‘instrumental variable’ to the 
environmental stringency index. Of course, the higher a country’s GDP per capita, the 
more stringent its environmental policy.
Table 7.3 The Spearman correlation Test
Rank ICPGDP PCGNP
ICPGDP 0.8678
(0.0001)
PCGNP 0.8537 0.9554
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Environmental stringency -0.9999 -0.8699 -0.8553
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Note: numbers in parentheses are p-values. See also Table 7.2 for notations of variables. 
Source: Author’s calculations.
Other factor endowments
Although data on sectoral factor supplies are difficult to get for the countries of 
interest, national factor endowment data are used to measure the fixed effect of factor 
abundance. The national factor endowment can be interpreted as the mean of the 
sectoral factor input. The justification can easily be found in the literature on the 
production possibility frontier where provincial data is used as the mean of firm level 
data. Since the econometrically estimated model is a system equation, these factor 
endowment variables examine whether countries with higher endowments in one 
factor will tend to be associated with a higher sectoral share in one of the sectors.
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These factor endowments are provided by Song (1996) and include: (1) Capital: 
capital stock at constant prices assuming 15-year average life of assets, in US$ 
million; (2) Labour force; (3) Labour 1: number of workers classified as professional 
or technical; (4) Labour 2: number of literate non-professional workers; (5) Labour 3: 
number of illiterate workers; (6) Land; (7) Oil: crude oil production plus production 
of natural gas, in thousands of US dollars; (8) Coal: production of primary solid fuels 
(coal, lignite, and brown coal) plus natural gas, in thousands of US dollars; (9) 
Minerals: composite of 12 kinds of major minerals. Note that the sum of Labour 1 to 
3 is equal to the total labour force in each sector of each country.
Data summary>
The country coverage in this dataset includes 16 out of the 18 APEC countries and 
most OECD countries. Table 7.4 gives a summary of how the 30 countries differ in 
their production. Each column gives the percentage share of manufacturing value 
added in total GDP. The last column gives the percentage share of the five 
environmentally sensitive industries’ value added in total manufacturing value added. 
One of the interesting features is that environmentally sensitive industries account for 
40 to 50 per cent of the total manufacturing value added for the majority of the 
countries. Other columns give the percentage share of each industry’s value added in 
total manufacturing value added. We can see that countries vary largely as to the 
composition of their environmentally sensitive industries’ production. The variability 
in these environmentally sensitive industries’ output share across countries is the 
focus of the study in next section.
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Table 7.4 Share of manufacturing in GDP and shares of selected industries in total 
manufacturing in 1988.
M anufacturing W ood Prod. P ap er & Printing C hem icals Non-M etal Metal E SG s
A ustralia 15.4 5.7 11.2 13.4 4.8 9.8 44.8
C a n ad a 21 .5 6.2 15.2 15.7 3.4 7.8 48.2
Chile 18.1 3.5 9.2 17.1 3.2 26 .5 59.4
C hina 35 .7 1.3 3.4 19.5 7.0 9.6 40 .8
D enm ark 20 .7 4.7 10.0 15.4 5.2 1.5 36.8
Finland 28.9 7.0 24.3 10.6 4.5 5.2 51.7
F rance 21 .7 3.0 7.4 19.6 4.3 5.6 39.9
G erm any 32.1 2.5 4.2 20.9 3.5 5.4 36.6
G reece 25.8 2.3 5.3 16.8 8.0 8.1 40 .6
Hong Kong 20.5 1.0 7.7 9.7 0.7 0.6 19.7
India 17.8 0.5 3.2 24.0 4.4 13.9 46 .0
Indonesia 19.7 13.9 4.7 16.4 3.9 8.3 47 .2
Italy 23 .5 3.0 6.5 14.0 6.1 7.7 37 .4
Ja p a n 28 .2 2.7 7.9 15.7 4.6 7.1 37 .9
K orea, Rep. 32.1 1.5 4.5 17.5 4.3 7.2 35.1
M alaysia 21.2 6.9 4.2 26.5 6.1 3.4 47.1
Mexico 26 .8 0.5 4.4 23 .0 7.7 11.8 47.3
N etherlands 18.8 1.8 10.1 25 .9 3.7 5.3 46 .7
New Z ea land 18.2 6.6 14.1 13.9 3.8 3.8 42 .2
Norway 14.0 6.1 14.6 11.8 3.6 12.9 48 .9
Philippines 25.6 3.9 4.0 22.8 3.8 6.2 40 .7
Portugal 27 .9 4.3 11.5 15.6 9.0 3.1 43 .3
S ingapo re 29.9 1.4 5.4 20.7 1.2 1.2 30 .0
S pain 24.1 4.0 7.1 17.9 6.7 6.4 42.1
Sri Lanka 15.4 1.2 4.1 9.9 6.1 0.9 22 .0
S w eden 25.2 6.1 16.3 12.9 2.9 6.1 44.3
Taiw an 37.2 3.0 4.1 24.0 3.8 6.6 41 .4
T hailand 25.8 2.8 18.2 17.0 6.3 2.6 46.9
Britain 25 .2 3.3 10.7 17.7 5.4 5.0 42 .0
United S ta te s 20 .0 3.0 11.2 17.0 2.9 4.2 38.3
Notes: The column labelled ‘Manufacturing’ gives the percentage share of manufacturing value added 
in total GDP. The column labelled ‘ESGs’ gives the percentage share of the five environmentally 
sensitive industries’ value added in total manufacturing value added. Other columns give the 
percentage share of each industry’s value added in total manufacturing value added.
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Table 7.5 Summary statistics of the sectoral share for each industry across 30 
countries
W ood Prod. Paper & Printing Chem icals Non-M etal Metal
Mean 0.0074 0.0183 0.0373 0.0094 0.0142
Standard Deviation 0.0040 0.0116 0.0197 0.0045 0.0135
Sam ple Variance 0.0000 0.0001 0.0004 0.0000 0.0002
M inim um 0.0004 0.0025 0.0110 0.0014 0.0010
M axim um 0.0153 0.0532 0.0879 0.0228 0.0743
Note: Sectoral share refers to share of GDP (not in percentage terms). 
Source: Author’s calculations.
Table 7.6 Environmental stringency rank measured by GDP per capita
GDPPC Rank GDPPC Rank GDPPC Rank
Norway 21,615 1 Italy 13,949 11 Korea, Rep. 3,615 21
Japan 20,954 2 Australia 13,197 12 M alaysia 2,025 22
Denm ark 20,158 3 Britain 12,663 13 Mexico 1,775 23
Sweden 19,559 4 New Zealand 11,050 14 Chile 1,742 24
United States 18,973 5 Hong Kong 9,461 15 Thailand 1,050 25
Finland 18,653 6 Singapore 8,656 16 Philippines 603 26
France 16,608 7 Spain 7,956 17 Indonesia 468 27
Canada 16,010 8 Taiwan 5,507 18 Sri Lanka 414 28
Netherlands 15,129 9 Greece 4,829 19 India 346 29
G erm any 14,699 10 Portugal 4,438 20 China 272 30
Note: GDPPC stands for GDP per capita in 1988 (constant prices, US$, 1987). The ranking is 
calculated on the basis of GDPPC.
Source: Author’s calculations.
The summary statistics for the dependent variables for each industry are given in 
Table 7.5. Environmental stringency is calculated as an index on the basis of a
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country’s level of development measured by GDP per capita in constant 1987 US 
dollars. For these 30 countries under study, the index number runs from 1 (strict) to 
30 (tolerant). The lower the index number, the more stringent the country’s 
environmental policy.
Empirical results
Seemingly unrelated regression estimation (SURE) techniques are used to estimate 
equation (7.15) as a system. The estimation result and hypothesis tests are reported in 
Table 7.7. Standardised coefficients are reported in Table 7.9. For each equation, the 
dependent variable is the sectoral share in GDP in each country. The definitions of 
independent variables in this system equation are given in Table 7.8. Since the 
sectoral shares for each country will sum to one rather than one hundred, and the 
independent variables are all in logarithms, the interpretation of the coefficient carries 
the form of semi-elasticity. A parameter of 0.0013 indicates that a 10 per cent 
increase in the independent variable will raise the output share by 0.013 percentage 
points. Constant terms that absorbed the country fixed effect, scale effect, all goods 
prices effect and non-tradable goods technology effect are included in the regression 
but not reported in this table.
As shown in Table 7.7, the own-technology effects are all positive, as suggested by 
theory, and statistically significant at the 5 per cent level in most cases. The largest 
positive effects are in chemicals and paper and printing, with slope coefficients of 
0.0146 and 0.0140, respectively. This means that a 10 per cent technology 
improvement in the chemicals sector will lead to a 0.146 percentage point increase in 
its sectoral share of GDP and a 0.140 percentage point increase in the paper and
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printing sector. Technological improvement in the non-metal products sector has a 
small positive effect, but is only statistically significant at the 13.96 per cent level. 
The wood products sector shows a positive technological effect, but it is not 
statistically significant.
The cross-technology effects are, however, mixed as suggested by theory. In most 
cases, the cross-technology effects are small and statistically insignificant except the 
cross-technology effects between the metal and non-metal sectors where they are 
negative and statistically significant. This result is similar to that in Harrigian’s study 
(1997) using the OECD International Sectoral Data Base (ISDB), although he uses 
total factor productivity as an instrument of technology.
Turning now to the effects of the environmental factor on sectoral shares, it appears 
that environmental stringency has only a negligible effect and is shown to be not 
statistically significant in all sectors. This suggests that countries with less stringent 
environmental policy are not necessarily those with a higher sectoral share of ESGs. 
This finding confirms the time-series evidence, as suggested in Chapters 3 and 4.
Other resource endowment factors do have statistically significant effects on sectoral 
shares of GDP. The factor endowment effects underlying the new framework are 
essentially similar to that of Learner (1984) and Song (1995) using the Heckscher- 
Ohlin-Vanek framework. Our findings include the following: a 10 per cent increase 
in the endowment of mineral resource is associated with 0.01 per centage increase in 
the non-metal sectoral share of GDP; countries with a relatively large endowment in
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Table 7.7 SURE estimates of the GDP share equations
V ariable W ood
Prod.
P ap e r  & Printing C hem icals Non-M etal Metal
LNT1 0.0013 0.0007 -0.0017 -0 .0010 0 .0019
(0 .3786) (0.2867) (-0.6919) (-0.4752) (1.1916)
LNT2 0.0007 0.0140 -0.0041 0.0021 0.0001
(0.2867) (4 .1391) (-1.2265) (1.1167) (0.0600)
LNT3 -0 .0017 -0.0041 0.0146 -0 .0035 -0 .0009
(-0.6919) (-1.2265) (2 .6070) (-1.7179) (-0.2885)
LNT4 -0 .0010 0.0021 -0.0035 0.0042 -0 .0039
(-0.4752) (1.1167) (-1.7179) (1 .4858) (-3.2779)
LNT5 0.0019 0.0001 -0.0009 -0 .0039 0 .0120
(1.1916) (0.0600) (-0.2885) (-3.2779) (3 .1795)
LNQ 0.0003 -0.0015 0.0023 0.0002 0 .0008
(0.5098) (-1.3582) (1.1105) (0.4058) (0.4644)
LNLD 0.0007 0.0038 -0.0112 -0 .0030 -0 .0025
(0.7061) (2 .1368) (-3.2160) (-3.2098) (-0.9479)
LNLB -0 .0016 0 .0045 0.0052 0 .0003 0 .0060
(-0.5823) (1.3165) (0.8368) (0.1159) (1.3184)
LNMI 0.0000 -0.0011 0.0016 0 .0010 0 .0009
(0.12826) (-1.5911) (1.2273) (2 .8046) (0.9389)
LNOI -0.0001 -0.0005 0 .0003 -0.0001 0.0000
(-0.6518) (-2.9725) (0.8183) (-0.5993) (-0.1702)
LNCO 0.0001 0.0000 0.0011 0 .0002 0 .0004
(0.4227) (0.0563) (2 .6937) (2.2264) (1.1547)
LNK 0.0005 -0.0053 0.0007 0 .0013 -0 .0055
(0.1067) (-0.7237) (0.0498) (0.3011) (-0.5303)
H y p o th es is  T e s ts  (p-value)
H om ogeneity  0 .860 0 .130 0.912 0.582 0 .217
Significance te s ts
A1: 0 .0755 0 .00002 0.0135 0 .0072 0.00005
T echnology
A2: Factor 0 .6400 0.055 0.0019 0.0017 0.137
endow m en ts
A3: 0 .112 0.0000 0.00005 0.00003 0.00006
T echnology  &
Factor
endow m ents.
Notes: SURE estimation results are listed in each column, with t-statistics in parentheses. For a 
detailed definition of variables, see Table 4.8. Marginal significance levels of hypothesis tests are 
reported below the heading ‘Hypothesis Tests’ above. These are computed using the appropriate Wald 
statistic with Chi-square distribution. The hypothesis for the homogeneity test is that the sum of the 
factor endowment terms is zero. It is tested for each industry separately with yj (1). The hypothesis for 
A1 to A3 is that the indicated coefficients are all zero. The test statistics for A1 to A3 are yj (5), y 2 (6), 
%2 (11), respectively.
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Table 7.8 Definition of the variables
(1) LNT1 to LN T5: Log of the technology level for each industry starting from wood products in the 
first row in Table 7.6.
(2) LNQ: log of the environmental stringency index. Number 1 stands for the most stringent 
environmental policy while number 30 stands for the least stringent.
(3) LNLD: log of the land area.
(4) LNLB: log of the total labour force.
(5) LNOI: log of the oil factor endowment as defined in the text.
(6) LNMI: log of the mineral factor endowment as defined in the text.
(7) LNCO: log of the coal factor endowment as defined in the text.
(8) LNK: log of the capital stock as defined in the text.
Table 7.9 Estimates of GDP share equation: standardised coefficients
V a ria b le W o o d  Prod . P a p e r  & Printing C h e m ic a ls N o n -M eta l M etal
LNT1 0 .3 6 4 1 0.0651 -0.0927 -0.2496 0.1518
LNT2 0.1768 1 .2 6 6 6 -0.2163 0.4785 0.0106
LNT3 -0.4122 -0.3541 0 .7 4 8 9 -0.7747 -0.0710
LNT4 -0.2767 0.1953 -0.1931 1 .0 0 3 6 -0.3125
LNT5 0.4355 0.0112 -0.0458 -0.8090 0 .8 4 1 5
LNQ 0.1581 -0.2424 0.2246 0.0983 0.1065
LNLD 0.3949 0.7400 -1.2851 -1.4779 -0.4210
LNLB -0.4858 0.4750 0.3210 0.0697 0.5424
LNMI 0.0751 -0.5597 0.4980 1.3391 0.4199
LNOI -0.1491 -0.4247 0.1336 -0.1130 -0.0312
LNCO 0.1087 0.0092 0.5052 0.4759 0.2436
LNK 0.0007 -0.0034 0.0005 0.0012 -0.0042
Notes: The standardised coefficients are often known as ‘beta’ coefficients. They adjust the estimated 
coefficients by the ratio of the standard deviation of the independent variable to the standard deviation 
of the dependent variable. This makes it possible compare the size of the effects of each independent 
variable directly.
Source: Author’s calculations.
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coal are generally associated with high sectoral shares of chemicals and non-metals; 
countries with a larger endowment of oil are associated with a lower sectoral share of 
paper and printing; countries with a large amount of land (which includes forest land) 
endowment are associated with a higher share of paper and printing industries. A 
country’s total labour force is not found to be significantly associated with high share 
of any one of the ESG sectors. The effects of capital endowment turn out to be 
insignificant in all cases. This might reflect the fact that capital is more mobile 
internationally than other natural resource endowment factors.
To understand the size of the effect of environmental stringency compared with the 
other factors, especially the technology factor, Table 7.9 shows the standardised 
coefficients of the SURE. The standardised coefficients are often known as ‘beta’ 
coefficients. They adjust the estimated coefficients by the ratio of the standard 
deviation of the independent variable to the standard deviation of the dependent 
variable. This makes it possible to compare the size of the effects of each independent 
variable directly. A standardised coefficient of 1.27 indicates that a one standard 
deviation increase in the independent variable will lead to an increase of dependent 
variable by 1.27 standard deviation. More interestingly, a normalisation of 
standardised coefficients provides more intuitive insight as in Table 7.10, using a 
standardised coefficient of the technology variable in each column as the basis for 
carrying out this normalisation. Comparing the size of the effect of environmental 
stringency with that of technology, we can see that the average effect of 
environmental stringency on sectoral share is only 0.23 times the effect of the 
technology factor.
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Table 7.10 SURE estimates of GDP share equation: a normalisation of standardised 
coefficients
Variable W ood Prod. Paper & Printing Chem icals Non-Metal Metal
LNT1 1.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 0.2
LNT2 0.5 1.0 -0.3 0.5 0.0
LNT3 -1.1 -0.3 1.0 -0.8 -0.1
LNT4 -0.8 0.2 -0.3 1.0 -0.4
LNT5 1.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.8 1.0
LNQ 0 .4 - 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1
LNLD 1.1 0.6 -1.7 -1.5 -0.5
LNLB -1.3 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.6
LNMI 0.2 -0.4 0.7 1.3 0.5
LNOI -0.4 -0.3 0.2 -0.1 0.0
LNCO 0.3 0.0 0.7 0.5 0.3
LNK 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Note: Normalisation is carried out on the basis of Table 4.9. See also text. 
Source: Author’s calculations.
Hypothesis tests are shown in Table 7.7. The Wald statistics are computed for each 
hypothesis and the marginal significance levels are reported. The homogeneity 
restrictions are not rejected for all the five cases. The technology factor and factor 
endowment are jointly significant (A3) at the 1 per cent level except in the case of the 
Wood sector where the significant level is 11.2 per cent. The technology factor and 
factor endowment are then tested separately (A1 and A2) and they are all significant 
at the 5 per cent level except that of the wood sector.
Conclusion
There are growing concerns in developing countries about the loss of international 
competitiveness and the impediments to economic development due to environmental
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regulation. Developed countries’ concern about eco-dumping by developing countries 
with lax environmental policies has also become an important issue. This chapter has 
attempted to investigate, econometrically the effectiveness of ‘eco-dumping’, if any, 
on the international competitiveness of environmentally sensitive industries.
A generalised GDP function, which incorporated both technology change and 
increasing returns to scale, was set up and a flexible translog function form was used 
to approximate this generalised GDP function. Seemingly unrelated regression 
estimation (SURE) techniques were used to estimate a system of sectoral share 
equations derived from the generalised GDP function. Environmental stringency is 
treated as a factor of production together with capital, land, labour, mineral, oil and 
coal endowments. The technology level is regarded as an important determinant of 
the sectoral share in production. The basic hypothesis is that the environmental factor 
is not a significant determinant of the international competitiveness of 
environmentally sensitive industries while technology is.
The econometric results suggest that the own-technology effects are all positive, as 
suggested by theory, and statistically significant at the 5 per cent level in most cases. 
However, the environmental stringency variable has only a negligible effect and is 
shown to be not statistically significant in all sectors. This suggests that countries 
with less stringent environmental policies do not necessarily have higher sectoral 
shares of ESGs. While trade is not explicitly addressed, the implication for trade is 
immediate: to the extent that countries have similar tastes, the inferences about the 
determinants of production patterns found here will translate into inferences about a 
country’s trade patterns (Harrigan 1997). This finding confirms the time-series
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evidence as suggested in Chapters 3 and 4, and supports the theoretical discussion in 
Chapter 6.
The policy implications are clear. On the one hand, these findings suggest that 
development strategies which rely on lax environmental regulations to achieve the 
economic goals of developing countries may not be appropriate since technological 
innovation may be a more relevant determinant of international trade 
competitiveness. There can be compromise between environmental standards and 
international competitiveness. Development strategies can take environmental 
standards into account.
On the other hand, the fear of eco-dumping from developing countries in the 
developed world seems ill-founded in light of these tests. The call for harmonisation 
of national environmental standards may not be justified, even from an empirical 
perspective.
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8  International Trade and Environmental 
Regulation: Some Conclusions
This study set out to examine one of the most important issues relating to trade and 
the environment, namely, the effects of domestic environmental policy on 
international trade competitiveness. The central question addressed was whether 
stringent domestic environmental policies reduce the international competitiveness of 
environmentally sensitive industries.
Summary and major findings
This study is distinguished by two major innovations beyond the established 
literature: the examination of time-series evidence to explore the relationship between 
environmental regulations and trade patterns, and the introduction of technology 
factors, together with endowment factors, to explain the empirical evidence.
There are five steps in the development of the argument. I first provide time-series 
evidence on the effects of environmental policy on trade patterns, using the trade-in­
goods approach. This is to investigate whether the patterns of exports of 
environmentally sensitive goods (ESGs) underwent systematic changes due to the 
introduction of stringent environmental standards in most developed countries in the 
1970s and 1980s. More specifically, I seek to explore whether countries that 
introduced more stringent environmental regulations in the 1970s and 1980s lost their
competitiveness in environmentally sensitive industries. For this purpose, a 
comprehensive dataset of trade flows of ESGs disaggregated to the four-digit level of
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the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) was compiled. This data set 
covers 31 years and 34 countries, accounting for nearly 80 per cent of world exports 
ofESGs in 1995.
This dataset is then analysed from two perspectives: (1) the export performance of 
ESGs in the initial period (1965) and the end period (1995) is compared; (2) the 
export performance of ESGs in the intervening years is examined. To investigate the 
export performance of ESGs between the initial period and the end period, I calculate 
the percentage change in export performance of normalised trade flows of ESGs 
matrix for each country. Surprisingly, I find that the export performance of ESGs for 
most countries remained unchanged between 1965 and 1995. A more rigorous 
statistical test of the association between the revealed comparative advantage in ESGs 
in 1965 and 1995 also reveals a strong association. To examine the export 
performance in ESGs in the intervening years, I calculate a normalised trade-share 
weighted export revealed comparative advantage index for each country in each year. 
The time-series patterns of this indicator for those countries that have higher 
environmental standards do not deteriorate in a systematic way. These results are 
rather robust when subjected to various sensitivity tests. To summarise, time-series 
evidence from the trade-in-goods approach suggests that the export pattern for ESGs 
did not undergo systematic change, despite the introduction of stringent 
environmental standards in most developed countries in the 1970s and 1980s.
Secondly, I provide time-series evidence on the trade effects of environmental policy 
using a different approach, namely a factor-content-of-trade approach. The 
environment in this approach is regarded as a factor of production. The concept of 
trade in embodied environmental factor services captures the idea that traded goods
160
embody an environmental factor service. If countries have different domestic 
environmental policies, the ability to pollute or the abundance of environmental 
services might differ. If the trade effects of domestic environment policy are 
significant, one would expect countries with stringent environmental regulations to 
have more embodied environmental factor services in their imports than their exports 
at each point in time, and that there would be systematic change in the pattern of 
embodied environmental factor services over time. The factor-content-of-trade 
approach is, therefore, a useful alternative to the trade-in-goods approach. In this 
approach, instead of using trade value to calculate net exports of environmental factor 
services, an approach taken in the literature, I use the trade-share-weighted average to 
impute the net export content of environmental factor services. I demonstrate that this 
modification removes possible biases from the effects of both inflation and 
macroeconomic imbalance. The result indicates that the net export content of 
environmental factor services for the majority of the countries in the study does not 
experience systematic structural change in the last 26 years, despite the introduction 
of stringent environmental regulations in most of the developed countries in the 1970s 
and 1980s. This observation is generally consistent with what I found using the trade- 
in-goods approach.
Thirdly, the observed time-series pattern is put into a multi-country econometric test 
using an extended gravity-equation framework. In this framework, bilateral exports 
depend on the countries’ size and wealth, degree of inward-orientation, geographic 
distance that measures the natural obstacles to trade between trading partners and 
‘artificial’ obstacles such as tariffs and environmental stringency. The extent of 
environmental stringency is measured by unique indices developed by the World 
Bank recently.
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We test the following two hypotheses. The first is more stringent environmental 
regulations lower total exports, and/or exports of ESGs, and/or exports of non- 
resource-based ESGs. The second is that new trade barriers emerge to offset the 
effects of more stringent environmental regulations.
Our findings reject both hypotheses. Overall, higher stringency of environmental 
regulations does not reduce total exports, exports of ESGs or exports of non-resource- 
based ESGs. We found no evidence to support the hypothesis that new trade barriers 
emerge to offset the effects of more stringent environmental regulations. Furthermore, 
higher import tariffs in trading partners are found to reduce significantly reporter 
countrys’ export performance in total exports, ESGs and non-resource-based ESG 
exports. These results support the empirical time-series observations using both the 
trade-in-goods-approach and the factor-content-of-trade approach, and appear to 
reflect the extent to which increases in the stringency of environmental regulations 
are accompanied by technological innovation which prevents the export performance 
of ESGs from deteriorating.
To explore the dynamic linkage between environmental regulation, technological 
innovation and growth, I set up an intertemporal dynamic general equilibrium model 
in which the more fundamental, dynamic determinant of a country’s long-run growth 
is its capacity for technological innovation. The physical setup of this model is 
basically along the lines of recent endogenous growth literature, especially Uzawa 
(1965), Lucas (1988) and Rebelo (1991). Three key features characterise the model. 
First, it is based on the intertemporal optimisation of representative agents in the 
economy. Second, ESGs are modelled as an intermediate good, which is used in the
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production of final consumption goods. Third, R&D takes place by means of a linear 
technology and is sector specific (to the intermediate goods sector). Firms with an 
R&D sector therefore have to make decisions about the allocation of the dynamic 
factor that can be accumulated. With the production function exhibiting constant 
returns to scale in the factor that is accumulated, equilibrium is characterised by 
endogenous growth.
Two important issues can be addressed using this framework. First, what are the 
effects of environmental regulation on long-run growth? Second, how important is 
technological innovation in determining the long-run growth? The basic findings are 
that (1) changes in the stringency of environmental regulations do not have long-run 
growth effects; and (2) technological innovation is an important determinant of a 
country’s long-run growth.
Fifthly and finally, I investigate the significance of the technology factor, as proposed 
both in the empirical study and the theoretical model above, in determining the 
international competitiveness of environmentally sensitive industries. For this 
purpose, a generalised GDP function, which incorporates both technology change and 
increasing returns to scale, is set up and a flexible translog function form is used to 
approximate this generalised GDP function. Seemingly unrelated regression 
estimation (SURE) techniques are used to estimate a system of sectoral share 
equations derived from the generalised GDP function. Environmental stringency is 
treated as a factor of production together with capital, labour, land, mineral, oil and 
coal endowments. The technology level is regarded as an important determinant of 
the sectoral share in production. The basic hypothesis is that environmental factor is
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not a significant determinant of international competitiveness of environmentally 
sensitive industries while technology is.
The econometric result suggests that the own-technology effects are all positive, as 
suggested by theory, and statistically significant at the 5 per cent level in most cases. 
However, the environmental stringency variable has only a negligible effect and is 
shown to be statistically insignificant in all sectors. This suggests that countries with 
less stringent environmental policy do not necessarily have higher sectoral shares of 
ESGs. While trade is not explicitly addressed, the implication for trade is 
straightforward: to the extent that countries have similar tastes, the inferences about 
the determinants of production pattern found here will translate into inferences about 
a country’s trade pattern (Harrigan 1997).
The idea conveyed through this piece of work is simple. The trade effects of domestic 
environmental policy can be better understood if one allows for the dynamic 
Ricardian technology factor in the conventional Heckscher-Ohlin framework. 
Innovation and subsequent increases in relative labour productivity, together with 
factor endowments, are important factors in determining the relationship between 
environmental regulation and international competitivenes.
Policy implications
Two policy implications follow from this study. The first relates to development 
strategy for developing countries as to growth, trade and environment. The second 
relates to the effectiveness of eco-dumping.
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Many developing countries have long seen environmental regulations and economic 
development as mutually exclusive. According to this view, to achieve rapid 
economic development and secure international competitiveness in environmentally 
sensitive industries, domestic environmental standards should not be stringent. To the 
extent that the environment has assumed a growing importance, this can be postponed 
until a high income level has been achieved. This perception has received 
considerable support from static cost-benefit analysis.
However, this idea is challenged by this study. This study has provided empirical 
time-series evidence across most of the countries involved in trade in ESGs. In 
general, I find that stringent environmental regulations did not reduce the 
international competitiveness of ESGs in the last three decades. The reason that 
higher domestic environmental regulations do not reduce competitiveness of ESGs is 
that environmental regulations appear to be productivity enhancing. Technological 
innovation is important in determining a country’s long-run growth.
In the light of this finding, I argue that environmental regulations and international 
competitiveness should not be treated as mutually exclusive. A development strategy 
that relies on lax environmental regulations to achieve the economic goals of 
developing countries may not be appropriate since technological innovation appears 
to be more relevant to trade competitiveness. There can be a compromise between 
environmental standards and international competitiveness. Development strategies 
for developing countries, therefore, can accommodate environmental standards. 
Economic development does not require lax environmental standards.
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Another closely related policy issue relates to the so-called ‘eco-dumping’ and ‘anti­
dumping’. This study suggests that less stringent environmental regulations do not 
increase the international competitiveness of ESGs. Hence, ‘eco-dumping’ appears to 
be ineffective in the light of the test. Debate on this issue should focus more on the 
facilitation of trade rather than restrictions on trade.
Directions for future research
The study provides a general but comprehensive picture of the effects on trade of 
domestic environmental policy. It suggests a number of useful directions for future 
research.
First, this study was constrained by the availability of the environmental stringency 
indices. The latest attempt by the World Bank has developed an index for 31 
countries on the basis of the UNCED national reports. This is a rather small sample, 
however. Furthermore, to what extent this aggregate index reflects the degree of 
environmental stringency, especially the degree of actual enforcement, remains to be 
explored. Eliste and Fredriksson (1998) have followed this line using the same 
methodology but focused only on agriculture. Construction of comparable time-series 
environmental stringency indices is important to future work.
Secondly, industry and country level studies are required if one is interested in 
assessing the difference of the effects of environmental regulation on individual 
industries and countries. Certainly, the methodology developed in this study, 
especially in Chapters 3 and 4, can be readily applied to this question. The sensitivity
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of different industries to changes in environmental regulation could also be traced in 
future.
Thirdly, the result that tighter environmental regulations appear to generate greater 
trade, as demonstrated in Chapter 5, is worthy of fuller investigation. The results from 
Chapter 5 rely heavily on the World Bank environmental stringency index. Further 
investigation may involve looking for sectoral environmental stringency and trade 
policy variables which are more focused on ESGs.
Fourthly, a more realistic theoretical model of the dynamic relationship between 
environmental regulations and competitiveness needs to be further developed. This 
could also be the focus of future study.
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